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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Dario Madeo; Chiara Mocenni |
| Abstract: | Cooperative behavior in real social dilemmas is often perceived as a phenomenon emerging from norms and punishment. To overcome this paradigm, we highlight the interplay between the influence of social networks on individuals, and the activation of spontaneous self-regulating mechanisms, which may lead them to behave cooperatively, while interacting with others and taking conflicting decisions over time. By extending Evolutionary game theory over networks, we prove that cooperation partially or fully emerges whether self-regulating mechanisms are sufficiently stronger than social pressure. Interestingly, even few cooperative individuals act as catalyzing agents for the cooperation of others, thus activating a recruiting mechanism, eventually driving the whole population to cooperate. |
| Date: | 2018–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1807.07848&r=evo |
| By: | Christoph Engel (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) |
| Abstract: | Behavioral law and economics applies the conceptual tools of behavioral economics to the analysis of legal problems and legal intervention. These models, and the experiments to test them, assume an institution free state of nature. In modern societies, the law’s subjects never see this state of nature. However a rich arrangement of informal and formal institutions creates generalized trust. If individuals are sufficiently confident that nothing too bad will happen, they are freed up to interact with strangers as if they were in a state of nature. This willingness dramatically reduces transaction cost and enables division of labor. If generalized trust can be assumed, simple economic models are appropriate. But they must be behavioral, since otherwise individuals would not want to run the risk of interaction. |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2018_02&r=evo |
| By: | Bridoux, Flore; Coeurderoy, Regis; Durand, Rodolphe |
| Abstract: | Limited attention has been paid to the crucial role of individuals’ motivation and social interactions in capability development. Building on literature in social psychology and behavioral economics that links heterogeneity in individual social motives to social interactions, we explain how the variation, selection, and retention processes underlying a group’s deliberate capability development are affected by the composition of the group in terms of individuals’ social motives in interplay with the organizational-level motivational levers designed by managers. Our multilevel theoretical model suggests that individual-level heterogeneity leads to the development of capabilities along different paths. For practice, this implies that, according to the composition of the group in terms of social motives, capabilities are more or less technically and evolutionary adequate and source of business process performance. |
| Keywords: | Deliberate Capability Development; Motivational Microfoundations; Social Interactions; Business Process Performance; Multilevel |
| JEL: | L10 |
| Date: | 2016–10–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:heccah:1176&r=evo |