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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | David Smerdon (University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands); Theo Offerman (University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands); Uri Gneezy (UC San Diego, United States) |
| Abstract: | Social norms permeate society across a wide range of issues and are important to understanding how societies function. In this paper we concentrate on 'bad' social norms - those that are inefficient or even damaging to a group. This paper explains how bad social norms evolve and persist; our theory proposes a testable model of bad norms based on anecdotal evidence from real-world examples. We then experimentally test the model and find empirical support to its main predictions. Central to the model is the role of a person's social identity in encouraging compliance to a norm. The strength of this identity is found to have a positive effect on bad norm persistence. Additionally, while the size of the social group does not have a long run effect, smaller groups are more likely to break a bad norm in the short term. Furthermore, the results suggest that both anonymous communication and increasing information about others' payoffs are promising intervention policies to counter bad norms. |
| Keywords: | Social norms; Experiment; Identity; Behavioral Economics |
| JEL: | D03 Z13 C92 |
| Date: | 2016–04–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20160023&r=evo |
| By: | Franz Dietrich (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Christian List (LSE - London School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people's behaviour. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, on a par with the unobservables in science, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has gone out of fashion in psychology, it remains influential in economics, especially in 'revealed preference' theory. We defend mentalism in economics, construed as a positive science, and show that it fits best scientific practice. We distinguish mentalism from, and reject, the radical neuroeconomic view that behaviour should be explained in terms of brain processes, as distinct from mental states. |
| Keywords: | decision theory,scientific realism,Mentalism,behaviourism,revealed preference |
| Date: | 2016–04–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01249632&r=evo |
| By: | Galor, Oded; Özak, Ömer |
| Abstract: | This research explores the origins of the distribution of time preference across regions. It advances the hypothesis, and establishes empirically that geographical variations in the natural return to agricultural investment have had a persistent effect on the distribution of time preference across societies. In particular, exploiting a natural experiment associated with the expansion of suitable crops for cultivation in the course of the Columbian Exchange, the research establishes that pre-industrial agro-climatic characteristics that were conducive to higher return to agricultural investment, triggered selection and learning processes that had a persistent positive effect on the prevalence of long-term orientation in the contemporary era. |
| Keywords: | Time preference, Delayed Gratification, Economic Growth, Culture, Agriculture, Economic Development, Evolution, Comparative Development, Human Capital, Education, Smoking |
| JEL: | D14 D9 E2 I12 I25 J24 J26 O1 O3 O4 Z1 |
| Date: | 2016–04–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:70719&r=evo |
| By: | David de la Croix (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)); Matthias Doepke (Department of Economics, Northwestern University); Joel Mokyr (Department of Economics, Northwestern University) |
| Abstract: | In the centuries leading up to the Industrial Revolution, Western Europe gradually pulled ahead of other world regions in terms of technological creativity, population growth, and income per capita. We argue that superior institutions for the creation and dissemination of productive knowledge help explain the European advantage. We build a model of technological progress in a pre-industrial economy that emphasizes the person-to-person transmission of tacit knowledge. The young learn as apprentices from the old. Institutions such as the family, the clan, the guild, and the market organize who learns from whom. We argue that medieval European institutions such as guilds, and specific features such as journeymanship, can explain the rise of Europe relative to regions that relied on the transmission of knowledge within extended families or clans. |
| Date: | 2016–03–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctl:louvir:2016009&r=evo |