| By: |
Zhang, Hanzhe (Michigan State University, Department of Economics);
Wu, Jiabin (Department of Economics, University of Oregon) |
| Abstract: |
We examine the evolution of preferences under different arrangements of the
marriage market, when preferences are influenced by own choices and parents’
preferences. Multiple stable equilibria arise under random matching, but a
unique equilibrium exists under assortative matching. Differences in
evolutionary trajectories after transitory and permanent shocks by marriage
markets allow us to discuss in a unified way the evolution of (i) female labor
force participation in developed countries, (ii) gender norms in developing
countries, (iii) the capitalistic spirit in preindustrial England, and (iv)
cultural norms in the long run. |
| Keywords: |
preference evolution; marriage market; intergenerational transmission; evolutionary games |
| JEL: |
C73 C78 Z13 |
| Date: |
2020–01–02 |
| URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:msuecw:2020_001&r=all |