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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Paul Dolan; Richard Layard; Gillian Tett; Helen Ward |
| Abstract: | The late Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman had a long association with CEP. At an LSE event, Richard Layard, Gillian Tett and Paul Dolan discussed how his work influenced psychology, economics and society - and their experience of researching and debating with him. |
| Keywords: | behavioural economics, kahneman |
| Date: | 2025–02–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepcnp:697 |
| By: | Fidanoski, Filip; Dixit, Vinayak; Ortmann, Andreas |
| Abstract: | Luckman et al. (2018) experimentally tested the conjecture that a single model of risky intertemporal choice can account for both risky and intertemporal choices, and under the conditions of their experiment, found evidence supporting it. Given the existing literature, that is a remarkable result which warrants (conceptual) replication. Following a tradition in psychology, Luckman et al. (2018) had first-year psychology students participate that were rewarded with non-monetary course credits (see also Luckman et al., 2020). Proper incentivisation is a long-standing bone of contention among experimentally working economists and psychologists, last but not least when it comes to the elicitation of preferences of any kind. Another reason to be sceptical is that the experiment was not properly powered up; the no-difference results reported by the authors might be spurious. In our conceptual replication of Luckman et al. (2018), we find significant differences between the risky and intertemporal choices at both the group and individual level. We find further that there is no significant difference between choices made by participants that are paid a flat incentive and participants that are paid under the random incentive scheme, at the group level. We find that order effects matter for intertemporal choices, but not for risky choices. At the individual level, we find evidence in favour of the model that assumes a common value function, but separate choice functions. This result is robust across our incentive systems, and order of presentation, but sensitive to different prior distributions. |
| Keywords: | experimental practices, replication, risky intertemporal preferences, risk preferences, time preferences |
| JEL: | C11 C52 C91 D01 D81 D90 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:205 |
| By: | Robinson, James Alan; Vostroknutov, Alexander; Vostroknutova, Ekaterina |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a new framework to model institutions and institutional change. It shows how moral agents, who strive to cooperate with others, can form institutions that facilitate cooperation. The framework makes it possible to model informal as well as formal institutions as games played by moral agents: when the quality of the government is low and agents are not willing to use its services they will create informal institutions that allow them to cooperate outside the official channels. It is also possible to conceptualize institutions as inclusive or extractive and model institutional change as a consequence of the choice of moral agents among available institutions as time unfolds. With a series of examples of clientelistic networks, the paper shows that the framework can be useful for understanding how and why such networks form and persist. The framework can be used to model any interactions among moral agents, thus giving rise to a wide variety of possible institutional settings. |
| Date: | 2023–11–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:10600 |
| By: | Barbara Tversky |
| Abstract: | Following an LSE event discussing the legacy of Daniel Kahneman (5 March 1934 to 27 March 2024), Barbara Tversky remembers him and his work. |
| Date: | 2025–02–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepcnp:698 |