nep-evo New Economics Papers
on Evolutionary Economics
Issue of 2015‒08‒13
three papers chosen by
Matthew Baker
City University of New York

  1. Evolution and monogamy By Alger, Ingela
  2. Political Identity and Trust By Pablo Hernandez; Dylan Minor
  3. How Market Economies Come to Live and Grow on the Edge of Chaos By Dominique, C-Rene

  1. By: Alger, Ingela
    Keywords: Economics of the family, Fertility, Monogamy, Polygyny, Reproductive success, Evolution
    JEL: D10
    Date: 2015–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:29371&r=evo
  2. By: Pablo Hernandez (New York University AD); Dylan Minor (Harvard Business School, Strategy Unit)
    Abstract: We explore how political identity affects trust. Using an incentivized experimental survey conducted on a representative sample of the U.S. population, we vary information about partners' partisan identity to elicit trust behavior, beliefs about trustworthiness, and actual reciprocation. By eliciting beliefs, we are able to assess whether differences in trust rates are due to stereotyping or a "taste for discrimination." By measuring actual trustworthiness, we are able to determine whether beliefs are statistically correct. We find that trust is pervasive and depends on the partisan identity of the trustee. Differential trust rates are explained by incorrect stereotypes about the other's lack of trustworthiness rather than by a "taste for discrimination." Given the importance of beliefs, we run additional treatments in which we disclose previous reciprocation rates before participants decide whether to trust. We find that beliefs are slightly more optimistic compared with the previous treatments, suggesting that incorrect stereotypes are hard to change.
    Keywords: Trust, Beliefs, Social Preferences, Political Ideology
    Date: 2015–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hbs:wpaper:16-012&r=evo
  3. By: Dominique, C-Rene
    Abstract: Summary: In a Hayek-Friedman-Lucas world, market economies are assumed to be natural, stable, and ergodic; hence, government policies are harmful to their efficiency. We develop a nonlinear dissipative dynamic model that shows that market economies instead live on the edge of chaos. We next appeal to the theory of differential equation to show that if they do not usually dissipate the totality of the information produced by their evolution it is due to a far-off self-organized equilibrium brought about by a spontaneous phase change originating in an optimal government policy.
    Keywords: Keywords: Unstable manifolds, Lyapunov Spectrum, information dimension, metric entropy, edge of chaos, self-organized equilibria, endogenous growth.
    JEL: C61 C62 C65
    Date: 2015–08–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:65945&r=evo

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