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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Ashraf, Quamrul; Cinnirella, Francesco; Galor, Oded; Gershman, Boris; Hornung, Erik |
| Abstract: | This paper advances a novel hypothesis regarding the historical roots of labor emancipation. It argues that the decline of coercive labor institutions in the industrial phase of development has been an inevitable by-product of the intensification of capital-skill complementarity in the production process. In light of the growing significance of skilled labor for fostering the return to physical capital, elites in society were induced to relinquish their historically profitable coercion of labor in favor of employing free skilled workers, thereby incentivizing the masses to engage in broad-based human capital acquisition, without fear of losing their skill premium to expropriation. In line with the proposed hypothesis, exploiting a plausibly exogenous source of variation in proto-industrialization across regions of nineteenth-century Prussia, the initial abundance of elite-owned physical capital that also came to be associated with skill-intensive industrialization is shown to have contributed to the subsequent intensity of de facto serf emancipation. |
| Keywords: | capital-skill complementarity; demand for human capital; emancipation; Industrialization; Labor coercion; nineteenth-century Prussia; physical capital accumulation; serfdom |
| JEL: | J24 J47 N13 N33 O14 O15 O43 |
| Date: | 2018–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12822&r=evo |
| By: | Klaus Wälde |
| Abstract: | We present a psychological model of stress. Appraisal translates stressors into subjective stress. Stress reduces instantaneous utility of an individual directly and via cognitive load. Coping can be under the control of the individual or more automatic. We predict the occurrence of uncontrolled coping .emotional outbursts .as a function of an individual’s theory-consistent personality and environment. We explain when stressors reduce income. We also explain under which conditions rising income does not go hand in hand with rising stress. First steps towards a theory of therapy show how stressed individuals can improve their well-being beyond standard coping measures. |
| Keywords: | stress, coping, personality, controlled vs. automatic reaction, emotional outbursts, income. |
| JEL: | D03 D91 I12 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6966&r=evo |
| By: | Lüger, Tim |
| Abstract: | Over the past two decades, there have been numerous attempts in economic theory to model the historical regime of a Malthusian trap as well as the transition to growth in one coherent framework, or in other words, a unified growth theory. However, in most of these models, an important effect suggested by Malthus has been frequently omitted. By including what he had called "the great preventive check" in the traditional Malthusian model which is based on the principle of population, the principle of diminishing returns and the principle of labor division, the transition can be modelled in a very simple dynamic macroeconomic framework. The aim of this paper is to first construct and calibrate the suggested classical model and to eventually employ a conventional VAR-Method to provide evidence of the above principles using country-specific annual historical data on crude birth rate, crude death rate and GDP per capita growth rate. As a result, it is argued that emerging economies follow a universal macroeconomic pattern of development. A decreasing death rate is succeeded by a decreasing birth rate which at the same time induces GDP per capita to rise sustainably. The correspondingly advanced microeconomic theory suggests that increasing life expectancy tends to create a demographic structure that is much less prone to overpopulation. |
| Keywords: | Demographic Transition,Malthusian Trap,Unified Growth Theory,Classical Growth Theory,Vectorautoregression |
| JEL: | B12 C32 J11 O11 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:darddp:231&r=evo |
| By: | Lüger, Tim |
| Abstract: | In spite of two centuries of extensive debate, a consistent framework of the classical theory of population on which economists can universally agree has not been established. This means that either the theory lacks consistency or it has been misunderstood in important ways. This paper attempts to settle this issue by arguing that the latter was the case, revealing prevailing misconceptions. Since a large amount of these misconceptions most probably arose from the lack of a consistent nomenclature, the paper intends to clarify the classical theory of population by employing unambiguous definitions of the principle of population, the Malthusian trap, positive checks and preventive checks to population. The classical theory of population can then be applied to analyze the transition from economic stagnation to economic growth. As a result, numerous current theories trying to explain the transition to growth that are based on an increase of production will prove secondary when compared to the great preventive check. |
| Keywords: | Demographic Transition,Malthusian Trap,Unified Growth Theory,Classical Growth Theory,Positive Checks,Preventive Checks |
| JEL: | B12 J1 N3 O11 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:darddp:232&r=evo |
| By: | Giuseppe Attanasi; Pierpaolo Battigalli; Elena Manzoni; Rosemarie Nagel |
| Abstract: | We study in a theoretical and experimental setting the interaction between belief-dependent preferences and reputation building in a nitely repeated trust game. We focus mainly on the effect of guilt aversion. In a simple two-types model, we analyze the effect of reputation building in presence of guilt-averse players and derive behavioral predictions. In the experiment, we elicit information on trustees belief-dependent preferences and disclose it to the paired trustor before the repeated game. Our ex- perimental results show that disclosing information on the trustees belief-dependent preferences and thus letting players play the repeated trust game in presence of almost complete information leads to higher trust and cooperation than in the corresponding incomplete information game setting. In particular, disclosure of information on preferences of guilt-averse trustees also enhances the trustorscooperation. Disclosure of information on belief-dependent preferences of reciprocity-concerned trustees, instead, does not lead to higher trust and cooperation. We show that this is theoretically consistent with subjects featuring low reciprocity concerns. JEL classifi cation: C72; C73; C91. Keywords: Repeated psychological game; reputation; guilt; reciprocity; almost complete information. |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:622&r=evo |