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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | H Peyton Young |
| Abstract: | Social norms are patterns of behavior that are self-enforcing at the group level: everyone wants to conform when they expect everyone else to conform. There are multiple mechanisms that sustain social norms, including a desire to coordinate, fear of being sanctioned, signaling membership in the group, or simply following the lead of others. This article shows how stochastic evolutionary game theory can be used to study the dynamics of norms. We illustrate with a variety of examples drawn from economics, sociology, demography, and political science. These include bargaining norms, norms governing the terms of contracts, norms of retirement, duelling, footbinding, medical treatment, and the use of contraceptives. These cases highlight the challenges of applying the theory to empirical cases. They also show that the modern theory of norm dynamics yields insights and predictions that go beyond conventional equilibrium analysis. |
| Keywords: | evolutionary game theory, equilibrium selection, stochastic stability |
| JEL: | C73 A12 O10 |
| Date: | 2014–10–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:726&r=evo |
| By: | Claire Loupias (EPEE - Centre d'Etudes des Politiques Economiques - Université d'Evry-Val d'Essonne); Bertrand Wigniolle (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris) |
| Abstract: | This paper suggests a new explanation for changes in economic and population growth with a long run perspective, emphasizing the role of land in the development process. Starting from a pre-industrialization state called the "Malthusian regime", land and labor are the main production factors. The size of population is limited by the quantity of land available for households and by incomes. Technical progress driven by a "Boserupian effect" may push the economy towards a take-off regime. In this regime, capital accumulation begins and a "learning-by-doing" effect in production takes over from the "Boserupian effect". If this effect is strong enough, the economy can reach an "ultimate growth regime". In the different phases, land plays a crucial role. |
| Keywords: | Endogenous fertility; Land; Endogenous growth; |
| Date: | 2013–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00823255&r=evo |
| By: | Kube, Sebastian (University of Bonn); Schaube, Sebastian (University of Bonn); Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah (University of Bonn); Khachatryan, Elina (University of Kassel) |
| Abstract: | Driven by an ever-growing number of studies that explore the effectiveness of institutional mechanisms meant to mitigate cooperation problems, recent years have seen an increasing interest in the endogenous implementation of these institutions. In this paper, we test within a unified framework how the process of institution formation is affected by three key aspects of natural environments: i) heterogeneity among players in the benefits of cooperation, ii) (a)symmetry in players' institutional obligations, and iii) potential trade-offs between efficiency and equality in payoff allocations. We observe social preferences to be limiting the scope for institution formation. Inequality-averse players frequently object to institutions that fail to address differences in players' benefits from cooperation – even if rejecting the institution causes monetary losses to all players. Relating our findings to previous studies on institution formation, we discuss potential advantages and drawbacks of stipulating unanimous support for implementing institutions that foster cooperation. |
| Keywords: | institution formation, unanimity voting, cooperation problems, heterogeneous agents, inequality aversion |
| JEL: | C90 D02 D62 D63 H41 |
| Date: | 2014–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8533&r=evo |