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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Gräbner-Radkowitsch, Claudius; Kapeller, Jakob |
| Abstract: | This entry discusses the concept of "systemism", elaborates how it implicitly underpinned most seminal works of evolutionary-institutional economics, and explains how future research would benefit from making the systemist nature of evolutionary economics more explicit. More precisely, the paper clarifies the ontological and epistemological claims associated with systemism, and describes how the explicit use of systemism can support a pluralist meta-paradigm in heterodox economics and political economy in general, and evolutionary-institutional economics research in particular. |
| Keywords: | Evolution, Institutions, Ontology, Epistemology, Models, Multi-Level Theorising, Emergence, Complexity |
| JEL: | B15 B25 B52 B55 C69 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifsowp:300520 |
| By: | Radoslaw (Radek) Stefanski; Alex Trew |
| Abstract: | The interest rate has been steadily falling for centuries. A process of selection that leads to increasing societal patience is key to explaining this decline. Three observations point to the potential role of this mechanism: patience varies across individuals, patience is inter-generationally persistent, and patience is positively related to fertility. A calibrated dynamic, heterogenous-agent model of fertility permits us to isolate the quantitative contribution of this mechanism. Selection can explain most of the decline in the interest rate over seven centuries, a fact that is robust to a number of model extensions. Quantitative implications are consistent with other facts, such as the steady increase in the investment rate since 1300. |
| Keywords: | Interest rates; selection; fertility; patience; heterogenous agents. |
| JEL: | E21 E43 J11 N30 O11 |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gla:glaewp:2023_01 |
| By: | Fergusson, Leopoldo (Universidad de los Andes); Guerra, José-Alberto (Universidad de los Andes); Robinson, James A. (University of Chicago) |
| Abstract: | Since formal rules can only partially reduce opportunistic behavior, third-party sanctioning to promote fairness is critical to achieving desirable social outcomes. Social norms may underpin such behavior, but they can also undermine it. We study one such norm —the “don’t be a toad” norm, as it is referred to in Colombia— that tells people to mind their own business and not snitch on others. In a set of fairness games where a third party can punish unfair behavior, but players can invoke the “don’t be a toad” norm, we find that the mere possibility of invoking this norm completely reverses the benefits of third-party sanctioning to achieve fair social outcomes. We establish this is an anti-social norm in a well-defined sense: most players consider it inappropriate, yet they expect the majority will invoke it. To understand this phenomenon we develop an evolutionary model of endogenous social norm transmission and demonstrate that a payoff advantage from adherence to the norm in social dilemmas, combined with sufficient heterogeneity in the disutility of those who view the norm as inappropriate, can generate the apparent paradox of an anti-social norm in the steady-state equilibrium. We provide further evidence that historical exposure to political violence, which increased the ostracization of snitches, raised sensitivity to this norm. |
| Keywords: | social norms; fairness; long-run effects of conflict; laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D30 D74 D91 N46 |
| Date: | 2024–07–17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000089:021159 |
| By: | Gräbner-Radkowitsch, Claudius; Kapeller, Jakob |
| Abstract: | This short paper explains the theory of path dependence and clarifies its relation to concepts such as positive feedback or lock-in, arguing that path dependence is a core theoretical element of political economy in general, and institutional and evolutionary economics in particular. We first clarify the core conceptual elements of path dependence, show how it is relevant in a wide variety of problems and approaches, and situate these diverse applications in a common theoretical understanding that can be synthesized as a general mechanism. We then discuss the different ways in which path dependence has been theorized in evolutionary-institutional economics and related schools of thought. Finally, we present some archetypical models of path dependent processes. |
| JEL: | B15 B25 B52 B55 C69 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifsowp:300261 |
| By: | Pierre-Alex Balland; Ron Boschma; ; ; |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes an evolutionary take on regional development traps. Our definition of regional traps centers around the structural inability of regions to develop new complex activities. We distinguish between several different traps. Using industry data, we follow European regions over time and provide evidence on which regions in the EU are trapped, and what kinds of traps they have fallen into. Our econometric analysis shows that being trapped has a negative impact on employment and wage growth in regions. We also find evidence that our development trap indicator explains well whether regions are stuck in a regional development trap, as defined by Iammarino et al. (2020). |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:egu:wpaper:2420 |
| By: | Florens Pfann (Maastricht University); Gerard Pfann (Maastricht University) |
| Abstract: | Variation in trust positively explains variation in patience. Across countries, this presentation |
| Date: | 2024–06–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boc:fsug24:02 |