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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Gonçalo Faria (IAST - Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse , School of Biology [University of St Andrews] - University of St Andrews [Scotland]); Andy Gardner (School of Biology [University of St Andrews] - University of St Andrews [Scotland]) |
| Abstract: | Genetic relatedness is a key driver of the evolution of cooperation. One mechanism that may ensure social partners are genetically related is kin discrimination, in which individuals are able to distinguish kin from non-kin and adjust their behaviour accordingly. However, the impact of kin discrimination upon the overall level of cooperation remains obscure. Specifically, while kin discrimination allows an individual to help more-related social partners over less-related social partners, it is unclear whether and how the population average level of cooperation that is evolutionarily favoured should differ under kin discrimination versus indiscriminate social behaviour. Here, we perform a general mathematical analysis in order to assess whether, when and in which direction kin discrimination changes the average level of cooperation in an evolving population. We find that kin discrimination may increase, decrease or leave unchanged the average level of cooperation, depending upon whether the optimal level of cooperation is a convex, concave or linear function of genetic relatedness. We develop an extension of the classic ‘tragedy of the commons' model of cooperation in order to provide an illustration of these results. Our analysis provides a method to guide future research on the evolutionary consequences of kin discrimination. |
| Date: | 2020–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03048825&r=all |
| By: | Asta Breinholt; Dalton Conley |
| Abstract: | A growing literature points to children’s influence on parents’ behavior, including parental investments in children. Further, previous research has shown differential parental response by socioeconomic status to children's birth weight, cognitive ability, and school outcomes – all early life predictors of later socioeconomic success. This study considers an even earlier, more exogenous predictor of parental investments: offspring genotype. Specifically, we analyze (1) whether children’s genetic propensity towards educational success affects parenting during early childhood; and (2) whether parenting in response to children’s genetic propensity towards educational success is socially stratified. Using data from the Avon Longitudinal Survey of Parents and Children (N=7,738), we construct polygenic scores for educational attainment and regress cognitively stimulating parenting behavior during early childhood on these polygenic scores. We use a range of modeling strategies to address the concern that child’s genotype may be proxying unmeasured parent characteristics. Results show that parents provide more cognitive stimulation to children with higher education polygenic scores. This pattern varies by socioeconomic status with college-educated parents responding less to children’s genetic propensity towards educational success than non-college-educated parents do. |
| JEL: | D13 I14 I24 J13 |
| Date: | 2020–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28217&r=all |
| By: | M Niaz Asadullah (Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya); Nazia Mansoor (INTO City, University of London); Teresa Randazzo (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Cà Foscari); Zaki Wahhaj (School of Economics, University of Kent) |
| Abstract: | Historically, son preference has been widely prevalent in South Asia, manifested in the form of skewed sex ratios, gender differentials in child mortality, and worse educational investments in daughters versus sons. In the present study, we show, using data from a purposefully designed nationally representative survey for Bangladesh that, among women of childbearing age, son bias in stated fertility preferences has weakened and there is an emerging preference for gender balance. We examine a number of different hypotheses for the decline in son preference, including the increasing availability of female employment in the manufacturing sector, increased female education, and the decline of joint family living. Using survival analysis, we show that, in contrast to stated fertility preferences, actual fertility decisions are still shaped by son preference. |
| Keywords: | Fertility, gender bias, birth spacing, female employment, Bangladesh |
| JEL: | J11 J13 J16 O12 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ven:wpaper:2020:24&r=all |
| By: | Yann Algan (Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Paris, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research - CEPR); Clément Malgouyres (PSE - Paris School of Economics - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, IPP - Institut des politiques publiques); Thierry Mayer (Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Paris, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research - CEPR, CEPII - Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales - Centre d'analyse stratégique); Mathias Thoenig (UNIL - Université de Lausanne, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research - CEPR) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies how economic incentives influence cultural transmission, using a crucial expression of cultural identity: Child naming decisions. Our focus is on Arabic versus Non-Arabic names given in France over the 2003-2007 period. Our model of cultural transmission features three determinants: (i) vertical (parental) cultural transmission culture; (ii) horizontal (neighborhood) influence; (iii) information on the economic penalty associated with Arabic names. We find that economic incentives largely influence naming choices: Would the parental expectation on the economic penalty be zero, the annual number of babies born with an Arabic name would be more than 50 percent larger. |
| Keywords: | Cultural Economics,Cultural Transmission,First Names,Social Interactions |
| Date: | 2021–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-03105274&r=all |
| By: | Jha, Chandan Kumar; Sarangi, Sudipta |
| Abstract: | This paper argues that the availability of arable land in antiquity created gender norms that continue to affect current gender inequality. We show that countries with greater ancestral arable land have lower levels of gender inequality, better female reproductive health outcomes, and greater female labor force participation. Using more than 80,000 individual-level observations from over 70 countries, we find that it is positively associated with attitudes regarding women’s rights and abilities. We show that the primary mechanism driving this relationship is the shaping of norms that promote female labor force participation. |
| Keywords: | gender inequality, historical factors, ancestral arable land, cultural norms |
| JEL: | D03 J16 N30 Z1 |
| Date: | 2020–11–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:104336&r=all |
| By: | Kevin He; Jonathan Libgober |
| Abstract: | We introduce an evolutionary framework to evaluate competing (mis)specifications in strategic situations, focusing on which misspecifications can persist over a correct specification. Agents with heterogeneous specifications coexist in a society and repeatedly match against random opponents to play a stage game. They draw Bayesian inferences about the environment based on personal experience, so their learning depends on the distribution of specifications and matching assortativity in the society. One specification is evolutionarily stable against another if, whenever sufficiently prevalent, its adherents obtain higher expected objective payoffs than their counterparts. The learning channel leads to novel stability phenomena compared to frameworks where the heritable unit of cultural transmission is a single belief instead of a specification (i.e., set of feasible beliefs). We apply the framework to linear-quadratic-normal games where players receive correlated signals but possibly misperceive the information structure. The correct specification is not evolutionarily stable against a correlational error, whose direction depends on matching assortativity. As another application, the framework also endogenizes coarse analogy classes in centipede games. |
| Date: | 2020–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2012.15007&r=all |
| By: | Stéphane Gauthier (PSE - Paris School of Economics - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | This article shows that two widely used data sources from the French military administration pertain to two different enlistment stages and combines these sources to build a quasi-exhaustive panel of young men around their 20s. The panel is applied to measure height growth of men born at the end of the 19th century in an economically backward small rural area of France. The one-year growth is 0:39cm and only concerns the shortest men; the tallest men already reached adult maturity. Industrial pollution imposes a growth penalty that overcomes the enhancing impact of industrial development. |
| Keywords: | Industrialization,Norm of reaction,Military data,Rural development,Height growth,Pollution |
| Date: | 2021–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-03117083&r=all |