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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Leopoldo Fergusson; José-Alberto Guerra; James A. Robinson |
| Abstract: | Since formal rules can only partially reduce opportunistic behavior, third-party sanctioning to promote fairness is critical to achieving desirable social outcomes. Social norms may underpin such behavior, but they can also undermine it. We study one such norm the "don’t be a toad" norm, as it is referred to in Colombia that tells people to mind their own business and not snitch on others. In a set of fairness games where a third party can punish unfair behavior, but players can invoke the "don’t be a toad" norm, we find that the mere possibility of invoking this norm completely reverses the benefits of third-party sanctioning to achieve fair social outcomes. We establish this is an anti-social norm in a well-defined sense: most players consider it inappropriate, yet they expect the majority will invoke it. To understand this phenomenon we develop an evolutionary model of endogenous social norm transmission and demonstrate that a payoff advantage from adherence to the norm in social dilemmas, combined with sufficient heterogeneity in the disutility of those who view the norm as inappropriate, can generate the apparent paradox of an anti-social norm in the steady-state equilibrium. We provide further evidence that historical exposure to political violence, which increased the ostracization of snitches, raised sensitivity to this norm. |
| JEL: | C91 D74 D91 N46 |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32717 |
| By: | Gill, David (Purdue University); Knepper, Zachary (Purdue University); Prowse, Victoria L. (Purdue University); Zhou, Junya (University of Texas at Dallas) |
| Abstract: | We explore the influence of cognitive ability and judgment on strategic behavior in the beauty contest game (where the Nash equilibrium action is zero). Using the level-k model of bounded rationality, cognitive ability and judgment both predict higher level strategic thinking. However, individuals with better judgment choose zero less frequently, and we uncover a novel dynamic mechanism that sheds light on this pattern. Taken together, our results indicate that fluid (i.e., analytical) intelligence is a primary driver of strategic level-k thinking, while facets of judgment that are distinct from fluid intelligence drive the lower inclination of high judgment individuals to choose zero. |
| Keywords: | cognitive ability, judgment, fluid intelligence, matrix reasoning, beauty contest, strategic sophistication, level-k, experiment, game theory |
| JEL: | C92 C72 D91 |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17168 |
| By: | Susan E. Perry (Unknown); Alecia Carter (Unknown); Jacob Foster (Unknown); Sabine Noebel (Unknown, IAST - Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse); Marco Smolla (Unknown) |
| Abstract: | Although anthropology was the first academic discipline to investigate cultural change, many other disciplines have made noteworthy contributions to understanding what influences the adoption of new behaviors. Drawing on a broad, interdisciplinary literature covering both humans and nonhumans, we examine (1) which features of behavioral traits make them more transmissible, (2) which individual characteristics of inventors promote copying of their inventions, (3) which characteristics of individuals make them more prone to adopting new behaviors, (4) which characteristics of dyadic relationships promote cultural transmission, (5) which properties of groups (e.g., network structures) promote transmission of traits, and (6) which characteristics of groups promote retention, rather than extinction, of cultural traits. One of anthropology's strengths is its readiness to adopt and improve theories and methods from other disciplines, integrating them into a more holistic approach; hence, we identify approaches that might be particularly useful to biological and cultural anthro pologists, and knowledge gaps that should be filled. |
| Keywords: | cultural change, innovation, cultural diffusion, social learning |
| Date: | 2022–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03947000 |
| By: | Gabriele Camera (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University); James Gilmore (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University); Marilyn Giselle Hazlett (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University); Jason Shachat (Durham University, Durham University Business School); Bochen Zhu (Wuhan University, Economics and Management School) |
| Abstract: | We study within- and cross-culture interaction in a Stag Hunt game, using a controlled online experiment with Chinese and American participants. We fnd that cross-culture interactions can have a positive impact on efciency. American participants, particularly females, more frequently selected the efcient but risky action when facing a Chinese counterpart. Chinese male participants, instead, less frequently selected the efcient but risky action when facing an American counterpart. These behavioral asymmetries do not support the notion of cultural equivalence, nor the hypothesis that multiculturalism fosters strategic uncertainty. |
| Keywords: | Coordination games, Online experiment, Cultural biases, Gender diferences. |
| JEL: | C92 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:24-13 |
| By: | Paola Giuliano; Antonio Spilimbergo |
| Abstract: | A growing body of work has shown that aggregate shocks affect the formation of preferences and beliefs. This article reviews evidence from sociology, social psychology, and economics to assess the relevance of aggregate shocks, whether the period in which they are experienced matters, and whether they alter preferences and beliefs permanently. We review the literature on recessions, inflation experiences, trade shocks, and aggregate non-economic shocks including migrations, wars, terrorist attacks, pandemics, and natural disasters. For each aggregate shock, we discuss the main empirical methodologies, their limitations, and their comparability across studies, outlining possible mechanisms whenever available. A few conclusions emerge consistently across the reviewed papers. First, aggregate shocks impact many preferences and beliefs, including political preferences, risk attitudes, and trust in institutions. Second, the effect of shocks experienced during young adulthood is stronger and longer lasting. Third, negative aggregate economic shocks generally move preferences and beliefs to the right of the political spectrum, while the effects of non-economic adverse shocks are more heterogeneous and depend on the context. |
| JEL: | E0 P0 Z11 |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32669 |