| By: |
Zvonimir Bašić (Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, UK);
Parampreet C. Bindra (University of Innsbruck);
Daniela Glätzle-Rützler (University of Innsbruck, Austria);
Angelo Romano (Leiden University, Netherlands);
Matthias Sutter (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, University of Cologne, Germany, University of Innsbruck, Austria, IZA Bonn, Germany, and CESifo Munich);
Claudia Zoller (Management Center Innsbruck) |
| Abstract: |
We study the developmental roots of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3
to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine pre-registered
hypotheses about which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation –
direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, and third-party punishment –
emerges earliest and is more effective as a means to increase cooperation in a
repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. We find that already children aged 3 act
in a conditionally cooperative way. Yet, direct and indirect reciprocity do
not increase overall cooperation rates beyond a control condition. Compared to
the latter, punishment more than doubles cooperation rates, making it the most
effective mechanism to promote cooperation. We also find that children’s
cognitive skills and parents’ socioeconomic background influence
cooperation. We complement our experimental findings with a meta-analysis of
studies on cooperation among adults and older children, confirming that
punishment outperforms direct and indirect reciprocity. |
| Keywords: |
Cooperation, reciprocity, third-party punishment, children, parents, prisoner’s dilemma game, experiment, meta-analysis |
| JEL: |
C91 C93 D01 D91 H41 |
| Date: |
2024–02 |
| URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2024_02&r=evo |