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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Wolff, Irenaeus |
| Abstract: | I show that whether participants generally believe in others’ preference stability is a crucial determinant of behaviour. Whether a participant’s behaviour can be predicted by her best-response or a Nash-equilibrium in a context where she can observe others' elicited preferences depends heavily both on the participant having stable preferences and on her generally believing in others’ preference stability. The latter is true because such a belief is associated with less dispersed beliefs. |
| JEL: | C72 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168231&r=evo |
| By: | Armin Falk; Anke Becker; Thomas Dohmen; Benjamin Enke; David B. Huffman; Uwe Sunde |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the global variation in economic preferences. For this purpose, we present the Global Preference Survey (GPS), an experimentally validated survey dataset of time preference, risk preference, positive and negative reciprocity, altruism, and trust from 80,000 individuals in 76 countries. The data reveal substantial heterogeneity in preferences across countries, but even larger within-country heterogeneity. Across individuals, preferences vary with age, gender, and cognitive ability, yet these relationships appear partly country specific. At the country level, the data reveal correlations between preferences and bio-geographic and cultural variables such as agricultural suitability, language structure, and religion. Variation in preferences is also correlated with economic outcomes and behaviors. Within countries and subnational regions, preferences are linked to individual savings decisions, labor market choices, and prosocial behaviors. Across countries, preferences vary with aggregate outcomes ranging from per capita income, to entrepreneurial activities, to the frequency of armed conflicts. |
| JEL: | D0 D03 D9 |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23943&r=evo |
| By: | Andrej Angelovski (LUISS Guido Carli, Rome); Daniela Di Cagno (LUISS Guido Carli, Rome); Werner Güth (Luiss Guido Carli, Rome; Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Frankfurt; Max Planck Institute on Collective Goods, Bonn); Daniela Grieco (Università Bocconi) |
| Abstract: | To shed light on the choice between trusting a partner versus monitoring her, we let one party decide between two stylized game paradigms—namely, the Ultimatum Game and the Yes–No Game. While in Ultimatum Games responders monitor the allocation proposal, in Yes–No Games, responders react without monitoring. Since monitoring can be costly, we allow the shared amount in Yes–No Games to be larger than that in Ultimatum Games. Experimental conditions can vary the monitoring cost, who decides between trusting and monitoring (i.e., proposer or responder), and whether the responder’s conflict payoff will be negative or positive. The latter brings about Yes–No Game (i.e., trusting) social dilemma situations. We question whether some responders opt for trusting and predominantly accept an unknown offer, especially when justified by efficiency concerns, and whether some proposers, due to behavioral concerns, are more inclined to suggest monitoring. |
| Keywords: | Trust, Monitoring, Institutional Choice, Ultimatum Game, Yes No Game |
| JEL: | C91 C72 C73 |
| Date: | 2017–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lui:cesare:1707&r=evo |
| By: | Björn Bartling; Yagiz Özdemir |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the impact of a key feature of competitive markets on moral behavior: the possibility that a competitor will step in and conclude the deal if a conscientious market actor forgoes a profitable business opportunity for ethical reasons. We study experimentally whether people employ the argument “if I don’t do it, someone else will” to justify taking a narrowly self-interested action. Our data reveal a clear pattern. Subjects do not employ the “replacement excuse” if a social norm exists that classifies the selfish action as immoral. But if no social norm exists, subjects are more inclined to take a selfish action in situations where another subject can otherwise take it. By demonstrating the importance of social norms of moral behavior for limiting the power of the replacement excuse, our paper informs the long-standing debate on the effect of markets on morals. |
| Keywords: | replacement excuse, social norms, moral behavior, competition, markets, utilitarianism, deontological ethics |
| JEL: | C92 D02 D63 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6696&r=evo |
| By: | Simon Gaechter; Leonie Gerhards; Daniele Nosenzo |
| Abstract: | A burgeoning literature in economics has started examining the role of social norms in explaining economic behavior. Surprisingly, the vast majority of this literature has studied social norms in asocial decision settings, where individuals are observed to act in isolation from each other. In this paper we use a large-scale dictator game experiment (N = 850) to show that “peers†can have a profound influence on individuals’ perceptions of norms of fair sharing, which we elicit in an incentive compatible way. However, in contrast to these strong peer effects in social norms of fair sharing, we find limited evidence of the influence of norms and peers on actual sharing behavior. We discuss how these results can be explained by heterogeneity in normative views as well as in willingness to comply with norms. |
| Keywords: | social norms, norm compliance, peer effects, fair sharing, dictator game, framing, experiments |
| JEL: | A13 C92 D03 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6497&r=evo |