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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Depetris-Chauvin, Emilio; Özak, Ömer (Southern Methodist University) |
| Abstract: | We explore the effect of historical ethnic borders on contemporary conflict in Africa. We document that the intensive and extensive margins of contemporary conflict are higher close to historical ethnic borders. Exploiting variations across artificial regions within an ethnicity's historical homeland and a theory-based instrumental variable approach, we find that regions crossed by historical ethnic borders have 27 percentage points higher probability of conflict and 7.9 percentage points higher probability of being the initial location of a conflict. We uncover several key underlying mechanisms: competition for agricultural land, population pressure, cultural similarity, and weak property rights. |
| Date: | 2024–05–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:k76mt&r=evo |
| By: | Avichai Snir; Dudi Levy; Dian Wang; Haipeng Allan Chen; Daniel Levy |
| Abstract: | Many experimental studies report that economics students tend to act more selfishly than students of other disciplines, a finding that received widespread public and professional attention. Two main explanations that the existing literature offers for the differences found in the behavior between economists and noneconomists are the selection effect, and the indoctrination effect. We offer an alternative, novel explanation. We argue that these differences can be explained by differences in the interpretation of the context. We test this hypothesis by conducting two social dilemma experiments in the US and Israel with participants from both economics and non-economics majors. In the experiments, participants face a tradeoff between profit maximization, that is the market norm and workers welfare, that is the social norm. We use priming to manipulate the cues that the participants receive before they make their decision. We find that when participants receive cues signaling that the decision has an economic context, both economics and non-economics students tend to maximize profits. When the participants receive cues emphasizing social norms, on the other hand, both economics and non-economics students are less likely to maximize profits. We conclude that some of the differences found between the decisions of economics and non-economics students can be explained by contextual cues. |
| Date: | 2024–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2405.03893&r=evo |
| By: | Nicolas Jacquemet (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Jason F. Shogren (Departement of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming - UW - University of Wyoming); Adam Zylbersztejn (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Stéphane Luchini (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Social norms like the mutual belief in reciprocity facilitate economic exchange. But this reciprocity norm requires trust among traders, which can be challenging to create among strangers even with communication. The honesty oath is a time-honored mechanism that societies use to overcome this challenge-taking a solemn oath to tell the truth sends a trustworthy signal of real economic commitment given incomplete contracts. Herein we explore how the truth-telling oath creates trust within the sequential reciprocity trust game with pre-play, fixed-form, and cheap-talk communication. Four key results emerge: (1) communication under oath creates more trust and cooperative behavior; but (2) the oath induces a selection effect-it makes people more wary of using communication as a signal. (3) Although the overall net effect on cooperation is positive, the oath cannot reverse a general decay of cooperation over time. (4) By comparing the oath's performance to mild and deterrent fines for deception, we find that the oath is behaviorally equivalent to mild fines. The deterrent fine induces the highest level of cooperation. |
| Keywords: | fine, Trust game, cooperation, communication, commitment, deception, oath |
| Date: | 2023–07–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-04391214&r=evo |
| By: | Alger, Ingela; Rivero-Wildemauwe, José Ignacio |
| Abstract: | We conduct a laboratory experiment using framing to assess the willing-ness to “sell a lemon”, i.e., to undertake an action that benefits self but hurts the other (the “buyer”). We seek to disentangle the role of other-regarding preferences and (Kan-tian) moral concerns, and to test if it matters whether the decision is described in neutral terms or as a market situation. When evaluating an action, morally motivated individuals consider what their own payo would be if—hypothetically—the roles were reversed and the other subject chose the same action (universalization). We vary the salience of role uncertainty, thus varying the ease for participants to envisage the role-reversal scenario. We find that subjects are (1) more likely to “sell a lemon” in the market frame, and (2) less likely to do so when the role uncertainty is salient. We also structurally estimate other-regarding and Kantian moral concern parameters. |
| Keywords: | market framing; lemons; social preferences; Kantian morality; experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D01 D91 |
| Date: | 2024–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:129328&r=evo |
| By: | Ingar Haaland (NHH Norwegian School of Economics); Christopher Roth (University of Cologne); Stefanie Stantcheva (Harvard University); Johannes Wohlfart (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen) |
| Abstract: | We survey the recent literature in economics measuring what is on top of people’s minds using open-ended questions. We first provide an overview of studies in political economy, macroeconomics, finance, labor economics, and behavioral economics that have employed such measurement. We next describe different ways of measuring the considerations that are on top of people’s minds. We also provide an overview of methods to annotate and analyze such data. Next, we discuss different types of applications, including the measurement of motives, mental models, narratives, attention, information transmission, and recall. Our review highlights the potential of using open-ended questions to gain a deeper understanding of mechanisms underlying observed choices and expectations. |
| Keywords: | Thoughts, Open-ended Questions, Text Data, Methodology, Surveys, Qualitative Research. |
| JEL: | C90 D83 D91 |
| Date: | 2024–05–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kucebi:2410&r=evo |
| By: | Charlotte Cordes; Jana Friedrichsen; Simeon Schudy |
| Abstract: | Procrastination is often attributed to time-inconsistent preferences but may also arise when individuals derive anticipatory utility from holding optimistic beliefs about their future effort costs. This study provides a rigorous empirical test for this notion of ‘motivated procrastination’. In a longitudinal experiment over four weeks, individuals must complete a cumbersome task of unknown length. We find that exogenous variation in scope for motivated reasoning results in optimistic beliefs among workers, which causally increase the deferral of work to the future. The roots for biased beliefs stem from motivated memory, such that procrastination may persist even if uncertainty is eventually resolved. |
| Keywords: | anticipatory utility, beliefs, memory, motivated cognition, procrastination, real effort, task allocation |
| JEL: | C91 D83 D84 D90 D91 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11072&r=evo |