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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Rustagi, Devesh (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | Does self-governance, a hallmark of democratic societies, foster norms of generalized cooperation? Does this effect persist, and if so, why? I investigate these questions using a natural experiment in Switzerland. In the middle-ages, the absence of an heir resulted in the extinction of a prominent noble dynasty. As a result, some Swiss municipalities became self-governing, whereas the others remained under feudalism for another 600 years. Evidence from a behavioral experiment, World Values Survey, and Swiss Household Panel consistently shows that individuals from historically self-governing municipalities exhibit stronger norms of cooperation today. Referenda data on voter-turnout allow me to trace these effects on individually costly and socially beneficial actions for over 150 years. Furthermore, norms of cooperation map into prosocial behaviors like charitable giving and environmental protection. Uniquely, Switzerland tracks every family’s place of origin in registration data, which I use to demonstrate persistence from cultural transmission in a context of historically low migration. |
| Keywords: | Self-governance ; norms of cooperation ; cultural transmission ; public goods game ; referendum ; Switzerland JEL Codes: D02 ; H41 ; N43 ; Z10 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1510 |
| By: | Christopher Graser (University of Amsterdam); Matthijs van Veelen (University of Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | We consider the repeated prisoner’s dilemma with implementation errors, and look at the resulting population dynamics, both analytically and with simulations. We show that with implementation errors, pure equilibrium strategies represented by finite state automata exhibit a structure that we call self-mirroring. Because selection easily spreads thinly on subgames that are reached after (multiple) errors, we find that in the simulations, strategies are often not best respond- ing in all subgames. We also explore how forgiveness and cooperation respond to changes in the error rate and the continuation probability. Close to an error rate of 0, both show a hump-shaped pattern. We also explore how forgiveness and cooperation change with the error rate in models with a limited strategy set, and we have results for forgiveness at high error rates and/or low continuation probabilities. |
| JEL: | C73 |
| Date: | 2024–04–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20240022 |