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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Philippe De Donder; Humberto Llavador; Stefan Penczynski; John E. Roemer; Roberto Vélez |
| Abstract: | Whether or not to vaccinate one's child is a decision that a parent may approach in several ways. The vaccination game, in which parents must choose whether to vaccinate a child against a disease, is one with positive externalities (herd immunity). In some societies, not vaccinating is an increasingly prevalent behavior, due to deleterious side effects that parents believe may accompany vaccination. The standard game-theoretic approach assumes that parents make decisions according to the Nash behavioral protocol, which is individualistic and non-cooperative. Because of the positive externality that each child's vaccination generates for others, the Nash equilibrium suffers from a free-rider problem. However, in more solidaristic societies, parents may behave cooperatively -they may optimize according to the Kantian protocol, in which the equilibrium is efficient. We test, on a sample of six countries, whether childhood vaccination behavior conforms better to the individualistic or cooperative protocol. In order to do so, we conduct surveys of parents in these countries, to ascertain the distribution of beliefs concerning the subjective probability and severity of deleterious side effects of vaccination. We show that in all the countries of our sample the Kant model dominates the Nash model. We conjecture that, due to the free-rider problem inherent in the Nash equilibrium, a social norm has evolved, quite generally, inducing parents to vaccinate with higher probability than they would in the non-cooperative solution. Kantian equilibrium offers one precise version of such a social norm. |
| Keywords: | Kantian equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, vaccination, social norm |
| JEL: | C72 D62 D63 I12 |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upf:upfgen:1808&r= |
| By: | Bleynat, Ingrid; Challú, Amílcar E.; Segal, Paul |
| Abstract: | Historical wage and income data provide both normative measures of living standards, and indicators of patterns of economic development. This study shows that, given limited historical data, median incomes are most appropriate for measuring welfare and inequality, while urban unskilled wages can be used to test dualist models of development. We present new estimates of these series for Mexico from 1800 to 2015 and find that both have historically failed to keep up with aggregate growth: GDP per worker is now over eight times higher than in the nineteenth century, while unskilled urban real wages are only 2.2 times higher, and national median incomes only 2.0 times higher. From the perspective of inequality and social welfare, our findings confirm that there is no automatic positive relationship between economic growth and rising living standards for the majority. From the perspective of development, we argue that these findings are explained by a dual economy model incorporating Lewis's assumption of a reserve army of labour, and we explain why the decline in inequality predicted by Kuznets has not occurred. |
| JEL: | N36 |
| Date: | 2021–08–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:112928&r= |
| By: | Giovanni Di Bartolomeo; Martin Dufwenberg; Stefano Papa |
| Abstract: | Building on a partner-switching mechanism, we experimentally test two theories that posit different reasons why promises breed trust and cooperation. The expectation-based explanation (EBE) operates via belief-dependent guilt aversion, while the commitment-based explanation (CBE) suggests that promises offer commitment power via a (belief-independent) preference to keep one's word. Previous research performed a similar test, which we however argue should be interpreted as concerning informal agreements rather than (unilateral) promises. |
| Keywords: | Promises; Partner-switching, Expectations, Commitment, Guilt, Informal agreements |
| JEL: | A13 C91 D01 D64 |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sap:wpaper:wp215&r= |
| By: | Thomas Neuber |
| Abstract: | Social norms pervade human interaction, but their demands are often in conflict. To understand behavior, it is thus crucial to know how individuals resolve normative tradeoffs. This paper proposes that sincere judgments about the relative importance of conflicting norms are shaped by personal interest. We show that people tend to follow norms from which they benefit themselves, even in contexts where their own decisions only affect others. In a (virtual) laboratory experiment, each subject makes two decisions over allocations of points within a group of two other participants. The sets of possible allocations entail different normative tradeoffs, and subjects have no personal stakes in their own decisions. However, they are affected by others’ decisions: each subject is part of a group, and the members of different groups simultaneously decide over others’ allocations along a circle. We find that subjects’ decisions are biased towards the normative principles aligned with their own interests, thereby favoring other players whenever these share those interests. Subjects’ beliefs about the choices made by others suggest a largely unconscious mechanism. Moreover, survey answers indicate that the effects are driven by self-centered reasoning: subjects who report pronounced perspective-taking are less biased. |
| Keywords: | egocentrism, experiment, social norms |
| JEL: | C91 D63 D91 |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2021_323&r= |