nep-evo New Economics Papers
on Evolutionary Economics
Issue of 2018‒05‒28
six papers chosen by
Matthew Baker
City University of New York

  1. Diversity and Conflict By Arbatli, Cemal Eren; Ashraf, Quamrul; Galor, Oded; Klemp, Marc
  2. Social Norms, Endogenous Sorting and the Culture of Cooperation By Fehr, Ernst; Williams, Tony
  3. Evaluating Trust and Trustworthiness in Social Groups and Networks By O'Higgins, Niall; Mazzoni, Clelia; Sbriglia, Patrizia
  4. Stunting: past, present, future By Schneider, Eric B.
  5. Colonial Legacy, State-building and the Salience of Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa By Ali, Merima; Fjeldstad, Odd†Helge; Jiang, Boqian; Shifa, Abdulaziz B.
  6. Perpetual growth, distribution, and robots By Nomaler, Onder; Verspagen, Bart

  1. By: Arbatli, Cemal Eren (National Research University); Ashraf, Quamrul (Williams College); Galor, Oded (Brown University); Klemp, Marc (University of Copenhagen)
    Abstract: This research advances the hypothesis and establishes empirically that interpersonal population diversity has contributed significantly to the emergence, prevalence, recurrence, and severity of intrasocietal conflicts. Exploiting an exogenous source of variations in population diversity across nations and ethnic groups, it demonstrates that population diversity, as determined predominantly during the exodus of humans from Africa tens of thousands of years ago, has contributed significantly to the risk and intensity of historical and contemporary internal conflicts, accounting for the confounding effects of geographical, institutional, and cultural characteristics, as well as for the level of economic development. These findings arguably reflect the adverse effect of population diversity on interpersonal trust, its contribution to divergence in preferences for public goods and redistributive policies, and its impact on the degree of fractionalization and polarization across ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups.
    Keywords: social conflict, population diversity, ethnic fractionalization, ethnic polarization, interpersonal trust, political preferences
    JEL: D74 N30 N40 O11 O43 Z13
    Date: 2018–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11487&r=evo
  2. By: Fehr, Ernst (University of Zurich); Williams, Tony (University of Zurich)
    Abstract: Throughout human history, informal sanctions played a key role in the enforcement of social norms and the provision of public goods. However, a considerable body of evidence suggests that informal peer sanctions often cause large efficiency costs. This raises the question whether alternative (peer) sanctioning systems exist that avoid these costs and will be preferred by the people. Here, we show that welfare-enhancing peer sanctioning without much need for costly punishment emerges quickly if we introduce two relevant features of social life into the experiment: (i) subjects can migrate across groups with different sanctioning institutions and (ii) they have the chance to achieve consensus about normatively appropriate behavior. The exogenous removal of the norm consensus opportunity reduces the efficiency of peer punishment and renders centralized sanctioning by an elected judge the dominant institution. However, if given the choice, subjects universally reject peer sanctioning without a norm consensus opportunity – an institution that has hitherto dominated research in this field – in favor of peer sanctioning with a norm consensus opportunity or an equally efficient institution with centralized punishment by an elected judge. Migration opportunities and normative consensus building are key to the quick emergence of an efficient culture of universal cooperation because the more prosocial subjects populate the two efficient institutions first, elect prosocial judges (if institutionally possible), and immediately establish a social norm of high cooperation. This norm appears to guide subjects' cooperation and punishment choices, including the virtually complete removal of antisocial punishment when judges make the sanctioning decision.
    Keywords: cooperation, punishment, endogenous institutions, public goods
    JEL: D02 D03 D72 H41
    Date: 2018–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11457&r=evo
  3. By: O'Higgins, Niall (ILO International Labour Organization); Mazzoni, Clelia (University of Campania-Luigi Vanvitelli); Sbriglia, Patrizia (University of Campania-Luigi Vanvitelli)
    Abstract: Trust and trustworthiness are important components of social capital and much attention has been devoted to their correct evaluation. In this paper, we argue that individuals' trust and trustworthiness are strongly dependent on the level of trust and trustworthiness of the social group in which subjects operate. Attitudinal indicators which are often used to measure trust and trustworthiness in economic and sociological studies are proxies of the individual's propensity to trust, but are insufficient measures of the effective level of trust since the latter may be strongly affected by the behaviour of the components of the individuals' social groups. In order to test our hypothesis, we use a rich dataset based on two experiments on the Trust Game (Berg et al.; 1995), where subjects also filled a questionnaire containing the main attitudinal questions the EVS (the European Value Survey) uses to measure individuals' trust. We then compare the ex-ante behavioural and attitudinal measures of trust with the ex post relative measures. Our main finding is that trust strongly varies once the individual is informed on the on the level of trustworthiness of the social group to which he\she has been allocated during the experiment. This difference is higher the higher is the family level of income and the parental education status of the subjects. We also find that relative behavioural measures are not correlated to attitudinal measures (Glaeser et al., 2000, Lazzarini, 2005), but they are strongly correlated to groups' trustworthiness. We also find that similar social preferences profiles (between Senders and Recipients) tend to enhance the degree of behavioural trust.
    Keywords: social capital, trust, experiments
    JEL: C91 C92
    Date: 2018–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11459&r=evo
  4. By: Schneider, Eric B.
    Abstract: Child malnutrition is a very important global health challenge. 155 million children globally suffer from malnutrition and are consequently stunted, much shorter than healthy children at the same age. Reducing stunting was an important target in the Millenium Development Goals and is also a target under Goal 2 of the Sustainable Development Goals. This report summarises recent research on child stunting that was presented and discussed at a conference, STUNTING: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE, at the London School of Economics and Political Science in September 2017. The conference brought together academics across a wide range of disciplines with policy experts and influencers from the third sector. There were four key lessons that participants took away from the conference. First, stunting was present in currently developed countries at the beginning of the twentieth century, which suggests that reductions in stunting were a corollary to the secular increase in mean adult height across the twentieth century. Second, there needs to be more research on catchup growth in adolescence to determine whether catch-up growth in height is also associated with improvements in other dimensions of health and human capital that are affected by malnutrition, for instance cognitive deficiencies. If interventions in adolescence can be effective, then it may be possible to mitigate some of the consequences of stunting for already stunted children. Third, researchers need to be aware of the large degree of spatial variation in stunting within countries and the distinct age pattern of stunting between ages 0 and 5 when trying to understand why children become stunted. Fourth, participants agreed that more interdisciplinary collaboration is necessary to design experiments and models to capture the multi-dimensional nature of child stunting.
    JEL: N0 I1
    Date: 2017–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:wpaper:87939&r=evo
  5. By: Ali, Merima; Fjeldstad, Odd†Helge; Jiang, Boqian; Shifa, Abdulaziz B.
    Abstract: African colonial history suggests that British colonial rule may have undermined state centralisation due to legacies of ethnic segregation and stronger executive constraints. Using micro†data from anglophone and francophone countries in sub†Saharan Africa, we find that anglophone citizens are less likely to identify themselves in national terms (relative to ethnic terms). To address endogeneity concerns, we utilise regression discontinuity by focusing on observations near anglophone−francophone borders, both across countries and within Cameroon. Evidence on taxation, security and the power of chiefs also suggests weaker state capacity in anglophone countries. These results highlight the legacy of colonial rule on state†building.
    Keywords: Governance,
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idq:ictduk:13752&r=evo
  6. By: Nomaler, Onder (ECIS, TU Eindhoven); Verspagen, Bart (UNU-MERIT, Maastricht University)
    Abstract: The current literature on the economic effects of machine learning, robotisation and artificial intelligence suggests that there may be an upcoming wave of substitution of human labour by machines (including software). We take this as a reason to rethink the traditional ways in which technological change has been represented in economic models. In doing so, we contribute to the recent literature on so-called perpetual growth, i.e., growth of per capita income without technological progress. When technology embodied in capital goods are sufficiently advanced, per capita growth becomes possible with a non-progressing state of technology. We present a simple Solow-like growth model that incorporates these ideas. The model predicts a rising wage rate but declining share of wage income in the steady state growth path. We present simulation experiments on several policy options to combat the inequality that results from this, including a universal basic income as well as an option in which workers become owners of "robots".
    Keywords: perpetual economic growth, economic effects of robots, income distribution
    JEL: O15 O41 O33 E25 P17
    Date: 2018–05–23
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:unumer:2018023&r=evo

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