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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Mathieu Couttenier (University of Lausanne); Pauline Grosjean (School of Economics, University of New South Wales, Sydney); Marc Sangnier (Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS & EHESS) |
| Abstract: | We document interpersonal violence as a dimension of the resource curse. We rely on a historical natural experiment in the United States, where mineral discoveries occurred sometimes before, sometimes after formal institutions were established in the county of discovery. In places where mineral discoveries occurred before formal institutions were established, there were more homicides per capita historically and the effect has persisted to this day. Today, the share of homicides and assaults explained by the historical circumstances of mineral discoveries is comparable to the effect of education or income. Our results imply that short-term and quasi-exogenous variations in the institutional environment can lead to large and persistent differences in cultural and institutional development. |
| Keywords: | Homicide, Resource Curse, Mineral Discoveries, US |
| JEL: | K42 N31 O14 Z13 |
| Date: | 2016–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1605&r=evo |
| By: | Marini, Annalisa |
| Abstract: | The present work reviews the relation between culture and economics; in doing so, we often distinguish between the historical component of culture (i.e. inherited values) and its contemporaneous component (i.e. social interactions). First, the paper emphasizes which cultural traits are relevant in economics, reviews situations where culture affects economic outcomes and addresses the relevance of culture across time and space. Then, it explains the theoretical framework of reference for the transmission of both contemporaneous and inherited culture. Finally, it presents econometric techniques available to the researchers and suitable to investigate the impact of culture on economic outcomes, providing suggestions for future research. |
| Keywords: | Contemporaneous Culture, Inherited Culture, Cultural Econometrics |
| JEL: | C0 Z1 |
| Date: | 2016–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:69747&r=evo |
| By: | Bosworth, Steven; Singer, Tania; Snower, Dennis J. |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the reflexive interplay between individual decisions and social forces to analyze the evolution of cooperation in the presence of "multi-directedness", whereby people's preferences depend on their psychological motives. People have access to multiple, discrete motives. Different motives may be activated by different social settings. Inter-individual differences in dispositional types affect the responsiveness of people's motives to their social settings. The evolution of these dispositional types is driven by changes in the frequencies of social settings. In this context, economic policies can influence economic decisions not merely by modifying incentives operating through given preferences, but also by influencing people's motives (thereby changing their preferences) and by changing the distribution of dispositional types in the population (thereby changing their motivational responsiveness to social settings). |
| Keywords: | Cooperation; Dispositions; Endogenous preferences; motivation; Reflexivity; Social dilemma |
| JEL: | A13 C72 D01 D03 D62 D64 |
| Date: | 2016–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11131&r=evo |
| By: | Michael Mäs; Heinrich H. Nax |
| Abstract: | ‘Noise’ in this study, in the sense of evolutionary game theory, refers to deviations from prevailing behavioral rules. Analyzing data from a laboratory experiment on coordination in networks, we tested ‘what kind of noise’ is supported by behavioral evidence. This empirical analysis complements a growing theoretical literature on ‘how noise matters’ for equilibrium selection. We find that the vast majority of decisions (96%96%) constitute myopic best responses, but deviations continue to occur with probabilities that are sensitive to their costs, that is, less frequent when implying larger payoff losses relative to the myopic best response. In addition, deviation rates vary with patterns of realized payoffs that are related to trial-and-error behavior. While there is little evidence that deviations are clustered in time or space, there is evidence of individual heterogeneity. |
| Keywords: | behavioral game theory; discrete choice; evolution; learning; logit response; stochastic stability; trial-and-error |
| JEL: | C73 C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:65422&r=evo |