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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Mario Cimoli; Giovanni Dosi; Xiaodan Yu |
| Abstract: | This work discusses the role of industrial policies within an evolutionary view of innovation and learning as drivers of economic development. Building on the notions of technological paradigms and trajectories, it links the processes of catching-up with the dynamics of capability accumulation within and across firms. In turn such processes are embedded in broader national systems of innovation wherein industrial policies play a pivotal role. |
| Keywords: | Technological paradigms; Catching up; Theory of production; Absolute and Comparative Advantages; National systems of innovation; Industrial Policies; Economic Evolution and Development. |
| Date: | 2020–03–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2020/08&r=all |
| By: | Hsuan-Wei Lee; Yen-Ping Chang; Yen-Sheng Chiang |
| Abstract: | Can the status hierarchy facilitate the emergence of group cooperation? In an evolutionary model, Mark (2018) provided a positive answer to the theoretical inquiry. Despite the contribution, we critiqued that there are not only mathematical errors in Mark's model but also limitations in applying it to other hierarchical structures. We present a more generalized model by introducing a novel hierarchy measure to interpolate the cooperativeness of group members in any hierarchy structure of interest. We derive the conditions under which cooperation can emerge and verify our analytical predictions by agent-based computer simulation. In general, our evolutionary model provides stronger evidence than Mark's original model with respect to how status behavior can facilitate the emergence of social cooperation. |
| Date: | 2020–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2004.00944&r=all |
| By: | Lensberg, Terje; Schenk-Hoppé, Klaus R. |
| Abstract: | We study one-shot play in the set of all bimatrix games by a large population of agents. The agents never see the same game twice, but they can learn ‘across games’ by developing solution concepts that tell them how to play new games. Each agent’s individual solution concept is represented by a computer program, and natural selection is applied to derive stochastically stable solution concepts. Our aim is to develop a theory predicting how experienced agents would play in one-shot games. |
| Keywords: | One-shot games, solution concepts, genetic programming, evolutionary stability. |
| JEL: | C63 C73 C90 |
| Date: | 2020–03–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:99095&r=all |
| By: | Simon Briole (PSE - Paris School of Economics); Héléne Le Forner (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Anthony Lepinteur (University of Luxembourg [Luxembourg]) |
| Abstract: | Although it is widely acknowledged that non-cognitive skills matter for adult outcomes, little is known about the role played by family environment in the formation of these skills. We use a longitudinal survey of children born in the UK in 2000–2001, the Millennium Cohort Study by the Centre for Longitudinal Studies, to estimate the effect of family size on socio-emotional skills, measured by the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire. To account for the endogeneity of fertility decisions, we use a well-known instrumental approach that exploits parents' preference for children's gender diversity. We show that the birth of a third child negatively affects the socio-emotional skills of the first two children in a persistent manner. However, we show that this negative effect is entirely driven by girls. We provide evidence that this gender effect is partly driven by an unequal response of parents' time investment in favour of boys and, to a lesser extent, by an unequal demand for household chores. |
| Keywords: | Non-cognitive skills,Family size,Birth order,Child development |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02504021&r=all |
| By: | Mavisakalyan, Astghik; Tarverdi, Yashar; Weber, Clas |
| Abstract: | This paper identifies a new source of differences in religiosity: the presence of future tense marking in language. We argue that the rewards and punishments that incentivise religious behaviour are less effective for speakers of languages that contain future tense marking. Consistent with this prediction, we show that speakers of future-tensed languages are less likely to be religious and to take up the short-term costs associated with religiosity. What is likely to drive this behaviour, according to our results, is the relatively lower appeal of the religious rewards for these individuals. Our analysis is based on within country regressions comparing individuals with identical observable characteristics who speak a different language. |
| Keywords: | Language,Culture,Religiosity |
| JEL: | D83 Z12 Z13 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:500&r=all |