|
on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Friedrich, Thomas |
| Abstract: | Hamilton´s rule is considered a cornerstone in evolutionary biology. It is used to understand why organisms help relatives and serves as starting point for the development of cooperation between strangers. The rule is based on a method from economics. It compares a benefit to cost ratio (k) to a genetic relation (r). Two issues are discussed. A solution is suggested. |
| Keywords: | Hamilton´s rule, benefit, cost, alogism |
| JEL: | Z00 |
| Date: | 2015–04–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:63381&r=evo |
| By: | Richard Arena (University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, France; GREDEG CNRS); Lauren Larrouy (University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, France; GREDEG CNRS) |
| Abstract: | In this contribution we relate the respective works of two important economists, Friedrich von Hayek and Michael Bacharach, namely one of the main intellectual leaders of the Austrian Schools and one of the most original game theorists. Hayek and Bacharach are two authors - few in number – who do not conceive that economic analysis could be built without the help of psychology. They both considered that subjective perceptions of the real world provide the first stage of decision processes and that, within this stage, psychological factors played a fundamental role. Therefore, they both proposed how perceptions, economic rationality and social coordination could be combined. However economists who really accept to take psychology into account often face new difficulties. The incorporation of subjectivity in economic behaviour can make much more complex the analysis of economic and social coordination. To overtake these new difficulties we will see that both Hayek and Bacharach integrate a specific approach to human cognition and resort to an evolutionary explanation of social coordination. This is the main message we deliver in this contribution. |
| Keywords: | Austrian economic theory, game theory, cognitive psychology, subjectivism, social coordination |
| JEL: | B21 B40 B53 C72 D01 D11 D50 |
| Date: | 2015–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2015-15&r=evo |
| By: | Jean Paul Rabanal (Ball State University); Olga A. Rabanal (Ball State University) |
| Abstract: | We apply standard evolutionary dynamics to study of stability of three competing market formats –call market (CM), posted offer (PO) and decentralized market (DM). In our framework, heterogeneous buyers and sellers seek to transact a homogeneous good, which can be done by allocating their time among three different market formats. We study the allocation of time among different formats using simulations of a large (evolutionary) dynamic system. Our results show that (i) the final participation of traders in CM is much higher compared to the two other formats, (ii) the PO can coexist with CM, and (iii) DM vanishes against CM in the long run but can survive against PO, depending on the initial participation conditions. |
| Keywords: | Centralized markets, decentralized markets, decentralized bargaining, market design, market formation, evolutionary dynamics |
| JEL: | D40 C78 C73 L10 |
| Date: | 2015–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apc:wpaper:2015-034&r=evo |
| By: | Giovanni Dosi; Marcelo C. Pereira; Maria Enrica Virgillito |
| Abstract: | Evolutionary theories of economic change identify the processes of idiosyncratic learningby individual firms and of market selection as the two main drivers of the dynamics of industries. Are such processes able to robustly account for the statistical regularities which industrial structures and dynamics display? In this work we address this question by means of a simple agent-based model formalizing the mechanisms of learning and selection. The interplay between these two engines shapes the dynamics of entry-exit and market shares and, collectively, the productivity and the size distributions and their patterns of growth. As such, and despite its simplicity, the model is able to robustly reproduce an ensemble of empirical stylised facts, including ample heterogeneity in productivity distributions, persistent market turbulence and fat-tailed distribution of growth rates. |
| Keywords: | Firms' Growth Rate, Productivity, Fat Tail Distributions, Learning Processes, Market Selection |
| Date: | 2015–01–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2015/04&r=evo |
| By: | Seema Jayachandran; Rohini Pande |
| Abstract: | India's child stunting rate is among the highest in the world, exceeding that of many poorer African countries. In this paper, we analyze data for over 174,000 Indian and Sub-Saharan African children to show that Indian firstborns are taller than African firstborns; the Indian height disadvantage emerges with the second child and then increases with birth order. This pattern persists when we compare height between siblings, and also holds for health inputs such as vaccinations. Three patterns in the data indicate that India's culture of eldest son preference plays a key role in explaining the steeper birth order gradient among Indian children and, consequently, the overall height deficit. First, the Indian firstborn height advantage only exists for sons. Second, an Indian son with an older sibling is taller than his African counterpart if and only if he is the eldest son. Third, the India-Africa height deficit is largest for daughters with no older brothers, which reflects that fact that their families are those most likely to exceed their desired fertility in order to have a son. |
| JEL: | D10 O12 O53 |
| Date: | 2015–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21036&r=evo |
| By: | Wuepper, David; Sauer, Johannes |
| Keywords: | Agribusiness, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, International Development, |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea15:201229&r=evo |