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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Nurfatima Jandarova (Tampere University, Finnish Centre of Excellence in Tax Systems Research (FIT)); Aldo Rustichini (University of Minnesota) |
| Abstract: | We analyze the evolution of the distribution of genotypes in European populations over the past 14, 000 years. In our model, evolution is driven by selection operating after a shift in the productivity of agriculture, induced by the post-Younger Dryas climate change, in a Roy model where individuals self-select into one of two sectors, foraging and farming. The model extends a standard Wright-Fisher model to include two technologies and sexual reproduction. We test the model in two data sets, ancient and modern DNA, matching the observed distributions of genetic variables (allele frequencies and lineages). We show that a shift in the distribution of allele frequencies in a direction favoring higher cognitive ability, occurred when climate warming changed the relative productivity of agriculture and foraging. The general implication we draw is that historical transformations (e.g., climate change and technological change) may affect the distribution of genotype and thus economic equilibria and institutions. |
| Keywords: | technological change, occupational choice, individual characteristics, genetic transmission, population genetics |
| JEL: | E71 J24 O33 |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fit:wpaper:27 |
| By: | Breitkopf, Laura; Chowdhury, Shyamal; Priyam, Shambhavi; Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah; Sutter, Matthias |
| Abstract: | We study the relationship between parenting style and a broad range of children's skills and outcomes. Based on survey and experimental data from 5, 580 children and their parents, we find that children exposed to positive parenting have higher IQs, are more altruistic, open to new experiences, conscientious, and agreeable, have a higher locus of control, self-control, and self-esteem, perform better in scholarly achievement tests, behave more prosocially in everyday life, and are more satisfied with their life. Positive parenting is negatively associated with children's neuroticism, patience, engagement in risky behaviors, and their emotional and behavioral problems. |
| Keywords: | parenting style, child outcomes, economic preferences, personality traits, IQ |
| JEL: | C91 D01 D10 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:304410 |
| By: | Chen, Frederick (Wake Forest University, Economics Department); He, Haosen (University of California, Berkeley); Yu, Chu A.(Alex) (Wake Forest University, Economics Department) |
| Abstract: | We formulate and numerically solve a game-theoretic model of rational agents' self-protective actions in an epidemic game with information delay. We then compare our model simulation results with data collected from real human players in an online experiment conducted by Chen et al (2013). We find that, compared with game-theoretic agents, human players receive poorer endgame outcomes due to a lack of synchronization in their self-protective actions. In addition, human players' decisions are dependent on their infection history, and they are less responsive to changes in disease prevalence compared to game-theoretic agents. Our results suggest that human players in the epidemic game differ substantially from fully rational, forward-looking, strategic agents in terms of both player outcomes and decision-making mechanisms. |
| Keywords: | Game theory; Dynamic game; Economic epidemiology; Mathematical epidemiology; Epidemics; Information delay; Coninuous-state dynamic programming; Numerical simulation |
| JEL: | C63 C73 I12 |
| Date: | 2024–10–22 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:wfuewp:0119 |
| By: | Cuimin Ba (University of Pittsburgh); J. Aislinn Bohren (University of Pennsylvania); Alex Imas (University of Chicago) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores how cognitive constraints—namely, attention and processing capacity—interact with properties of the learning environment to determine how people react to information. In our model, people form a simplified mental representation of the environment via salience-channeled attention, then process information with cognitive imprecision. The model predicts overreaction to information when environments are complex, signals are noisy, information is surprising, or priors are concentrated on less salient states; it predicts underreaction when environments are simple, signals are precise, information is expected, or priors are concentrated on salient states. Results from a series of pre-registered experiments provide support for these predictions and direct evidence for the proposed cognitive mechanisms. We show that the two psychological mechanisms act as cognitive complements: their interaction is critical for explaining belief data and together they yield a highly complete model in terms of capturing explainable variation in belief-updating. Our theoretical and empirical results connect disparate findings in prior work: underreaction is typically found in laboratory studies, which feature simple learning settings, while overreaction is more prevalent in financial markets which feature greater complexity. |
| Keywords: | overreaction, underreaction, beliefs, noisy cognition, representativeness, bounded rationality, attention, mental representation, completeness, restrictiveness, behavioral economics, learning, forecasting, inference |
| Date: | 2024–08–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pen:papers:24-030 |
| By: | Eugen Dimant; Fabio Galeotti; Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - EM - EMLyon Business School - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We investigate how individuals select sources of information about peers' behavior and normative views, and the influence of this social information on individual behavior and both empirical and normative expectations. This is explored through two experiments (N=1, 945; N=2, 414) using a lying game, with and without known political identification. Our findings reveal a self-serving bias in the selection of information sources, with a preference for lenient sources (i.e., those presenting more tolerant empirical or normative information about lying), particularly when these sources align with an individual's political identity. We observe that being exposed to information that suggests lying is more socially acceptable increases lying behavior. Additionally, while people's normative expectations are not swayed by observing their peers' actions, these expectations are influenced by information about what peers believe is the right thing to do, underscoring the role of normative information in shaping social norms. |
| Keywords: | Social norms, Information acquisition, Peer effects, Group identity, Lying, Experiment |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04740082 |