nep-evo New Economics Papers
on Evolutionary Economics
Issue of 2018‒08‒20
twelve papers chosen by
Matthew Baker
City University of New York

  1. The Economics of Missionary Expansion: Evidence from Africa and Implications for Development By Remi Jedwab; Felix Meier zu Selhausen; Alexander Moradi
  2. An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games By Paul Pezanis-Christou; Werner Güth
  3. Bounded Rationality, Satisficing and the Evolution of Economic Thought By Clement A. Tisdell
  4. What drives markups? Evolutionary pricing in an agent-based stock-flow consistent macroeconomic model By Pascal Seppecher; Isabelle Salle; Marc Lavoie
  5. "Flowers of Evil? Industrialization and Long Run Development" By Raphael Franck; Oded Galor
  6. Interventions when Social Norms are Endogenous: A Critique By Rohan Dutta; David K Levine; Salvatore Modica
  7. Monetary Services Aggregation under Uncertainty: A Behavioral Economics Extension Using Choquet Expectation By William, Barnett; Qing, Han; Jianbo, Zhang
  8. Modelling of Information Spreading in the Population of Taxpayers: Evolutionary Approach By Kumacheva, Suriya Sh.; Gubar, Elena A.; Zhitkova, Ekaterina M.; Kurnosykh, Zlata; Skovorodina, Tatiana
  9. Nash Equilibrium Strategies and Survival Portfolio Rules in Evolutionary Models of Asset Markets By Sergei Belkov; Igor V. Evstigneev; Thorsten Hens
  10. Evolutionary Finance Models with Short Selling and Endogenous Asset Supply By Sergei Belkov; Igor V. Evstigneev; Thorsten Hens
  11. An Evolutionary Perspective on the British Banking Crisis By Neill Marshall; Stuart Dawley; Andy Pike; Jane Pollard; Mike Coombes
  12. An Evolutionary Finance Model with a Risk-Free Asset By Sergei Belkov; Igor V. Evstigneev; Thorsten Hens

  1. By: Remi Jedwab; Felix Meier zu Selhausen; Alexander Moradi
    Abstract: One of the most powerful cultural transformations in modern history has been the dramatic expansion of Christianity outside Europe. Recent, yet extensive, literature uses Christian missions established during colonial times as a source of exogenous variation to study thelong-term effects of religion, human capital and culture in Africa, the Americas and Asia. We argue that the endogeneity of missionary expansion may be underestimated, thus questioning the link between missions and economic development. Using annual panel data on missions from 1751 to 1932 in Ghana as well as cross-sectional data on missions for 43 sub-Saharan African countries in 1900 and 1924, we show that: (i) locational decisions were driven by economic factors, as missionaries went to healthier, safer, and more accessible and developed areas, privileging the best locations first; (ii) these factors may spuriously explain why locations with past missions are more developed today, especially as most studies rely on historical mission atlases that tend to only report the best mission locations. Our study identifies factors behind the spatial diffusion of religion. It also highlights the risks of omission and endogenous measurement error biases when using historical data and events for identification.
    Keywords: Path Dependence; Economic Development; Economics of Religion; Human Capital; Compression of History; Measurement Error; Christianity; Colonization; Africa
    JEL: F54 L31 N37 O15 O17 Z12
    Date: 2018
  2. By: Paul Pezanis-Christou (School of Economics, University of Adelaide); Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods (Bonn) and LUISS (Rome))
    Abstract: We justify risk neutral equilibrium bidding in commonly known fair division games with incomplete information in an evolutionary setup by postulating (i) minimal common knowledge assumptions, (ii) optimally responding agents to conjectural beliefs about how others behave and (iii) evolution of conjectural beliefs with fitness measured by expected payoffs. We axiomatically justify the game forms, derive the evolutionary games for first- and second-price fair division and determine the evolutionarily stable conjectures. The latter coincide with equilibrium bidding, irrespectively of the number of bidders, i.e., heuristic belief adaptation implies the same bidding behavior as equilibrium analysis based on common knowledge and counterfactual bids.
    Date: 2018–07
  3. By: Clement A. Tisdell
    Abstract: Provides a sketch of the development of the concept of bounded rationality in economic thought. The concept of rationality has several meanings. These different meanings are taken into account in considering the further development of economic thought. Different views of ecological rationality are critically examined in the light of these concepts. Whether or not various theories of behavioral economics can be classified as exhibiting bounded rationality is discussed. Satisficing behavior is commonly associated with bounded rationality but as demonstrated, it is not the only reason for adopting such behavior. The idea of some authors that optimization models under constraints are of little or no relevance to bounded rationality is rejected. Bounded rationality is an important contributor to the diversity of (economic) behaviors. This is stressed. Whether or not a behavior is rational depends to a considerable extent on the situation (the constraints) that decision-makers or actors face. The time-constraint is very important as an influence on the rationality of decisions. Aspects of this are covered.
    Keywords: Institutional and Behavioral Economics
    Date: 2017–11–13
  4. By: Pascal Seppecher (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - UP13 - Université Paris 13 - USPC - Université Sorbonne Paris Cité - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Isabelle Salle (Utrecht School of Economics - Utrecht University [Utrecht]); Marc Lavoie (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - UP13 - Université Paris 13 - USPC - Université Sorbonne Paris Cité - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: This paper studies coordination between firms in a multi-sectoral macroeconomic model with endogenous business cycles. Firms are both in competition and interdependent, and set their prices with a markup over unit costs. Markups are heterogeneous and evolve under market pressure. We observe a systematic coordination within firms in each sector, and between each sector. The resulting pattern of relative prices are consistent with the labor theory of value. Those emerging features are robust to technology shocks.
    Keywords: General interdependence, Pricing, Agent-based modeling
    Date: 2017–03–10
  5. By: Raphael Franck; Oded Galor
    Abstract: This research explores the effect of industrialization on the process of development. In contrast to conventional wisdom that views industrial development as a catalyst for economic growth, the study establishes that while the adoption of industrial technology was conducive to economic development in the short-run, it has detrimental effects on the standard of living in the long-run. Exploiting exogenous geographic and climatic sources of variation in the diffusion and adoption of steam engines across French departments during the early phases of industrialization, the research establishes that intensive industrialization in the middle of the 19th century increased income per capita in the subsequent decades but diminished it by the turn of the 21st century. The analysis further suggests that the adverse effect of earlier industrialization on long-run prosperity can be attributed to the negative impact of the adoption of unskilled-intensive technologies in the early stages of industrialization on the long-run level of human capital and thus on the incentive to adopt skill-intensive technologies in the contemporary era. Preferences and educational choices of second generation migrants within France indicate that industrialization has triggered a dual techno-cultural lock-in characterized by a reinforcing interaction between technological inertia, reflected by the persistence predominance of low-skilled-intensive industries, and cultural inertia, in the form of a lower predisposition towards investment in human capital. These findings suggest that the characteristics that permitted the onset of industrialization, rather than the adoption of industrial technology per se, have been the source of prosperity among the currently developed economies that experienced an early industrialization. Thus, developing economies may benefit from the allocation of resources towards human capital formation and skilled intensive sectors rather than toward the promotion of traditional unskilled-intensive industrial sectors.
    Date: 2018
  6. By: Rohan Dutta; David K Levine; Salvatore Modica
    Date: 2018–08–13
  7. By: William, Barnett; Qing, Han; Jianbo, Zhang
    Abstract: A central tenet of behavioral economics is that the axioms producing expected utility maximization by consumers are too strong to be descriptive of rational behavior. The existing theory of monetary services aggregation under risk assume expected utility maximization. We extend those results to uncertainty under weaker axiomatic assumptions by using Choquet expectations. Choquet integration reduces to Riemann integration as a special case under the stronger assumption of additive probability measure, not accepted in the literature on behavioral economics. Our theoretical results on monetary services aggregation are generalizations of prior results, nested as special cases of our results under stronger behavioral assumptions.
    Keywords: Uncertainty Aversion, User Cost, Choquet Expectation, Monetary Aggregation
    JEL: C43 E41 G12
    Date: 2018–07–30
  8. By: Kumacheva, Suriya Sh.; Gubar, Elena A.; Zhitkova, Ekaterina M.; Kurnosykh, Zlata; Skovorodina, Tatiana
    Abstract: Collected papers presented on the Tenth International Conference Game Theory and Management / Editors Leon A. Petrosyan, Nikolay A. Zenkevich. Ó SPb.: Saint Petersburg State University, 2017. Ó 404 p.
    Keywords: tax audit, tax evasion, total tax revenue, information spreading, evolutionary game on networks,
    Date: 2017
  9. By: Sergei Belkov (University of Manchester); Igor V. Evstigneev (University of Manchester); Thorsten Hens (University of Zurich, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH), and Swiss Finance Institute)
    Abstract: We consider a stochastic model of a financial market with one-period assets and endogenous asset prices. The model was initially developed and analyzed in the context of Evolutionary Finance with the main focus on questions of "survival and extinction" of investment strategies (portfolio rules). In this paper we view the model from a different, game-theoretic, perspective and analyze Nash equilibrium properties of survival portfolio rules.
    Keywords: Stochastic games, Evolutionary finance, Capital growth theory, Random dynamical systems.
    JEL: C73 D52 G11
    Date: 2017–08
  10. By: Sergei Belkov (University of Manchester); Igor V. Evstigneev (University of Manchester); Thorsten Hens (University of Zurich, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH), and Swiss Finance Institute)
    Abstract: Evolutionary Finance focuses on questions of "survival and extinction" of investment strategies (portfolio rules) in the market selection process. It analyzes stochastic dynamics of financial markets in which asset prices are determined endogenously by a short-run equilibrium between supply and demand. Equilibrium is formed in each time period in the course of interaction of portfolio rules of competing market participants. A comprehensive theory of evolutionary dynamics of this kind has been developed for models in which short selling is not allowed and asset supply is exogenous. The present paper extends the theory to a class of models with short selling and endogenous asset supply.
    Keywords: Evolutionary finance, Survival portfolio rules, Random dynamical systems
    JEL: C73 D52 G11
    Date: 2017–09
  11. By: Neill Marshall; Stuart Dawley; Andy Pike; Jane Pollard; Mike Coombes
    Abstract: Developing an evolutionary perspective towards the changing anatomy of the banking sector reveals the enduring tensions and contradictions between spatial centralisation and the possibilities for decentralisation before, during and after the British banking crisis. The shift from banking boom to crisis in 2007 is conceptualised as a significant and on-going moment in the long-term evolution of the historical institutional-spatial dominance of London over other city-regions in Britain. The analysis demonstrates the importance of the institutional and geographical legacies of the British national political economy and variegation of capitalism established in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in shaping contemporary geographical outcomes. Regulatory changes combined with financial innovation in the latter years of the twentieth century to create an opportunity for English regional and Scottish banks excluded from previous institutional-spatial centralisation to expand excessively and consequently several failed in the banking crisis. The paper considers the future trajectory of institutional-spatial centralisation in the banking sector amidst the continued spatial restructuring of the banking crisis, involving a re-drawing of organisational boundaries, overlapping institutional and technological changes and unprecedented uncertainty about the impact of Brexit on Britain?s wider political and economic landscape.
    Keywords: Banking crisis, evolutionary geographical political economy, cities and regions, uneven development
    JEL: R10 R12 R23 J21 J24
    Date: 2018–08
  12. By: Sergei Belkov (University of Manchester); Igor V. Evstigneev (University of Manchester); Thorsten Hens (University of Zurich, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH), and Swiss Finance Institute)
    Abstract: The purpose of this work is to develop an evolutionary finance model with a risk-free asset playing the role of a numeraire. The model describes a market where one risk-free and several "short-lived" risky assets (securities) are traded in discrete time. The risky securities live one period, yield random payoffs at the end of it, and then are identically re-born at the beginning of the next period. The main goal of the study is to identify investment strategies that make it possible for an investor to "survive" in the market selection process. It is shown that a strategy of this kind exists, is in a sense asymptotically unique and can be described by a simple explicit formula amenable for quantitative investment analysis.
    Keywords: Evolutionary finance, Survival portfolio rules, Risk-free asset, Random dynamical systems.
    JEL: C73 D52 G11
    Date: 2017–11

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