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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Spolaore, Enrico (Tufts University, NBER, CESIfo, and CAGE); Wacziarg, Romain (UCLA, NBER, and CEPR) |
| Abstract: | We explore the interrelationships between various measures of cultural distance. We first discuss measures of genetic distance, used in the recent economics literature to capture the degree of relatedness between countries. We next describe several classes of measures of linguistic, religious, and cultural distances. We introduce new measures of cultural distance based on differences in average answers to questions from the World Values Survey. Using a simple theoretical model we hypothesize that ancestral distance, measured by genetic distance, is positively correlated with linguistic, religious, and cultural distance. An empirical exploration of these correlations shows this to be the case. This empirical evidence is consistent with the view that genetic distance is a summary statistic for a wide array of cultural traits transmitted intergenerationally. |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:234&r=evo |
| By: | Ron Boschma; Koen Frenken |
| Abstract: | The chapter gives a brief overview of the most recent literature on Evolutionary Economic Geography (EEG). We describe how EEG has provided new and additional insights on a number of topics that belong to the core of the economic geography discipline: why do industries concentrate in space, how do clusters operate and evolve, how are innovation networks structured in space and how do they evolve over time, what types of agglomeration externalities induce urban and regional growth, how do regions diversify, and how do institutions and institutional change matter for the development of new growth paths in regions. |
| Keywords: | Evolutionary Economic Geography, related variety, regional branching, proximity, path dependence, co-evolution, institutional change |
| Date: | 2015–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:egu:wpaper:1518&r=evo |
| By: | Petar Hafner, Milos Krstic (University of Niš, Faculty of Economics, University of Nis, Faculty of Mathematics and Science) |
| Abstract: | Behavioral economics and economic sociology arise and develop on the point where economics and psychology, as well as economics and sociology, overlap. Behavioral economics studies economic factors and psychological appearance that have a direct impact on economic behavior. On the other hand, economic sociology studies the behavioral norms of the social groups and the organizations. The correlation between the research subjects of these scientific disciplines imposes a need for specifying an interdisciplinary model of human behavior in society. The aim of this paper is to evaluate opportunities for the development of an interdisciplinary model of human behavior. |
| Keywords: | Economic sociology, behavioral economics, rational behavioral, interdisciplinary research |
| JEL: | A10 A14 |
| Date: | 2015–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esb:casctr:2014-414&r=evo |
| By: | Accinelli, Elvio; Covarrubias, Enrique |
| Abstract: | This paper models the dynamic of a sector where firms imitate the technology of leading firms. While it would seem natural to expect that managers will aim at producing with the technology that produces the highest benefits, if many other managers also follow this behavior, the market structure might be modified so much that the advantage associated with a high-profit technology might be erased or even reverse. By modeling this imitation process with replicating dynamics, we find that even if the parameters of the economy are continuous through time and the economy follows a path of competitive equilibria, endogenous discrete jumps in technological choices occur. |
| Keywords: | General equilibrium; evolutionary games |
| JEL: | C73 D51 O14 |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:64736&r=evo |
| By: | Ido Polak (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS); Joseph Abdou (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS) |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces a class of games called the positive semidefinite games, for which we show the absence of mixed and nonstrict ESS's. As a result, a strategy is an ESS if and only if it is strict Nash. One famous example in this class of games is Rock{Paper{Scissors. For a smaller class of games called the positive definite games, we prove a similar result forThis paper introduces a class of games called the positive semidefinite games, for which we show the absence of mixed and nonstrict ESS's. As a result, a strategy is an ESS if and only if it is strict Nash. One famous example in this class of games is Rock{Paper{Scissors. For a smaller class of games called the positive definite games, we prove a similar result for NSS's. This result opens the door to a corollary: for doubly symmetric games, the existence of an ESS is assured. This is an interesting result because of the stronger dynamic stability properties of ESS's as compared to NSS's. The coordination games played on the identity matrix are an example of games in this latter class. NSS's. This result opens the door to a corollary: for doubly symmetricgames, the existence of an ESS is assured. This is an interesting result because of the stronger dynamic stability properties of ESS's as compared to NSS's. The coordination games played on the identity matrix are anexample of games in this latter class. |
| Date: | 2014–03–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01066397&r=evo |
| By: | Andrew T. Young (West Virginia University, College of Business and Economics) |
| Abstract: | I employ a case study of the Visigoths in the fourth and fifth centuries to analyze the collective action problems faced by roving versus stationary bandits. A roving bandit provides exclusive collective goods to its members. A stationary bandit also provides exclusive goods to its members, but it also provides inclusive collective goods to out-group individuals in its domain. The inclusive goods provided to the out-group are an input to the production of the exclusive goods enjoyed by the in-group members. I describe how the transition from the former to the latter likely involves redefinition of the relevant group, its shared interest, and the type of good(s) that it provides. The Gothic retinues of the fourth century were essentially roving bandits. Having been driven across the Danube into the Roman Empire by an invasion of Huns, a group of these retinues formed the Visigothic confederacy. The Visigoths sacked Rome and were subsequently settled in Gaul, eventually becoming the stationary Visigothic Kingdom. I describe how the Visigothic elite came to recognize an encompassing interest in their domain and drew upon the human capital of the Gallo-Roman senators to provide inclusive collective goods. |
| Keywords: | collective action problems, governance institutions, state emergence, roving versus stationary bandits, Visigoths, Roman Empire, ancient economic history |
| JEL: | D72 N43 N93 P16 |
| Date: | 2015–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wvu:wpaper:15-09&r=evo |