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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Gallier, Carlo; Langbein, Jörg; Vance, Colin |
| Abstract: | We conduct a framed field experiment in Indonesian fishing communities with an eye towards evaluating the potential of Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURFs) for preserving coral reef fisheries. Conducted in three culturally distinctive sites, the study assembles groups of five fishers who participate in a common-pool resource game. We implement the game with randomly assigned treatments in all sites to explore whether the extraction decision varies according to three recommended non-binding extraction levels originating from (1) a democratic process, (2) a group leader or (3) an external source that recommends a socially optimal extraction level. In one of the sites - that having the highest levels of ethnic and religious diversity - we find that democratic decision-making as well as information originating from outside the community promotes the cooperative behavior that underpins TURFs, a result that is robust to regressions controlling for individual and community attributes. The absence of treatment effects in the remaining two sites highlights that a set of formal rules may have different consequences in different communities, depending on underlying values and norms. |
| Keywords: | Framed field experiment,Commons dilemmas,Coral reefs,Self-governance |
| JEL: | C93 H43 L31 Q32 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:16046&r=evo |
| By: | Bauer, Michal (Charles University, Prague); Blattman, Christopher J. (Harris School, University of Chicago); Chytilová, Julie (Charles University, Prague); Henrich, Joseph (Harvard University); Miguel, Edward (University of California, Berkeley); Mitts, Tamar (Columbia University) |
| Abstract: | In the past decade, nearly 20 studies have found a strong, persistent pattern in surveys and behavioral experiments from over 40 countries: individual exposure to war violence tends to increase social cooperation at the local level, including community participation and prosocial behavior. Thus while war has many negative legacies for individuals and societies, it appears to leave a positive legacy in terms of local cooperation and civic engagement. We discuss, synthesize and reanalyze the emerging body of evidence, and weigh alternative explanations. There is some indication that war violence especially enhances in-group or "parochial" norms and preferences, a finding that, if true, suggests that the rising social cohesion we document need not promote broader peace. |
| Keywords: | war, cooperation, social preferences, post-conflict development |
| JEL: | C80 D74 H56 O10 O12 O40 |
| Date: | 2016–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9997&r=evo |
| By: | Rohan Dutta; David K Levine; Nicholas W Papageorge; Lemin Wu |
| Date: | 2016–06–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000001365&r=evo |
| By: | Heckman, James J. (University of Chicago); Corbin, Chase O. (Center for the Economics of Human Development (CEHD)) |
| Abstract: | This paper discusses the relevance of recent research on the economics of human development to the work of the Human Development and Capability Association. The recent economics of human development brings insights about the dynamics of skill accumulation to an otherwise static literature on capabilities. Skills embodied in agents empower people. Enhanced skills enhance opportunities and hence promote capabilities. We address measurement problems common to both the economics of human development and the capability approach. The economics of human development analyzes the dynamics of preference formation, but is silent about which preferences should be used to evaluate alternative policies. This is both a strength and a limitation of the approach. |
| Keywords: | skills, capabilities, freedom, technology of skill formation |
| JEL: | D63 D04 D31 I31 |
| Date: | 2016–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10005&r=evo |