nep-evo New Economics Papers
on Evolutionary Economics
Issue of 2018‒06‒11
five papers chosen by
Matthew Baker
City University of New York

  1. Somatic Distance, Cultural Affinities, Trust and Trade By Jacques Melitz; Farid Toubal
  2. Ancestral characteristics of modern populations By Giuliano, Paola; Nunn, Nathan
  3. Time preferences between individuals and groups in the transition from hunter-gatherer to industrial societiesm By Yayan Hernuryadin; Koji Kotani; Yoshio Kamijo
  4. Micro and macro policies in the Keynes +Schumpeter evolutionary models By Giovanni Dosi; Mauro Napoletano; Andrea Roventini; Tania Treibich
  5. Public Goods Games and Psychological Utility: Theory and Evidence By Sanjit Dhami; Mengxing Wei; Ali al-Nowaihi

  1. By: Jacques Melitz; Farid Toubal
    Abstract: Somatic distance, or differences in physical appearance, proves to be extremely important in the gravity model of bilateral trade in conformity with results in other areas of economics and outside of it in the social sciences. This is also true quite independently of survey evidence about bilateral trust. These findings are obtained in a sample of the 15 members of the European Economic Association in 1996. Robustness tests also show that somatic distance has a more reliable influence on bilateral trade than the other cultural variables. The article finally discusses the interpretation and the breadth of application of these results.
    Keywords: somatic distance, cultural interactions, trust, language, bilateral trade
    JEL: F10 F40 Z10
    Date: 2018
  2. By: Giuliano, Paola; Nunn, Nathan
    Abstract: We construct a database, with global coverage, that provides measures of the cultural and environmental characteristics of the pre-industrial ancestors of the world's current populations. In this paper, we describe the construction of the database, including the underlying data, the procedure to produce the estimates, and the structure of the final data. We then provide illustrations of some of the variation in the data and provide an illustration of how the data can be used.
    Keywords: cultural traits; Historical development; Persistence; Political Institutions
    JEL: N00 Z10 Z13
    Date: 2018–05
  3. By: Yayan Hernuryadin (School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology); Koji Kotani (School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology); Yoshio Kamijo (School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology)
    Abstract: Three societies of the hunter-gatherer, the agrarian and the industrial represent the course of human history for cultural and economic development. In this course, each society exhibits distinct cultures and daily life practices that shape human behaviors and preferences, characterizing temporal actions and consequences at individual and group levels. We examine individual and group time preferences as well as their relation across the three societies. To this end, we conduct a field experiment of eliciting individual and group discount factors in the societies of Indonesia: (i) the fisheries, (ii) the farming and (iii) the urban ones as a proxy of the hunter-gatherer, the agrarian and the industrial, respectively. We find that both individual and group discount factors are the lowest (highest) in the fisheries (agrarian) society among the three, while those in the urban are in the middle. We identify that the determinants of group discount factors differ across societies; members of the lowest and middle discount factors in a group play an important role in forming a group discount factor in fisheries societies, while only the member with the middle discount factor is a key in agrarian and urban societies. Overall, our results suggest that individual and group discount factors non-monotonically change as societies transition from fisheries to agrarian and from agrarian to urban ones, and comparatively shortsighted people (the lowest and middle) are more influential than farsighted people in forming group time preferences.
    Keywords: discount factors, individual and group time preferences, fisheries, farming, urban
    Date: 2018–06
  4. By: Giovanni Dosi (Laboratory of Economics and Management); Mauro Napoletano (Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques); Andrea Roventini (Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM)); Tania Treibich (Maastricht University)
    Abstract: Abstract This paper presents the family of the Keynes+Schumpeter (K+S, cf. Dosi et al, J Econ Dyn Control 34 1748–1767 2010, J Econ Dyn Control 37 1598–1625 2013, J Econ Dyn Control 52 166–189 2015) evolutionary agent-based models, which study the effects of a rich ensemble of innovation, industrial dynamics and macroeconomic policies on the long-term growth and short-run fluctuations of the economy. The K+S models embed the Schumpeterian growth paradigm into a complex system of imperfect coordination among heterogeneous interacting firms and banks, where Keynesian (demand-related) and Minskian (credit cycle) elements feed back into the meso and macro dynamics. The model is able to endogenously generate long-run growth together with business cycles and major crises. Moreover, it reproduces a long list of macroeconomic and microeconomic stylized facts. Here, we discuss a series of experiments on the role of policies affecting i) innovation, ii) industry dynamics, iii) demand and iv) income distribution. Our results suggest the presence of strong complementarities between Schumpeterian (technological)
    Keywords: Keynes; Schumpeter; Evolutionary models
    Date: 2017–01
  5. By: Sanjit Dhami; Mengxing Wei; Ali al-Nowaihi
    Abstract: We consider a theoretical model of a public goods game that incorporates reciprocity, guilt-aversion/surprise-seeking, and the attribution of intentions behind these emotions. In order to test our predictions, we implement the ‘induced beliefs method’ and a within-subjects design, using the strategy method. We find that all our psychological variables contribute towards the explanation of contributions. Guilt-aversion is pervasive at the individual-level and the aggregate-level and it is relatively more important than surprise-seeking. Our between-subjects analysis confirms the results of the within-subjects design.
    Keywords: public goods games, psychological game theory, reciprocity, surprise-seeking/guilt-aversion, attribution of intentions, induced beliefs method, within and between subjects designs
    JEL: D01 D03 H41
    Date: 2018

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