nep-evo New Economics Papers
on Evolutionary Economics
Issue of 2024‒03‒25
four papers chosen by
Matthew Baker, City University of New York


  1. The Dawn of Civilization Metal Trade and the Rise of Hierarchy By Matthias Flückiger; Mario Larch; Markus Ludwig; Luigi Pascali
  2. On Injunctive Norms: Theory and Experiment By Juan-Bartroli, Pau
  3. Awareness of self-control By Mohammad Mehdi Mousavi; Mahdi Kohan Sefidi; Shirin Allahyarkhani
  4. Dynamically Consistent Intertemporal Dual-Self Expected Utility By Mononen, Lasse

  1. By: Matthias Flückiger; Mario Larch; Markus Ludwig; Luigi Pascali
    Abstract: In the latter half of the fourth millennium BC, our ancestors witnessed a remarkable transformation, progressing from simple agrarian villages to complex urban civilizations. In regions as far apart as the Nile Valley, Mesopotamia, Central Asia, and the Indus Valley, the first states appeared together with writing, cities with populations exceeding 10, 000, and unprecedented socio-economic inequalities. The cause of this “Urban Revolution” remains unclear. We present new empirical evidence suggesting that the discovery of bronze and the ensuing long-distance trade played a crucial role. Using novel panel data and 2SLS techniques, we demonstrate that trade corridors linking metal mines to fertile lands were more likely to experience the Urban Revolution. We propose that transit bottlenecks facilitated the emergence of a new taxing elite. We formally test this appropriability theory and provide several case studies in support.
    Keywords: urban civilizations, long-distance trade, metal trade, transit bottlenecks
    JEL: D02 F10 H10 N40 O43
    Date: 2024
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10929&r=evo
  2. By: Juan-Bartroli, Pau
    Abstract: Recent studies have shown that individuals’ behavior is sensitive to their perceptions of socially appropri-ate behavior. In this paper, I introduce a theory of injunctive norms in which individuals evaluate the social appropriateness of a given behavior using universalization reasoning. The theory allows one to compute the social appropriateness of any behavior without relying on individuals’ expectations, preferences, and actual behavior. Furthermore, it can be applied to a wide range of interactions and rationalize several observations unaccounted for by theories of social preferences. I test the theory’s predictions with evidence from past studies and new data from a lab experiment.
    Keywords: Social Norms; Morality; Lab Experiments; Social Preferences
    JEL: C91 D91
    Date: 2024–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:129160&r=evo
  3. By: Mohammad Mehdi Mousavi; Mahdi Kohan Sefidi; Shirin Allahyarkhani
    Abstract: Economists modeled self-control problems in decisions of people with the time-inconsistence preferences model. They argued that the source of self-control problems could be uncertainty and temptation. This paper uses an experimental test offered to individuals instantaneous reward and future rewards to measure awareness of self-control problems in a tempting condition and also measure the effect of commitment and flexibility cost on their welfare. The quasi-hyperbolic discounting model with time discount factor and present bias at the same time was used for making a model for measuring awareness and choice reversal conditions. The test showed 66% awareness of self-control (partially naive behaviors) in individuals. The welfare implication for individuals increased with commitment and flexibility costs. The result can be useful in marketing and policy-making fields design precisely offers for customers and society.
    Date: 2024–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2402.11072&r=evo
  4. By: Mononen, Lasse (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)
    Abstract: Experimental evidence on intertemporal choice has documented a preference for consumption smoothing that cannot be explained by discounted utility. We study a general class of dynamically consistent intertemporal dual-self preferences that accommodate a preference for consumption smoothing. We show that these general preferences have a simple and tractable structure. They are characterized by a gain-loss asymmetry where gains with respect to future utility are discounted differently than losses. As applications, first, we show that under the stationarity axiom, these preferences are convex or concave. Second, we show that dynamically consistent intertemporal Choquet expected utility coincides with discounted expected utility.
    Date: 2024–02–21
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:686&r=evo

This nep-evo issue is ©2024 by Matthew Baker. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
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