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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Jensen, Martin Kaae (Department of Economics, University of Leicester); Rigos, Alexandros (Department of Economics, Lund University) |
| Abstract: | This study considers evolutionary models with non-uniformly random matching when interaction occurs in groups of n>=2 individuals. In such models, groups with different compositions of individuals generally co-exist and the reproductive success (fitness) of a specific strategy – and consequently long-run behavior in the population – varies with the frequencies of different group types. These frequencies crucially depend on the particular matching process at hand. Two new equilibrium concepts are introduced: Nash equilibrium under a matching rule (NEMR) and evolutionarily stable strategy under a matching rule (ESSMR). When matching is uniformly random, these reduce to Nash equilibrium and evolutionarily stable strategy, respectively. Several results that are known to hold for population games under uniform random matching carry through to our setting. In our most novel contribution, we derive results on the efficiency of the Nash equilibria of population games and show that for any (fixed) payoff structure, there always exists some matching rule leading to average fitness maximization in NEMR. Finally, we provide a series of applications to commonly studied normal-form games. |
| Keywords: | evolutionary game theory; evolutionarily stable strategy; ESS; non-uniformly random matching |
| JEL: | C72 C73 |
| Date: | 2017–09–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2017_011&r=evo |
| By: | Hannes Rusch (Philipps-Universität Marburg) |
| Abstract: | A recent series of papers has introduced a fresh perspective on the problem of the evolution of human cooperation by suggesting an amendment to the concept of cooperation itself: instead of thinking of cooperation as playing a particular strategy in a given game, usually C in the prisoner's dilemma, we could also think of cooperation as collaboration, i.e. as coalitional strategy choice, such as jointly switching from (D;D) to (C;C). The present paper complements previous work on collaboration by expanding on its genericity: conditions for the evolutionary viability and stability of collaboration under fairly undemanding assumptions about population and interaction structure are derived. Doing so, this paper shows that collaboration is an adaptive principle of strategy choice in a broad range of niches, i.e., stochastic mixtures of games. |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:201739&r=evo |
| By: | Florian Herold (University of Bamberg, Germany); Christoph Kuzmics (University of Graz, Austria) |
| Abstract: | Individuals are randomly matched to play an ex-ante symmetric hawk-dove game. Individuals assume one of a finite set of observable labels and condition their action choice on their opponent's label. We study the evolutionary stability of chosen labels and their social interaction structure. Evolutionary stable social structures are different for games in which a dove player prefers the opponent to play hawk (anti-coordination games), and those in which everyone prefers their opponent to play dove (confl ict games). Non-trivial hierarchical social structures can only emerge in anti-coordination games. Egalitarian social structures can emerge in both, but are more fragile in con flict games. |
| Keywords: | Evolution; Hawk-Dove Games; Roles |
| JEL: | C72 C73 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grz:wpaper:2017-09&r=evo |
| By: | Committee, Nobel Prize (Nobel Prize Committee) |
| Abstract: | Economists aim to develop models of human behavior and interactions in markets and other economic settings. But we humans behave in complex ways. Although we try to make rational decisions, we have limited cognitive abilities and limited willpower. While our decisions are often guided by self-interest, we also care about fairness and equity. Moreover cognitive abilities, self-control, and motivation can vary significantly across different individuals. |
| Keywords: | Behavioral economics; |
| JEL: | D03 D90 G02 |
| Date: | 2017–10–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:nobelp:2017_001&r=evo |
| By: | Committee, Nobel Prize (Nobel Prize Committee) |
| Abstract: | The American economist Richard H. Thaler is a pioneer in behavioural economics, a research field in which insights from psychological research are applied to economic decision-making. A behavioural perspective incorporates more realistic analysis of how people think and behave when making economic decisions, providing new opportunities for designing measures and institutions that increase societal benefit. |
| Keywords: | Behavioral economics; |
| JEL: | D03 D90 G02 |
| Date: | 2017–10–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:nobelp:2017_002&r=evo |