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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Quamrul H. Ashraf (Williams College); Oded Galor (Brown University) |
| Abstract: | A vibrant literature has emerged in recent years to explore the influences of human evolution and the genetic composition of populations on the comparative economic performance of societies, highlighting the roles played by the Neolithic Revolution and the prehistoric "out of Africa" migration of anatomically modern humans in generating worldwide variations in the composition of genetic traits across populations. The recent attempt by Nicholas Wade's "A Troublesome Inheritance: Genes, Race and Human History" to expose the evolutionary origins of comparative economic development to a wider audience provides an opportunity to review this important literature in the context of his theory. |
| Keywords: | Comparative development, natural selection, human evolution, Malthusian era, Neolithic Revolution, genes, race |
| JEL: | O11 N10 N30 Z10 |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wil:wileco:2016-02&r=evo |
| By: | Emilio Depetris-Chauvin (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile); Ömer Özak (Southern Methodist University) |
| Abstract: | This research explores the emergence and prevalence of economic specialization and trade in pre-modern societies. It advances the hypothesis, and establishes empirically that population diversity had a positive causal effect on economic specialization and trade. Based on a novel ethnic level dataset combining geocoded ethnographic, linguistic and genetic data, this research exploits the exogenous variation in population diversity generated by the ``Out-of-Africa'' migration of anatomically modern humans to causally establish that higher levels of population diversity were conducive to economic specialization and the emergence of trade-related institutions that, in turn, translated into pre-modern era differences in comparative development. Additionally, this research provides suggestive evidence that regions historically inhabited by pre-modern societies with high levels of economic specialization have higher levels of contemporary occupational heterogeneity, economic complexity and development. |
| Keywords: | Economic Specialization, Division of Labor, Trade, Comparative Development, Economic Development, Population Diversity, Population Heterogeneity, Genetic Diversity, Linguistic Diversity, Diversity, Persistence, Out of Africa, Serial Founder Effect |
| JEL: | D74 F10 F14 N10 O10 O11 O12 O40 O43 O44 O47 O49 Z10 |
| Date: | 2016–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:smu:ecowpa:1605&r=evo |
| By: | Matthew Embrey (University of Sussex); Guillaume R. Frechette (NYU); Sevgi Yuksel (UCSB) |
| Abstract: | More than half a century after the first experiment on the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, evidence on whether cooperation decreases with experience, as suggested by backward induction, remains inconclusive. This paper provides a meta-analysis of prior experimental research and reports the results of a new experiment to elucidate how cooperation varies with the environment in this canonical game. We describe forces that affect initial play (formation of cooperation) and unraveling (breakdown of cooperation). First, contrary to the backward induction prediction, the parameters of the repeated game have a signifcant effect on initial cooperation. We identify how these parameters impact the value of cooperation - as captured by the size of the basin of attraction of Always Defect- to account for an important part of this effect. Second, despite these initial differences, the evolution of behavior is consistent with the unraveling logic of backward induction for all parameter combinations. Importantly, despite the seemingly contradictory results across studies, the paper establishes a systematic pattern of behavior: Subjects converge to using threshold strategies that conditionally cooperate until a threshold round; and conditional on establishing cooperation, the first defection round moves earlier with experience. Simulation results generated from a learning model estimated at the subject level provide insights on the long-term dynamics and the forces slowing down the unravelling of cooperation. |
| Keywords: | repeated games, prisoners dilemma, threshold strategies, basin of attraction |
| JEL: | C73 C92 |
| Date: | 2016–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sus:susewp:8616&r=evo |
| By: | Anja Prummer; Jan-Peter Siedlarek; ; |
| Abstract: | We offer a novel explanation for why some immigrant groups and minorities have persistent, distinctive cultural traits – the presence of a rigid institution. Such an institution is necessary for communities to not fully assimilate to the mainstream society. We distinguish between different types of institutions, such as churches, foreign-language media or ethnic business associations and ask what level of cultural distinction these institutions prefer. Any type of institution can have incentives to be extreme and select maximal cultural distinction from the mainstream society. If institutions choose positive cultural distinction, without being extremist, then a decrease in discrimination leads to reduced assimilation. |
| Date: | 2014–10–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1465&r=evo |
| By: | Proto, Eugenio (University of Warwick); Oswald, Andrew J. (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies a famous unsolved puzzle in quantitative social science. Why do some nations report such high levels of mental well-being? Denmark, for instance, regularly tops the league table of rich countries’ happiness; Britain and the US enter further down; some nations do unexpectedly poorly. The explanation for the longobserved ranking - one that holds after adjustment for GDP and other socioeconomic variables - is currently unknown. Using data on 131 countries, the paper cautiously explores a new approach. It documents three forms of evidence consistent with the hypothesis that some nations may have a genetic advantage in well-being. |
| Keywords: | Well-being; international; happiness; genes; 5HTT; countries JEL Classification: I30; I31 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:273&r=evo |