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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Daniele Nosenzo (Aarhus Univeristy, Denmark); Erte Xiao (Monash University, Australia); Nina Xue (Monash University, Australia) |
| Abstract: | The literature on punishment and prosocial behavior has presented conflicting findings. In some settings, punishment crowds out prosocial behavior and backfires; in others, however, it promotes prosociality. We examine whether the punisher’s motives can help reconcile these results through a novel experiment in which the agent’s outcomes are identical in two environments, but in one the pre-emptive punishment scheme is self-serving (i.e., potentially benefits the punisher), while in the other it is other-regarding (i.e., potentially benefits a third party). We find that self-serving punishment reduces the social stigma of selfish behavior, while other-regarding punishment does not. Self-serving punishment is thus less effective at encouraging compliance and is more likely to backfire. We further show that the normative message is somewhat weaker when punishment is less costly for the punisher. Our findings have implications for the design of punishment mechanisms and highlight the importance of the punisher’s motives in expressing norms. |
| Keywords: | punishment, norms, stigma, crowd out, expressive function of punishment |
| JEL: | C91 C72 D02 |
| Date: | 2024–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2024-09&r= |
| By: | Mesoudi, Alex (University of Exeter); Jimenez, Angel V; Jensen, Keith; Chang, Lei |
| Abstract: | Cumulative cultural evolution, where populations accumulate ever-improving knowledge, technologies and social customs, is arguably a unique feature of human sociality and responsible for our species’ ecological dominance of the planet. However, at the heart of cumulative cultural evolution is a cooperative dilemma. Assuming asocial learning is more costly than social learning, social learners can act as ‘information free-riders’ by copying innovations from asocial learners without paying the cost. This cost asymmetry will reduce innovation, inhibiting cumulative culture. Innovators might respond by protecting their knowledge and keeping the benefits to themselves – ‘information hoarding’ - but then others cannot build on their discoveries and again cumulative culture is inhibited. Here we formally model information free-riding and information hoarding within a cumulative cultural evolution framework using both analytical and agent-based models. Model 1 identifies the restrictive conditions under which information sharing can evolve in the face of information free-riding and hoarding. Models 2-4 then show how three mechanisms known to favour cooperation in non-informational contexts - kin selection, reputation-based partner choice and cultural group selection – can also solve the informational cooperative dilemma and facilitate cumulative cultural evolution, each with distinct signatures potentially detectable in historical, ethnographic and other empirical data. |
| Date: | 2024–05–26 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:a9zty&r= |
| By: | Molho, Catherine; Peña, Jorge; Singh, Manvir; Derex, Maxime |
| Abstract: | Norms and institutions enable large-scale human cooperation by creating shared expectations and changing individuals’ incentives via monitoring or sanctioning. Like material technologies, these social technologies satisfy instrumental ends and solve difficult problems. However, the similarities and differences between the evolution of material technologies and the evolution of social technologies remain unresolved. Here, we review evidence suggesting that, compared to the evolution of material technologies, institutional and normative evolution exhibits constraints in the production of variation and the selection of useful variants. These constraints stem from the frequency-dependent nature of social technologies and limit the pace and scope of normative and institutional evolution. We conclude by reviewing research on the social transmission of institutions and norms and highlighting an experimental paradigm to study their cultural evolution. |
| Keywords: | Institutions; norms; technology; social learning; cultural evolution |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:129408&r= |
| By: | Snir, Avichai; Levy, Dudi; Wang, Dian; Chen, Haipeng (Allan); Levy, Daniel |
| Abstract: | Many experimental studies report that economics students tend to act more selfishly than students of other disciplines, a finding that received widespread public and professional attention. Two main explanations that the existing literature offers for the differences found in the behavior between economists and non-economists are: (i) the selection effect, and (ii) the indoctrination effect. We offer an alternative, novel explanation: we argue that these differences can be explained by differences in the interpretation of the context. We test this hypothesis by conducting two social dilemma experiments in the US and Israel with participants from both economics and non-economics majors. In the experiments, participants face a tradeoff between profit maximization (market norm) and workers’ welfare (social norm). We use priming to manipulate the cues that the participants receive before they make their decision. We find that when participants receive cues signaling that the decision has an economic context, both economics and non-economics students tend to maximize profits. When the participants receive cues emphasizing social norms, on the other hand, both economics and non-economics students are less likely to maximize profits. We conclude that some of the differences found between the decisions of economics and non-economics students can be explained by contextual cues. |
| Keywords: | Selection; Indoctrination; Self-Interest; Market Norms; Social Norms; Economic Man; Rational Choice; Fairness; Experimental Economics; Laboratory Experiments; Priming; Economists vs. Non-Economists; Behavioral Economics |
| JEL: | A11 A12 A13 A20 B40 C90 C91 D01 D63 D91 P10 |
| Date: | 2024–04–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:120871&r= |
| By: | Adam S. Tuzolele Mbuku (Université catholique du Congo - Université catholique du Congo) |
| Abstract: | Historically, Homo Economicus has been conceptualized as a perfectly rational individual who always seeks to maximize his utility. However, this assumption has been challenged by recent discoveries in neuroeconomics, which suggest that emotions and neural processes play a key role in economic decision-making. We have examined a variety of research works in the field of neuroeconomics, including those that explore the interaction between emotion and deliberation, the role of emotions in economic decisions, and how neural structures and mechanisms influence economic choices. These works have highlighted the importance of emotions in economic decision-making and have challenged the traditional assumption of Homo Economicus. Furthermore, we have explored how discoveries in neuroeconomics can help improve existing economic models by integrating knowledge about brain functioning. We have also discussed the potential implications of neuroeconomics for economic policy, particularly in the context of the Democratic Republic of Congo. |
| Abstract: | Historiquement, l'Homo Economicus a été conceptualisé comme un individu parfaitement rationnel qui cherche toujours à maximiser son utilité. Cependant, cette hypothèse a été remise en question par les découvertes récentes en neuroéconomie, qui suggèrent que les émotions et les processus neuronaux jouent un rôle clé dans la prise de décision économique. Nous avons examiné une variété de travaux de recherche dans le domaine de la neuroéconomie, y compris ceux qui explorent l'interaction entre émotion et délibération, le rôle des émotions dans les décisions économiques, et comment les structures et les mécanismes neuronaux influencent les choix économiques. Ces travaux ont mis en évidence l'importance des émotions dans la prise de décision économique et ont remis en question l'hypothèse traditionnelle de l'homo economicus. En outre, nous avons exploré comment les découvertes en neuroéconomie peuvent aider à améliorer les modèles économiques existants en intégrant les connaissances sur le fonctionnement du cerveau. Nous avons également discuté des implications potentielles de la neuroéconomie pour la politique économique, en particulier dans le contexte de la République Démocratique du Congo. |
| Keywords: | Neuroeconomics, Cognitive biases, Behavioral economics, Economic model, Homo economicus, Neuroéconomie, Biais cognitifs, Économie comportementale, Modèle économique |
| Date: | 2024–04–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04564775&r= |