|
on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Pauline Grosjean (School of Economics, Australian School of Business, the University of New South Wales); Rose Khattar (School of Economics, Australian School of Business, the University of New South Wales) |
| Abstract: | We document the implications of missing women in the short and long run. We exploit a natural historical experiment, which sent large numbers of male convicts and far fewer female convicts to Australia in the 18th and 19th century. In areas with higher sex ratios, women historically married more, worked less, and were less likely to occupy high-rank occupations. Today, people have more conservative attitudes towards women working, women are still less likely to have high-ranking occupations and earn a lower wage income. We document the role of vertical cultural transmission and of marriage homogamy in sustaining cultural persistence. |
| Keywords: | Culture, gender roles, sex ratio, natural experiment, Australia |
| JEL: | I31 N37 J16 |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:swe:wpaper:2014-29c&r=evo |
| By: | Lorenzo Cerda Planas (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | The aim of this paper is twofold. Starting from the population dynamics literature, which usually finds the resulting distribution of a trait in a population, according to some parents' preferences, I answer the inverted question: Which preference function would yield into a given trait distribution? I solve this using a continuous trait, instead of finite types of agents. Using this result, I connect this transmission theory of social traits with the well-known results of Dictator Game (DG) experiments. I use a specific definition of a Kantian trait applied to DG results, and determine the distribution of this trait that is commonly found in these experiments. With these two ingredients, I show that homo-œconomicus parents have a greater' dislike' or disutility of having offspring with different traits from them compared to their Kantian counterparts. This could be a result of myopic empathy being stronger in homo-œconomicus parents, driving this dislike of difference. |
| Date: | 2015–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01163937&r=evo |
| By: | Yang, Yingrui |
| Abstract: | The current economics and psychology are developed within the Newtonian tradition in physics from both conceptual and instrumental perspectives. This paper aims to integrate economics and cognitive science by applying gauge field theory of modern theoretical physics. Many controversies between normative theories and behavioral theories are characterized by the “man vs. men” dilemma. Gauge potential and gauge field strength are constructed at both the man-level and the men-level in order to satisfy the principle of gauge invariance. To maintain the Lagrangian density function invariant, the gauge transformations of the first kind and the second kind are performed at the man-level and the men-level, respectively. The market dynamics is modeled by the logic of electrodynamics. The interactions of the market and individual participants are formulated by the logic of electromagnetic coupling. In establishing the market dynamic equations, individual utility function serves as gauge function and efficiency provides gauge freedom. |
| Keywords: | bounded rationality; economic rational man; electrodynamics; gauge theory; market dynamics; cognitive field |
| JEL: | A1 A12 C0 C02 D00 D01 D03 |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:65274&r=evo |
| By: | Christoph Kuzmics (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University); Daniel Rodenburger (University of Jena) |
| Abstract: | Using data from an experiment by Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993), designed for a different purpose, we test the "standard theory" that players have preferences only over their own mentary payoffs and that play will be in (evolutionary stable) equilibrium. In the experiment each subject is recurrently (24 times) randomly matched with ever changing opponents to play a 14 player game. We find that assuming risk-neutrality for all players leads to a predicted evolutionary stable equilibrium that, while it can be rejected at the 5% level of significance, is nevertheless remarkably close to "explaining" the data. Moreover, when we assume that players are risk-averse and we calibrate their risk-aversion in one treatment with a simple game, this theory cannot be rejected at the 5% level of significance for another treatment with a more complicated game, despite the fact that we have close to 400 data points. |
| Keywords: | opinion polls, elections, voting, testing, Nash equilibrium, attainable equilibrium, symmetries |
| JEL: | C72 D72 |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:542&r=evo |
| By: | Geiger, Niels |
| Abstract: | This paper is devoted to the question of operationalising the development of behavioural economics, focussing on trends in the academic literature. The main research goal is to provide a quantitative assessment in order to answer the question of whether or not behavioural economics has gained in relative importance in the past few years. After an introduction and a short summary of the history of behavioural economics, several studies are laid out and evaluated. The results generally confirm the story as it is usually told in the literature, and add some notable additional insights. |
| Keywords: | behavioural economics,bounded rationality,culturomics |
| JEL: | D03 E61 E65 |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:hohpro:442015&r=evo |
| By: | Dannenberg,Astrid; Martinsson,Peter |
| Abstract: | This paper summarizes the results from public goods experiments investigating the effect of nonbinding agreements on cooperation. Unlike previous studies, this experimental study was conducted among members of forest user groups in Ethiopia and Nepal with long histories of social interdependence. These countries are also characterized by a high degree of collectivism. Overall, the results show a weak effectof nonbinding agreements on cooperation in the two locations. The main reason for this is that the cooperation level is relatively high even without an agreement and only a small proportion of subjects change their behavior when the agreement option is introduced. Nonetheless, the research indicates that the willingness to enter an agreement varies between subjects and strongly correlates with their cooperativeness. |
| Keywords: | Post Conflict Reconstruction,Rules of Origin,Economic Theory&Research,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,Literature&Folklore |
| Date: | 2015–06–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:7325&r=evo |
| By: | Obschonka, Martin; Stuetzer, Michael; Gosling, Samuel D.; Rentfrow, Peter J.; Lamb, Michael E.; Potter, Jeff; Audretsch, David B. |
| Abstract: | In recent years, modern economies have shifted away from being based on physical capital and towards being based on new knowledge (e.g., new ideas and inventions). Consequently, contemporary economic theorizing and key public policies have been based on the assumption that resources for generating knowledge (e.g., education, diversity of industries) are essential for regional economic vitality. However, policy makers and scholars have discovered that, contrary to expectations, the mere presence of, and investments in, new knowledge does not guarantee a high level of regional economic performance (e.g., high entrepreneurship rates). To date, this “knowledge paradox” has resisted resolution. We take an interdisciplinary perspective to offer a new explanation, hypothesizing that “hidden” regional culture differences serve as a crucial factor that is missing from conventional economic analyses and public policy strategies. Focusing on entrepreneurial activity, we hypothesize that the statistical relation between knowledge resources and entrepreneurial vitality (i.e., high entrepreneurship rates) in a region will depend on “hidden” regional differences in entrepreneurial culture. To capture such “hidden” regional differences, we derive measures of entrepreneurship-prone culture from two large personality datasets from the United States (N = 935,858) and Great Britain (N = 417,217). In both countries, the findings were consistent with the knowledge-culture-interaction hypothesis. A series of nine additional robustness checks underscored the robustness of these results. Naturally, these purely correlational findings cannot provide direct evidence for causal processes, but the results nonetheless yield a remarkably consistent and robust picture in the two countries. In doing so, the findings raise the idea of regional culture serving as a new causal candidate, potentially driving the knowledge paradox; such an explanation would be consistent with research on the psychological characteristics of entrepreneurs. |
| Keywords: | Innovation, Personality, Knowledge, Culture, Entrepreneurship, Psychology, Regions, Cities |
| JEL: | L26 M13 O3 O30 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:65202&r=evo |