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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Aguirregabiria, Victor; Xie, Erhao |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the identification of players'; preferences and beliefs in empirical applications of discrete choice games using experimental data. The experiment comprises a set of games with similar features (e.g., two-player coordination games) where each game has different values for the players'; monetary payoffs. Each game can be interpreted as an experimental treatment group. The researcher assigns randomly subjects to play these games and observes the outcome of the game as described by the vector of players' actions. Data from this experiment can be described in terms of the empirical distribution of players' actions conditional on the treatment group. The researcher is interested in the nonparametric identification of players' preferences (utility function of money) and players' beliefs about the expected behavior of other players, without imposing restrictions such as unbiased or rational beliefs or a particular functional form for the utility of money. We show that the hypothesis of unbiased/rational beliefs is testable and propose a test of this null hypothesis. We apply our method to two sets of experiments conducted by Goeree and Holt (2001) and Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels (2009). Our empirical results suggest that in the matching pennies game, a player is able to correctly predict other player's behavior. In the public good coordination game, our test can reject the null hypothesis of unbiased beliefs when the payoff of the non-cooperative action is relatively low. |
| Keywords: | Testing biased beliefs; Multiple equilibria; Strategic uncertainty; Coordination game. |
| JEL: | C57 C72 |
| Date: | 2016–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11275&r=evo |
| By: | Alain Cohn; Michel André Maréchal |
| Abstract: | Conceptual priming has become an increasingly popular tool in economics. Here, we review the literature that uses priming in incentivized experiments to study economic questions. We mainly focus on the role of social identity, culture, and norms in shaping preferences and behavior. We also discuss recently raised objections to priming research and conclude with promising avenues for future research. |
| Keywords: | Priming, experiment, identity, endogenous preferences |
| JEL: | C90 D03 |
| Date: | 2016–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:226&r=evo |
| By: | Paolo Ramazzotti (University of Macerata) |
| Abstract: | The paper discusses the ends and scope of economic policy from an evolutionary and institutionalist perspective. I focus on how complexity and di erent types of coordination characterize the economy we live in. I then discuss how public coordination and change can be conceived of. I point out that the means to adequately deal with economic complexity depend on which social priorities prevail and on how the economy is conceptually framed in relation to those priorities. This requires the combined formulation of moral and cognitive value judgments and the non-separability of economic theory from the ends of economic policy. |
| Date: | 2016–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcr:wpdief:wpaper00081&r=evo |
| By: | Cabello, Matias; Rojas, Carolina |
| Abstract: | Despite the repeated claim by eminent students of economic growth that scientists and inventors have contributed to economic development, no study has yet quantified this effect using the rich historical record of great minds. Introducing a novel database of per capita researchers since the antiquity, we show that the history of research activity (corrected for geographical biases) predicts economic growth over the long run better than any other established growth predictor, and that this predictive power, while subject to swings, has been consistently increasing through time over the long run. These conclusions are drawn after presenting a number of facts suggesting that forces exogenous to income and population growth have determined how intensively countries have engaged in research. In contrast to a large body of literature, we find that property rights and schooling have been of minor importance for research and for economic growth through modern history.Our estimated dynamic impact of researcher densities on economic growth are very consistent through a variety of samples and regressions, based either on cross-sectional or on time-series variance. Permanently doubling the number of researchers per capita had barely an impact in 1800, but today its impact might be an increase of annualized economic growth rates of 1% in a 20-years span. |
| Keywords: | Economic growth, long run, science, research, education, institutions. |
| JEL: | N1 N10 O11 O30 O43 O47 |
| Date: | 2016–05–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:71488&r=evo |
| By: | Zhang, Yu; Kibriya, Shahriar |
| Abstract: | Slave trade affects regional economic development, degree of trust among individuals, community cohesion, and ethnic identity, which in turn have a bearing on the spatial distribution of civil conflict in Africa. Hence, ethnic homelands that have more slaves exported are expected to be more prone to conflict. By using a subnational dataset in Sub Sahara Africa (SSA) between 1997 and 2014, we find that slave trade in the colonial period significantly causes higher risks of civil conflict in the present. In order to reduce the concern of endogeneity, we employ the historical slave trade distances as instruments, which do not affect conflict except through their influence on slave trade. |
| Keywords: | civil conflict, slave trade, sub Saharan Africa, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, International Development, |
| Date: | 2016–08–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea16:236202&r=evo |
| By: | Raul V. Fabella (School of Economics, University of the Philippines Diliman; National Academy of Science and Technology) |
| Abstract: | J. Harsanyi introduced structural polymorphism in game theory, that is, there are many possible agent types such as “low productivity” or high productivity” with corresponding probability but all operating under one behavioral type, strict rationality. In this paper, we introduce behavioral polymorphism into Bayesian games. The multiplicity of behavioral types have become increasingly recognized and studied. Agents ascribe to each other a probability distribution across the possible types. They then choose the appropriate type as response to the possible type of the others which type determines the choice of strategy. We show in a dimorphic game model with the two types being strict rationality (SR) and utilitarian altruist (UA) that there always is a high enough assignment such that cooperation is the dominant strategy for both players in initially social dilemma games. Thus, the strategy set is endogenous in games with behavioral polymorphism. We argue that the assignment is based on some heuristics such as the counter-parties’ membership in some groups. |
| Keywords: | behavioral polymorphism; Bayesian games; cooperation; dominant strategy |
| JEL: | C70 C72 |
| Date: | 2016–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:phs:dpaper:201603&r=evo |