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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Resul Cesur; Sadullah Yıldırım |
| Abstract: | Evolutionary accounts assert that while diversity may lower subjective well-being (SWB) by creating an evolutionary mismatch between evolved psychological tendencies and the current social environment, human societies can adapt to diversity via intergroup contact under appropriate conditions. Exploiting a novel natural experiment in history, we examine the impact of the social environment, captured by population diversity, on SWB. We find that diversity lowers cognitive and hedonic measures of SWB. Diversity-induced deteriorations in the quality of the macrosocial environment, captured by reduced social cohesion, retarded state capacity, and increased inequality in economic opportunities, emerge as mechanisms explaining our findings. The analysis of first- and second-generation immigrants in Europe and the USA reveals that the misery of home country diversity persists even after neutralizing the role of the social environment. However, these effects diminish among the second generation, suggesting that long-term improvements in the social environment can alleviate the burden of diversity. Finally, in exploring whether human societies can adapt to diversity, we show evidence that diversity causes adopting cultural traits (such as establishing stronger family ties, assigning greater importance to friendships, and adopting a positive attitude towards competition) that can mitigate the misery of diversity. These results survive an exhaustive set of robustness checks. |
| JEL: | D60 D63 I30 I31 N30 Z13 |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33163 |
| By: | Yaroslav Rosokha; Xinxin Lyu; Denis Tverskoi; Sergey Gavrilets |
| Abstract: | We study cooperation among individuals and groups facing a dynamic social dilemma in which the benefits of cooperation are divided according to political power obtained in a contest. The main theoretical and experimental results focus on the role of the incumbency advantage. Specifically, an incumbency advantage in the political contest leads to a rapid breakdown of cooperation in the social dilemma. In addition, we investigate whether groups behave differently than individuals and provide simulations based on the individual evolutionary learning model of Arifovic and Ledyard (2012) to shed light on the difference observed in the experiment. |
| Keywords: | Dynamic Games, Cooperation, Coordination, Contest, Experiments, Group Decision Making |
| JEL: | C73 C92 D91 |
| Date: | 2024–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pur:prukra:1350 |
| By: | Hung Truong |
| Abstract: | Is gender identity binary or nonbinary? My analysis shows that while both are possible, the latter is a more attracting equilibrium under an adaptive learning perspective. I frame the gender identity problem as a modified \textit{battle of the sexes} game, where individuals define their gender identity under pairwise matching motives. From a baseline game-theoretical standpoint, I demonstrate that the binary-only world and the nonbinary-only world are both Nash equilibria in the stage game and are locally stable in the infinitely repeated game. Thus, any state of gender identity could theoretically persist. I then adopt a genetic learning algorithm as an equilibrium selection criterion to investigate evolutionary dynamics further and provide a rationale for the transition from binary to nonbinary gender identity. Specifically, in a binary-origin world, divergence occurs as individuals identifying as nonbinary gender evolve to become the majority due to their higher flexibility in matching outcomes. My framework captures how adaptive learning drives identity evolution, offering a parsimonious tool to analyze how diversity and exclusivity emerge in varying economic environments. |
| Date: | 2024–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2412.10959 |
| By: | Jakub Bielawski; {\L}ukasz Cholewa; Fryderyk Falniowski |
| Abstract: | Precise description of population game dynamics introduced by revision protocols - an economic model describing the agent's propensity to switch to a better-performing strategy - is of importance in economics and social sciences in general. In this setting innovation or imitation of others is the force which drives the evolution of the economic system. As the continuous-time game dynamics is relatively well understood, the same cannot be said about revision driven dynamics in the discrete time. We investigate the behavior of agents in a $2\times 2$ anti-coordination game with symmetric random matching and a unique mixed Nash equilibrium. In continuous time the Nash equilibrium is attracting and induces a global evolutionary stable state. We show that in the discrete time one can construct (either innovative or imitative) revision protocol and choose a level of the time step, under which the game dynamics is Li-Yorke chaotic, inducing complex and unpredictable behavior of the system, precluding stable predictions of equilibrium. Moreover, we reveal that this unpredictability is encoded into any imitative revision protocol. Furthermore, we show that for any such game there exists a perturbed pairwise proportional imitation protocol introducing chaotic behavior of the agents for sufficiently large time step. |
| Date: | 2024–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2412.06037 |
| By: | Dongwoo Lee; Gavin Kader |
| Abstract: | As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used for a variety of complex and critical tasks, it is vital to assess their logical capabilities in strategic environments. This paper examines their ability in strategic reasoning -- the process of choosing an optimal course of action by predicting and adapting to other agents' behavior. Using six LLMs, we analyze responses from play in classical games from behavioral economics (p-Beauty Contest, 11-20 Money Request Game, and Guessing Game) and evaluate their performance through hierarchical models of reasoning (level-$k$ theory and cognitive hierarchy theory). Our findings reveal that while LLMs show understanding of the games, the majority struggle with higher-order strategic reasoning. Although most LLMs did demonstrate learning ability with games involving repeated interactions, they still consistently fall short of the reasoning levels demonstrated by typical behavior from human subjects. The exception to these overall findings is with OpenAI's GPT-o1 -- specifically trained to solve complex reasoning tasks -- which consistently outperforms other LLMs and human subjects. These findings highlight the challenges and pathways in advancing LLMs toward robust strategic reasoning from the perspective of behavioral economics. |
| Date: | 2024–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2412.13013 |
| By: | Minhyeok Lee |
| Abstract: | Human cultural complexity did not arise in a vacuum. Scholars in the humanities and social sciences have long debated how ecological factors, such as climate and resource availability, enabled early hunter-gatherers to allocate time and energy beyond basic subsistence tasks. This paper presents a formal, interdisciplinary approach that integrates theoretical modeling with computational methods to examine whether conditions that allow lower spoilage of stored food, often associated with colder climates and abundant large fauna, could indirectly foster the emergence of cultural complexity. Our contribution is twofold. First, we propose a mathematical framework that relates spoilage rates, yield levels, resource management skills, and cultural activities. Under this framework, we prove that lower spoilage and adequate yields reduce the frequency of hunting, thus freeing substantial time for cultural pursuits. Second, we implement a reinforcement learning simulation, inspired by engineering optimization techniques, to validate the theoretical predictions. By training agents in different $(Y, p)$ environments, where $Y$ is yield and $p$ is the probability of daily spoilage, we observe patterns consistent with the theoretical model: stable conditions with lower spoilage strongly correlate with increased cultural complexity. While we do not claim to replicate prehistoric social realities directly, our results suggest that ecologically stable niches provided a milieu in which cultural forms could germinate and evolve. This study, therefore, offers an integrative perspective that unites humanistic inquiries into the origins of culture with the formal rigor and exploratory power of computational modeling. |
| Date: | 2024–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2412.09335 |
| By: | Jang, Haneul; Redhead, Daniel |
| Abstract: | Cultural transmission across generations is key to cumulative cultural evolution. While several mechanisms—such as vertical, horizontal, and oblique transmission—have been studied for decades, how these mechanisms change across the life course, beyond childhood. Furthermore, it remains under-explored whether different mechanisms apply to distinct forms of learning processes: long-term learning—where individuals invest time and effort to acquire skills—and short-term learning—where individuals share information of immediate use. To investigate the network structure of these two types of knowledge transmission—long-term learning of foraging skills and short-term learning of food location information—we present social network data (1, 633 nominations) collected from all 132 inhabitants (aged 4 to 75) of a BaYaka community in the Republic of the Congo. Applying latent network models that estimate and adjust for measurement biases typical to self-reported data, we find that the demographic structure of a population—age distribution, sex, kinship, and marriage—shapes the dynamics of community-wide knowledge transmission. Foraging skills are transmitted within smaller, sparser networks with limited reciprocity, whereas food location information is exchanged more widely and reciprocally among peers. Both long-term and short-term knowledge transmission extend into adulthood, with adults learning from older adults, peers, and marital partners, and sharing knowledge with younger generations. Crucially, individuals tend to report more accurately about the partners with whom they shared knowledge than about those from whom they received knowledge. Our findings provide important empirical evidence on how community-wide cultural transmission is structured by demography and perception, and how these factors operate across different learning processes in a real-world foraging society. |
| Date: | 2025–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:130134 |
| By: | Arnaud Deseau (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, AMU - Aix Marseille Université) |
| Abstract: | The Malthusian trap is a well recognized source of stagnation in per capita income prior to industrialization. However, previous studies have found mixed evidence about its exact strength. This article contributes to this ongoing debate by estimating the speed of convergence for a panel of 9 preindustrial European economies over a long period of time (14th–18th century). The analysis relies on a calibrated Malthusian model for England and -convergence regressions. I find evidence of significant differences in the strength of the Malthusian trap between preindustrial European economies. The strongest estimated Malthusian trap is in Sweden, with a half-life of 20 years. The weakest estimated Malthusian trap is in England, with a half-life of about 230 years. This implies that some preindustrial economies were able to experience prolonged variations in their standards of living after a shock, while still being subject to Malthusian stagnation in the long run. |
| Keywords: | Convergence, Homeostasis, Malthusian trap, Preventive checks, Positive checks, Malthusian model, Beta-convergence |
| Date: | 2024–10–26 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04828757 |
| By: | Luigi Guiso; Paola Sapienza; Luigi Zingales |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how the concept of embedded culture played a transformative role in the ongoing cultural revolution within economics and business. We trace the field's shift from the 20th-century concept of homo economicus universalis to an approach incorporating cultural embeddedness in economic behavior. Beyond documenting this intellectual transformation, we identify fertile areas for future research and explore how an embedded cultural perspective can enhance both our understanding of economic phenomena and the design of effective policies. |
| JEL: | D21 M14 Z1 Z13 |
| Date: | 2024–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33268 |