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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Kenza El Qaoumi (CGS - Centre de Gestion Scientifique - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris); Pascal Le Masson (CGS - Centre de Gestion Scientifique - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris); Benoit Weil (CGS - Centre de Gestion Scientifique - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris) |
| Abstract: | Testing Evolutionary Theory of Household Consumption Behavior in the case of Novelty |
| Date: | 2014–07–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01082519&r=evo |
| By: | Bernd Irlenbusch (Corporate Development and Business Ethics - University of Cologne); Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - CNRS, Université de Lyon) |
| Abstract: | This review surveys recent research developed in behavioral economics on the determinants of unethical behavior. Most recent progress has been made in three directions: the understanding of the importance of moral norms in individual decision-making, the conflicting role of opportunities provided by asymmetries of information and social preferences, and the crucial effect of rules, occupational norms and incentive schemes in the diffusion of dishonesty. The connection between economics and psychology is the most vivid on the first dimension. |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01159696&r=evo |
| By: | Fabien Moizeau (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1) |
| Abstract: | We study how in a city either opposite social norms remain or a particular code of behavior spreads and ultimately prevails. We develop a multicommunity model with overlapping generations. When young, an individual chooses a certain level of educational effort. The crucial feature is that the decision is influenced by peers living in the area who favor a social norm either valuing education or discrediting it. When an adult, an individual who cares about both her offspring’s expected income and the social norm chooses the family’s location. Endogenous location leads to different patterns of social norms in the city. We identify two types of urban equilibrium: a culturally-balanced city where social norms are distributed evenly among urban areas and where the rate of education is the same in each urban area and a culturally-divided city where urban areas oppose on their prevailing social norm and exhibit different rates of education. We then study the dynamics of social norms. We show that there are multiple long-run patterns of social norms. A particular steady state is achieved depending on the initial distribution support for social norms in the population. Finally, we show that a public policy promoting social integration can lead, in the long run, to a population unanimously discrediting education. Enforcing social integration can obtain less education than allowing the culturally-divided city to arise. |
| Date: | 2015–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01114139&r=evo |