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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Oded Galor; Marc Klemp; Daniel C. Wainstock |
| Abstract: | Research spanning various disciplines underscores the significance of cultural diversity in facilitating cross-pollination of ideas, while diminishing social cohesiveness. Yet, the exploration of the impact of an equally intriguing dimension of diversity has remained uncharted: has the coalescence of diverse ancestral background in the formation of individuals' mindset shaped their productivity? Has a diverse mindset been central for individual's prosperity? This research advances the hypothesis that an intermediate level of diverse ancestral origins strikes a balance between the conflicting effects of cultural proximity and distinctiveness, creating an individual mindset that is conducive for productivity. While a limited cultural diversity among an individual's ancestors may reduce the scope for ancestral cross-pollination, and may diminish the individual's creativity, and adaptability, an extensive ancestral cultural divide could potentially hinder individual's coherence, human capital formation, and productivity. Leveraging the rich web of ancestries of the modern US population, we provide supporting evidence for the hypothesis and the underlying mechanism, establishing that there exists a hump-shaped relationship between intrapersonal diversity and earned income, mediated by the acquisition of human capital, in the form of educational attainment, originality, and ow of ideas. |
| Keywords: | mindset, diversity, culture, ancestry, productivity, human capital |
| JEL: | D60 O10 Z10 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10937&r=evo |
| By: | Laura Breitkopf (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn); Shyamal Chowdhury (University of Sydney); Shambhavi Priyam (World Bank, Washington DC, US); Hannah Schildberg-Hörisch (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf (DICE), IZA Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn); Matthias Sutter (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, University of Cologne, Germany, University of Innsbruck, Austria, IZA Bonn, Germany, and CESifo Munich) |
| Abstract: | We use novel data on nearly 6, 000 children and adolescents aged 6 to 16 that combine incentivized measures of social, time, and risk preferences with rich information on child behavior and family environment to study whether children’s economic preferences predict their behavior. Results from standard regression specifications demonstrate the predictive power of children’s preferences for their prosociality, educational achievement, risky behaviors, emotional health, and behavioral problems. In a second step, we add information on a family’s socio-economic status, family structure, religion, parental preferences and IQ, and parenting style to capture household environment. As a result, the predictive power of preferences for behavior attenuates. We discuss implications of our findings for research on the formation of children’s preferences and behavior. |
| Keywords: | social preferences, time preferences, risk preferences, experiments with children, origins of preferences, human capital, behavior |
| JEL: | C91 D01 |
| Date: | 2024–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2024_09&r=evo |
| By: | Zdybel, Karol B. |
| Abstract: | Spontaneous norms, or simply norms, can be defined as rules of conduct that emerge without intentional design and in the absence of purposeful external coordination. While the law and economics scholarship has formally analyzed spontaneous norms, the analysis has typically been limited to scenarios where agents possess complete information about the interaction structure, including others' understanding of desirable and undesirable outcomes. In contrast, this paper examines spontaneous norms under the assumption of agent heterogeneity and private preferences. By employing a game-theoretical framework, the analysis reveals that norms' lifecycle can be divided into a formative phase and a long-run phase. The formative phase crucially shapes the norm's content and is itself critically dependent on the initial beliefs that agents hold about each other. Moreover, spontaneous norms are resilient to minor shocks to the belief structure but disintegrate when the magnitude of shocks becomes significant. In the final part, the paper highlights the broader implications of its findings, indicating applications in general law and economics, legal anthropology and history, and the sociology of social norms. |
| Keywords: | Spontaneous norms, Social norms, Custom, Private assessment, Legal history |
| JEL: | K00 K10 K39 P48 Z13 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ilewps:78&r=evo |
| By: | Pisor, Anne (Washington State University); Smith, Kristopher M; Deminchuk, Jeff |
| Abstract: | Glowacki defines peace as harmonious relationships between groups maintained without the threat of violence, where groups can be anything from families to nation states. However, defining such contentious concepts like “peace” and “groups” is a difficult task, and we discuss the implications of Glowacki’s definitions for understanding intergroup relationships and their evolutionary history. |
| Date: | 2024–01–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:euz2a&r=evo |
| By: | Andrea Coletta; Kshama Dwarakanath; Penghang Liu; Svitlana Vyetrenko; Tucker Balch |
| Abstract: | Modeling subrational agents, such as humans or economic households, is inherently challenging due to the difficulty in calibrating reinforcement learning models or collecting data that involves human subjects. Existing work highlights the ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to address complex reasoning tasks and mimic human communication, while simulation using LLMs as agents shows emergent social behaviors, potentially improving our comprehension of human conduct. In this paper, we propose to investigate the use of LLMs to generate synthetic human demonstrations, which are then used to learn subrational agent policies though Imitation Learning. We make an assumption that LLMs can be used as implicit computational models of humans, and propose a framework to use synthetic demonstrations derived from LLMs to model subrational behaviors that are characteristic of humans (e.g., myopic behavior or preference for risk aversion). We experimentally evaluate the ability of our framework to model sub-rationality through four simple scenarios, including the well-researched ultimatum game and marshmallow experiment. To gain confidence in our framework, we are able to replicate well-established findings from prior human studies associated with the above scenarios. We conclude by discussing the potential benefits, challenges and limitations of our framework. |
| Date: | 2024–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2402.08755&r=evo |
| By: | Mingyang Li; Han Pengsihua; Songqing Zhao; Zejun Wang; Limin Yang; Weian Liu |
| Abstract: | On August 24, 2023, Japan controversially decided to discharge nuclear wastewater from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant into the ocean, sparking intense domestic and global debates. This study uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the strategic dynamics between Japan, other countries, and the Japan Fisheries Association. By incorporating economic, legal, international aid, and environmental factors, the research identifies three evolutionarily stable strategies, analyzing them via numerical simulations. The focus is on Japan's shift from wastewater release to its cessation, exploring the myriad factors influencing this transition and their effects on stakeholders' decisions. Key insights highlight the need for international cooperation, rigorous scientific research, public education, and effective wastewater treatment methods. Offering both a fresh theoretical perspective and practical guidance, this study aims to foster global consensus on nuclear wastewater management, crucial for marine conservation and sustainable development. |
| Date: | 2024–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2402.07210&r=evo |
| By: | Daniele De Luca |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a new approach to power in Game Theory. Cooperation and conflict are simulated with a mechanism of payoff alteration, called F-game. Using convex combinations of preferences, an F-game can measure players' attitude to cooperate. We can then define actual and potential power as special relations between different states of the system. |
| Date: | 2024–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2401.16406&r=evo |
| By: | Paul Heidhues (Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf); Botond Koszegi (Central European University (CEU)); Philipp Strack (Yale University) |
| Abstract: | We model an agent who stubbornly underestimates how much his behavior is driven by undesirable motives, and, attributing his behavior to other considerations, updates his views about those considerations. We study general properties of the model, and then apply the framework to identify novel implications of partially naive present bias. In many stable situations, the agent appears realistic in that he eventually predicts his behavior well. His unrealistic self- view does, however, manifest itself in several other ways. First, in basic settings he always comes to act in a more present-biased manner than a sophisticated agent. Second, he systematically mispredicts how he will react when circumstances change, such as when incentives for forward-looking behavior increase or he is placed in a new, ex-ante identical environment. Third, even for physically non-addictive products, he follows empirically realistic addiction-like consumption dynamics that he does not anticipate. Fourth, he holds beliefs that Ñ when compared to those of other agents Ñ display puzzling correlations between logically unrelated issues. Our model implies that existing empirical tests of sophistication in intertemporal choice can reach incorrect conclusions. Indeed, we argue that some previous findings are more consistent with our model than with a model of correctly specified learning. |
| Date: | 2023–01–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2378&r=evo |