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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Ager, Philipp; Herz, Benedikt |
| Abstract: | This paper provides new insights on the relationship between structural change and the fertility transition. We exploit the spread of an agricultural pest in the American South in the 1890s as plausibly exogenous variation in agricultural production to establish a causal link between earnings opportunities in agriculture and fertility. Households staying in agriculture reduced fertility because children are a normal good, while households switching to manufacturing reduced fertility because of the higher opportunity costs of raising children. The lower earnings opportunities in agriculture also decreased the value of child labor which increased schooling, consistent with a quantity-quality model of fertility. |
| Keywords: | Fertility Transition, Structural Change, Industrialization, Agricultural Income |
| JEL: | J13 N31 O14 |
| Date: | 2019–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:92883&r=all |
| By: | Giovanna d’Adda; Martin Dufwenberg; Francesco Passarelli; Guido Tabellini |
| Abstract: | We consider an expanded notion of social norms that render them belief-dependent and partial, formulate a series of related testable predictions, and design an experiment based on a variant of the dictator game that tests for empirical relevance. Main results: Normative beliefs influence generosity, as predicted. Degree of partiality leads to more dispersion in giving behavior, as predicted. Keywords: Social norms, partial norms, normative expectations, consensus, experiment. JEL codes: C91, D91 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:643&r=all |
| By: | Mark T. Le Quement (University of East Anglia); Amrish Patel (University of East Anglia) |
| Abstract: | We study psychological games of cheap talk communication involving players who have misaligned material interests and reciprocity preferences. We find that full and efficient information transmission is often impossible if reciprocity concerns are too high. Furthermore, higher material preference misalignment may facilitate the achievement of full information transmission. A key driver of our results is that truth-telling is not per se a kind action by the sender. We contrast discrete and continuous environments, alternative conceptions of reciprocity preferences and consider one-sided reciprocity models. |
| Keywords: | Cheap talk, Gift-Exchange, Incomplete Information, Psychological Game, Reciprocity. |
| JEL: | D81 D83 D91 |
| Date: | 2018–01–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:ueaeco:2018_06&r=all |