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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Yannis Petrohilos-Andrianos; Anastasios Xepapadeas |
| Abstract: | We study the evolution of compliance and regulation in a common pool resource setup with myopic appropriators whose decision on whether to comply or not with the harvesting rule is a result of imitation as described by a proportional rule. The regulator first sets the optimal quota and then harvesters can choose between compliance and violation. We investigate myopic regulation and optimal regulation regimes with both proportional and non-proportional fine formulation and and an endogenized probability of audition. The equilibria are then characterized in terms of their stability properties. |
| Keywords: | Common pool resources, replicator dynamics, optimal regulation, compliance |
| Date: | 2015–12–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aue:wpaper:1518&r=evo |
| By: | Proto, Eugenio (Department of Economics, University of Warwick); Rustichini, Aldo (Department of Economics, University of Minnesota); Sofianos, Andis (Department of Economics, University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | Intelligence affects the social outcomes of groups. A systematic study of the link is provided in an experiment where two groups of subjects with different levels of intelligence, but otherwise similar, play a repeated prisoner's dilemma. Initial cooperation rates are similar, but increase in the groups with higher intelligence to reach almost full cooperation, while they decline in the groups with lower intelligence. Cooperation of higher intelligence subjects is payo sensitive and not automatic: in a treatment with lower continuation probability there is no difference between different intelligence groups. |
| Keywords: | Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Cooperation, Intelligence JEL Classification: C73, C91, C92, B83 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:255&r=evo |
| By: | Kodila-Tedika, Oasis; Asongu, Simplice |
| Abstract: | This study assesses the relationship between tribalism (the tribalism index) and government effectiveness (per the World Bank) in 65 countries using cross-sectional data averages from 2000-2010. This study finds that countries with high-tribal populations generally enjoy bad governance in terms of government ineffectiveness. Government ineffectiveness and tribalism are found to mutually reinforce each other in a robust relationship. |
| Keywords: | Institutions, Tribalism, Government effectiveness |
| JEL: | D02 D73 I20 O55 |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:68313&r=evo |
| By: | Cimoli, Mario; Porcile, Gabriel (Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) United Nations) |
| Abstract: | The microfoundations of economic models are a hotly debated topic in the literature. The debate is important because microfoundations —the ways in which agents decide and behave— have implications that go beyond a specific firm, market or activity; they strongly condition macroeconomic outcomes. This document addresses the classical problems of rationality, uncertainty and institutions: when there is Keynes-Knight uncertainty and rationality is bounded, decision making adopts the form of conventional rules or heuristics. The hyper-rational representative agent of the rational expectations world could generate highly misleading outcomes in macro models. Section 2 applies this discussion to the study of technical change and to innovation and diffusion of technology in the international system, which transform the patterns of specialization. Section 3 discusses the forces that may trap a country in a low-growth trap and the crucial role of institutions in escaping from this trap. |
| Date: | 2015–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecr:col026:37758&r=evo |