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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Galor, Oded (Brown University); Klemp, Marc (Brown University) |
| Abstract: | Exploiting a novel geo-referenced data set of population diversity across ethnic groups, this research advances the hypothesis and empirically establishes that variation in population diversity across human societies, as determined in the course of the exodus of humans from Africa tens of thousands of years ago, contributed to the differential formation of pre-colonial autocratic institutions within ethnic groups and the emergence of autocratic institutions across countries. Diversity has amplified the importance of institutions in mitigating the adverse effects of non-cohesiveness on productivity, while contributing to the scope for domination, leading to the formation of institutions of the autocratic type. |
| Keywords: | autocracy, economic growth, diversity, institutions, Out-of-Africa Hypothesis of Comparative Development |
| JEL: | O1 O43 Z10 |
| Date: | 2017–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10818&r=evo |
| By: | Ed Hopkins |
| Abstract: | We investigate the relationship between the continuous time best response dynamic, its perturbed version and evolutionary dynamics in relation to mixed strategy equilibria. We find that as the level of noise approaches zero, the perturbed best response dynamic has the same quantitative properties as a broad class of evolutionary dynamics. That is, stability properties of equilibria are robust across learning dynamics of quite different origins and motivations. |
| Keywords: | games, learning, evolution, mixed strategies |
| JEL: | C72 D83 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edn:esedps:3&r=evo |
| By: | Ed Hopkins |
| Abstract: | Fictitious play and "gradient" learning are examined in the context of a large population where agents are repeatedly randomly matched. We show that the aggregation of this learning behaviour can be qualitatively different from learning at the level of the individual. This aggregate dynamic belongs to the same class of simply defined dynamic as do several formulations of evolutionary dynamics. We obtain sufficient conditions for convergence and divergence which are valid for the whole class of dynamics. These results are therefore robust to most specifications of adaptive behaviour. |
| Keywords: | games, fictitious play, reinforcement learning, evolution |
| JEL: | C72 D83 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edn:esedps:2&r=evo |