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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Hisham Aidi |
| Abstract: | Scholars of social movements and global protest have long neglected social movements in Africa, ostensibly because African societies are too rural, too tradition- or ethnicity-bound, or lacking advanced class formations. Those who have broached the topic tend to focus on South Africa’s labor movement and anti-apartheid struggle. Even less addressed is how social movements in various parts of the continent have affected each other. A continent-wide approach however shows that protests in sub-Saharan Africa preceded the North African uprisings, by almost a decade. These protests had similar objectives and faced comparable obstacles, yet much of the scholarship on the “Arab Spring” has ignored the sub-Saharan connections and precedents. How did these movements build on earlier waves of political agitation? How do these “protest coalitions” combine political and economic motivations? |
| Date: | 2018–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ocp:ppaper:pb1836&r=all |
| By: | Constantin Udriste; Massimiliano Ferrara; Dorel Zugravescu; Florin Munteanu; Ionel Tevy |
| Abstract: | This mathematical essay brings together ideas from Economics, Geobiodynamics and Thermodynamics. Its purpose is to obtain real models of complex evolutionary systems. More specifically, the essay defines Roegenian Economy and links Geobiodynamics and Roegenian Economy. In this context, we discuss the isomorphism between the concepts and techniques of Thermodynamics and Economics. Then we describe a Roegenian economic system like a Carnot group. After we analyse the phase equilibrium for two heterogeneous economic systems. The European Union Economics appears like Cartesian product of Roegenian economic systems and its Balance is analysed in details. A Section at the end describes the "economic black holes" as small parts of a a global economic system in which national income is so great that it causes others poor enrichment. These ideas can be used to improve our knowledge and understanding of the nature of development and evolution of thermodynamic-economic systems. |
| Date: | 2018–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1812.07961&r=all |
| By: | Khan, Abhimanyu |
| Abstract: | I study recurrent strategic interaction between two responsive behavioural rules in generic bi-matrix weakly acyclic games. The two individuals that play the game in a particular period choose their strategy by responding to a sample of strategies used by the co-players in the recent history of play. The response of a player is determined by his behavioural rule. I show that the game reaches a convention whenever the behavioural rule of each player is `weakly responsive' to the manner in which strategies were chosen in the past by the co-players, and stays locked into the convention if the behavioural rules are `mildly responsive'. Furthermore, amongst `mildly responsive' behavioural rules, individuals described by the behavioural rule of `extreme optimism' perform the best in the sense that their most preferred convention is always in the stochastically stable set; under an additional mild restriction that differentiates the behavioural rule of the other player from extreme optimism, the convention referred to above is the unique stochastically stable state. |
| Keywords: | evolution of conventions; behavioural rules; weakly responsive; mildly responsive; optimism |
| JEL: | C73 |
| Date: | 2018–12–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:90429&r=all |