nep-evo New Economics Papers
on Evolutionary Economics
Issue of 2024‒02‒05
two papers chosen by
Matthew Baker, City University of New York


  1. The roots of cooperation By Zvonimir BaÅ¡ić; Parampreet C. Bindra; Daniela Glätzle-Rützler; Angelo Romano; Matthias Sutter; Claudia Zoller
  2. The Emergence of Enforcement By Luca Anderlini; Leonardo Felli; Michele Piccione

  1. By: Zvonimir BaÅ¡ić (Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, UK); Parampreet C. Bindra (University of Innsbruck); Daniela Glätzle-Rützler (University of Innsbruck, Austria); Angelo Romano (Leiden University, Netherlands); Matthias Sutter (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, University of Cologne, Germany, University of Innsbruck, Austria, IZA Bonn, Germany, and CESifo Munich); Claudia Zoller (Management Center Innsbruck)
    Abstract: We study the developmental roots of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine pre-registered hypotheses about which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation – direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, and third-party punishment – emerges earliest and is more effective as a means to increase cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. We find that already children aged 3 act in a conditionally cooperative way. Yet, direct and indirect reciprocity do not increase overall cooperation rates beyond a control condition. Compared to the latter, punishment more than doubles cooperation rates, making it the most effective mechanism to promote cooperation. We also find that children’s cognitive skills and parents’ socioeconomic background influence cooperation. We complement our experimental findings with a meta-analysis of studies on cooperation among adults and older children, confirming that punishment outperforms direct and indirect reciprocity.
    Keywords: Cooperation, reciprocity, third-party punishment, children, parents, prisoner’s dilemma game, experiment, meta-analysis
    JEL: C91 C93 D01 D91 H41
    Date: 2024–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2024_02&r=evo
  2. By: Luca Anderlini (Department of Economics, Georgetown University); Leonardo Felli (Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge); Michele Piccione (London School of Economics)
    Abstract: How do mechanisms that enforce cooperation emerge in a society where none are available and agents are endowed with raw power, that allows a more powerful agent to expropriate a less powerful one? We study a model where expropriation is costly and agents can choose whether to engage in surplus-augmenting cooperation or engage in expropriation. While in bilateral relations, if cooperation is not overwhelmingly productive and expropriation is not too costly, the latter will prevent cooperation, when there are three or more agents, powerful ones can become enforcers of cooperation for agents ranked below them. In equilibrium they will expropriate smaller amounts from multiple weaker cooperating agents who in turn will not deviate for fear of being expropriated more heavily because of their larger expropriation proceeds. Surprisingly, the details of the power structure are irrelevant for the existence of equilibria with enforcement provided that enough agents are present and one is ranked above all others. These details are instead key to the existence of other highly non-cooperative equilibria that obtain in certain cases.
    Keywords: Jungle, Power Structures, Enforcement, Rule of Law
    JEL: C79 D00 D01 D31 K19 K40 K49
    Date: 2023–12–13
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~23-23-06&r=evo

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