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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Gerardo Infante (UEA - University of East Anglia (Norwich)); Guilhem Lecouteux (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - Polytechnique - X - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Robert Sugden (UEA - University of East Anglia (Norwich)) |
| Abstract: | Neoclassical economics assumes that individuals have stable and context-independent preferences, and uses preference satisfaction as a normative criterion. By calling this assumption into question, behavioural findings cause fundamental problems for normative economics. A common response to these problems is to treat deviations from conventional rational choice theory as mistakes, and to try to reconstruct the preferences that individuals would have acted on, had they reasoned correctly. We argue that this preference purification approach implicitly uses a dualistic model of the human being, in which an inner rational agent is trapped in an outer psychological shell. This model is psychologically and philosophically problematic. |
| Keywords: | context-dependent preferences, behavioural welfare economics, libertarian paternalism,preference purification, inner rational agent |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01427046&r=evo |
| By: | Julien Benistant (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Etienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Etienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Using a real-effort experiment, we studied how minimal group identity affects unethical behavior in a contest game. We varied (i) whether individuals had to report their own output or the output of their competitor, (ii) whether group identity was induced or not, and (iii) whether pairs of competitors shared the same group identity or not. We show that individuals misreported in the same proportion and to the same extent by inflating their output or by decreasing their opponent's output. Misreporting was affected neither by the competitor's group identity nor by the individual's beliefs about misreporting. This suggests that in such competitive settings, unethical behavior is mainly driven by an unconditional desire to win. Abstract: Using a real-effort experiment, we studied how minimal group identity affects unethical behavior in a contest game. We varied (i) whether individuals had to report their own output or the output of their competitor, (ii) whether group identity was induced or not, and (iii) whether pairs of competitors shared the same group identity or not. We show that individuals misreported in the same proportion and to the same extent by inflating their output or by decreasing their opponent's output. Misreporting was affected neither by the competitor's group identity nor by the individual's beliefs about misreporting. This suggests that in such competitive settings, unethical behavior is mainly driven by an unconditional desire to win. |
| Keywords: | lying, group identity, competition, experiment,Unethical behavior |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01592007&r=evo |
| By: | Friedel BOLLE (European University Viadrina, Germany.); Jonathan H.W. TAN (University of Nottingham, UK.) |
| Abstract: | The Vendetta Game dynamically models conflict resolution processes in which players can take turns to steal from one another probabilities of winning a prize. Vendettas are far more prevalent in the laboratory than predicted in equilibrium, assuming self-interest or even spite. To make sense of this, we identify four behavioral types each with their temperaments: melancholic Gamesmen (27%) who play equilibrium, antisocially sanguine Sharks (53%) who optimistically demand more than their equilibrium share, choleric Educators (17%) who punish greedy co-players or otherwise play equilibrium, and phlegmatic Meeks (3%) who demand less than their equilibrium share. Within games, i.e. through the course of stealing and counter-stealing, non-Sharks become greedier. Across games, the characteristic profiles of subject types sharpen with experience. Sharks earn least and Meeks earn most. The clash of temperaments perpetuates feuds. We compare our four types with the types of players observed in the related Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. |
| Keywords: | conflict; vendetta game; experiment; temperaments; types |
| JEL: | C72 D74 |
| Date: | 2017–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nan:wpaper:1708&r=evo |
| By: | James B. Ang (Department of Economics, Nanyang Technological University, 14 Nanyang Drive, Singapore 637332.); Per G. Fredriksson (Department of Economics, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY 40292, USA.) |
| Abstract: | Several recent contributions to the literature have suggested that the strength of family ties is related to various economic and social outcomes. For example, Alesina and Giuliano (2014) highlight that the strength of family ties is strongly correlated with lower GDP and lower quality of institutions. However, the forces shaping family ties remain relatively unexplored in the literature. This paper proposes and tests the hypothesis that the agricultural legacy of a country matters for shaping the strength of its family ties. Using data from the World Values Survey and the European Values Study, the results show that societies with a legacy in cultivating wheat tend to have weaker family ties. Analysis at the sub-national level (US data) and the country level corroborate these ?ndings. The estimations allow for alternative hypotheses which propose that pathogen stress and climatic variation can potentially also give rise to the formation of family ties. The results suggest that the suitability of land for wheat production is the most influential factor in explaining the variation in the strength of family ties across societies and countries. |
| Keywords: | Family ties; agriculture; long-run comparative development |
| JEL: | O1 Q1 Z1 |
| Date: | 2017–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nan:wpaper:1705&r=evo |
| By: | Dasgupta, Indraneel (Indian Statistical Institute); Neogi, Ranajoy Guha (Indian Statistical Institute) |
| Abstract: | We model political contestation over school language policy, within linguistic communities where weak property rights protection leads to high decentralized expropriation. We show that improvements in governance institutions that facilitate property rights protection might exacerbate such language conflicts, even as they reduce the chances of persisting with educational indigenization, while, paradoxically, increasing the net social benefit from doing so. Our findings offer explanations of why languages and cultures of the colonizers continue to play a dominant role in the educational systems of most post-colonial developing societies, and why early post-independence attempts at cultural-linguistic indigenization were either reversed or slowed down subsequently. The main policy implication of our analysis relates to the connection it establishes between property rights protection and the welfare consequences of educational indigenization: such indigenization may improve social welfare when weak institutions lead to weak property rights protection, but reduce it otherwise. |
| Keywords: | production and expropriation, linguistic communities, language policy, language conflict, linguistic autarchy, linguistic globalization, property rights |
| JEL: | D72 D74 O20 Z18 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10998&r=evo |
| By: | James B. Ang (Division of Economics, Nanyang Technological University, 14 Nanyang Drive, Singapore 637332.); Satyendra K. Gupta (Division of Economics, Nanyang Technological University, 14 Nanyang Drive, Singapore 637332.) |
| Abstract: | This research establishes that the emergence and persistence of intrastate con ict incidence since 1960 are in uenced by regional agro-ecological factors captured by the extent of variation in crop yield potential. Our results based on cross-country and grid-level analysis indicate that higher potential crop yield variability within a country that is exogenous to both human intervention and regional culture increases the likelihood of intrastate con ict. Our ndings are robust to the inclusion of various geographical, institutional, and potentially confounding economic development correlates. |
| Keywords: | Intrastate con ict, crop yield, agronomy |
| JEL: | E02 F50 Q10 |
| Date: | 2017–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nan:wpaper:1702&r=evo |
| By: | Mathieu Alemany Oliver (CERGAM - Centre d'Études et de Recherche en Gestion d'Aix-Marseille - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille 3 - AMU - Aix Marseille Université) |
| Abstract: | This research explores childlike consumer behavior from an evolutionary perspective. More specifically, it uses the concept of neoteny to show that the retention of ancestors' juvenile characteristics is related to specific behaviors. The results of factor analyses conducted on a UK sample (n = 499) and a French sample (n = 292) 7 years later indicate four dimensions of childlike consumer behavior, namely, stimulus seeking, reality conflict, escapism, and control of aggression. |
| Keywords: | consumer behavior,paedomorphosis,evolutionary psychology,neoteny,childlike behavior |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01466840&r=evo |