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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Matthias Flückiger; Mario Larch; Markus Ludwig; Luigi Pascali |
| Abstract: | In the latter half of the fourth millennium BC, our ancestors witnessed a remarkable transformation, progressing from simple agrarian villages to complex urban civilizations. In regions as far apart as the Nile Valley, Mesopotamia, Central Asia, and the Indus Valley, the first states appeared together with writing, cities with populations exceeding 10, 000, and unprecedented socio-economic inequalities. The cause of this “Urban Revolution” remains unclear. We present new empirical evidence suggesting that the discovery of bronze and the ensuing long-distance trade played a crucial role. Using novel panel data and 2SLS techniques, we demonstrate that trade corridors linking metal mines to fertile lands were more likely to experience the Urban Revolution. We propose that transit bottlenecks facilitated the emergence of a new taxing elite. We formally test this appropriability theory and provide several case studies in support. |
| Keywords: | urban civilizations, long-distance trade, metal trade, transit bottlenecks |
| JEL: | D02 F10 H10 N40 O43 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10929&r=evo |
| By: | Juan-Bartroli, Pau |
| Abstract: | Recent studies have shown that individuals’ behavior is sensitive to their perceptions of socially appropri-ate behavior. In this paper, I introduce a theory of injunctive norms in which individuals evaluate the social appropriateness of a given behavior using universalization reasoning. The theory allows one to compute the social appropriateness of any behavior without relying on individuals’ expectations, preferences, and actual behavior. Furthermore, it can be applied to a wide range of interactions and rationalize several observations unaccounted for by theories of social preferences. I test the theory’s predictions with evidence from past studies and new data from a lab experiment. |
| Keywords: | Social Norms; Morality; Lab Experiments; Social Preferences |
| JEL: | C91 D91 |
| Date: | 2024–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:129160&r=evo |
| By: | Mohammad Mehdi Mousavi; Mahdi Kohan Sefidi; Shirin Allahyarkhani |
| Abstract: | Economists modeled self-control problems in decisions of people with the time-inconsistence preferences model. They argued that the source of self-control problems could be uncertainty and temptation. This paper uses an experimental test offered to individuals instantaneous reward and future rewards to measure awareness of self-control problems in a tempting condition and also measure the effect of commitment and flexibility cost on their welfare. The quasi-hyperbolic discounting model with time discount factor and present bias at the same time was used for making a model for measuring awareness and choice reversal conditions. The test showed 66% awareness of self-control (partially naive behaviors) in individuals. The welfare implication for individuals increased with commitment and flexibility costs. The result can be useful in marketing and policy-making fields design precisely offers for customers and society. |
| Date: | 2024–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2402.11072&r=evo |
| By: | Mononen, Lasse (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University) |
| Abstract: | Experimental evidence on intertemporal choice has documented a preference for consumption smoothing that cannot be explained by discounted utility. We study a general class of dynamically consistent intertemporal dual-self preferences that accommodate a preference for consumption smoothing. We show that these general preferences have a simple and tractable structure. They are characterized by a gain-loss asymmetry where gains with respect to future utility are discounted differently than losses. As applications, first, we show that under the stationarity axiom, these preferences are convex or concave. Second, we show that dynamically consistent intertemporal Choquet expected utility coincides with discounted expected utility. |
| Date: | 2024–02–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:686&r=evo |