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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Buggle, Johannes; Durante, Ruben |
| Abstract: | This research examines the historical relationship between economic risk and the evolution of social cooperation. We hypothesize that norms of generalized trust developed in pre-industrial times as a result of experiences of cooperation triggered by the need of subsistence farmers to cope with climatic risk. These norms persisted over time, even after climate had become largely unimportant for economic activity. We test this hypothesis for Europe combining high-resolution climate data for the period 1500-2000 with survey data at the sub-national level. We find that regions with higher inter-annual variability in precipitation and temperature display higher levels of trust. This effect is driven by variability in the growing season months, and by historical rather than recent variability. Regarding possible mechanisms, we find that regions with more variable climate were more closely connected to the Medieval trade network, indicating a higher propensity to engage in inter-community exchange. These regions were also more likely to adopt inclusive political institutions earlier on, and are characterized by a higher quality of local governments still today. Our findings suggest that, by favoring the emergence of mutually-reinforcing norms and institutions, exposure to environmental risk had a long-lasting impact on human cooperation. |
| Keywords: | Climate; Cooperation; Persistence; Political Institutions; Risk; Trust |
| JEL: | N53 O11 O13 Q54 Z10 |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12380&r=evo |
| By: | Hodler, Roland; Valsecchi, Michele; Vesperoni, Alberto |
| Abstract: | The effects of ethnic geography, i.e., the distribution of ethnic groups across space, on economic, political and social outcomes are not well understood. We develop a novel index of ethnic segregation that takes both ethnic and spatial distances between individuals into account. Importantly, we can decompose this index into indices of spatial dispersion, generalized ethnic fractionalization, and the alignment of spatial and ethnic distances. We use maps of traditional ethnic homelands, historical population density data, and language trees to compute these four indices for more than 150 countries. We apply these indices to study the relation between historical ethnic geography and current economic, political and social outcomes. Among other things, we document that countries with higher historical alignment, i.e., countries where ethnically diverse individuals lived far apart, have higher-quality government, higher incomes and higher levels of trust. |
| Keywords: | economic development; ethnic diversity; ethnic geography; fractionalization; quality of government; Segregation; trust. |
| JEL: | C43 D63 O10 Z13 |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12378&r=evo |
| By: | Todd R. Kaplan, Bradley J. Ruffle, Ze'ev Shtudiner (Wilfrid Laurier University) |
| Abstract: | Efficient cooperation often requires coordination, such that exactly one of two players takes an available action. If the decisions whether to pursue the action are made simultaneously, then neither or both may acquiesce leading to an inefficient outcome. However, inefficiency may be reduced if players move sequentially. We test this experimentally by introducing repeated two-stage versions of such a game where the action is individually profitable. In one version, players may wait in the first stage to see what their partner did and then coordinate in the second stage. In another version, sequential decision-making is imposed by assigning one player to move in stage one and the other in stage two. Although there are fewer cooperative decisions in the two-stage treatments, we show that overall subjects coordinate better on efficient cooperation and on avoiding both acquiescing. Yet, only some pairs actually achieve higher profits, while the least cooperative pairs do worse in the two-stage games than their single-stage counterparts. For these, rather than facilitating coordination, the additional stage invites attempts to disguise uncooperative play, which are met with punishment. |
| Keywords: | experimental economics, cooperation, efficiency, two-stage games, turntaking |
| JEL: | C90 Z13 |
| Date: | 2017–09–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wlu:lcerpa:0105&r=evo |
| By: | Eder, Christoph; Halla, Martin |
| Abstract: | We explore the origins of the cultural norm regarding illegitimacy and test the hypothesis that traditional agricultural production structures influenced the historical illegitimacy ratio, and have a lasting effect until today. Based on data dating back to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, we use exogenous variation in the local agricultural suitability to show that descendants from societies focusing on animal husbandry (and not crop farming) are today still more likely to have a non-marital birth. |
| JEL: | J13 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168090&r=evo |
| By: | José Garcia Montalvo; Marta Reynal-Querol |
| Abstract: | The relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and economic growth is complex. Empirical research working with cross-country data nds a negative, or statistically insignificant, relationship. However, research at the city level usually finds a positive relationship between diversity and wages/productivity. Generally, the trade-off between the economic benefits of diversity and the costs of heterogeneity implies that the relationship between diversity and growth depends on the size of the area used as the unit of observation. In this paper we perform a systematic analysis of the effect of the size of geographical units on the relationship between ethnic diversity and growth. We nd a positive relationship for small geographical areas and no effect for large areas and countries. There are potentially different mechanisms that can explain this result depending on the structure of the economy and its level of development. In the case of Africa, we argue that a possible explanation of the positive relationship between diversity and growth is the increase in trade at the boundaries between ethnic groups due to ethnic specialization. |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upf:upfgen:1585&r=evo |