|
on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Charles Anderton (Department of Economics and Accounting, College of the Holy Cross) |
| Abstract: | This article uses evolutionary game theory to reveal the interpersonal and geographic characteristics of a society that make it vulnerable to a conquest from within by terrorist organizations and genocide architects. Under conditions identified in the space-less version of the model, entrepreneurs of violence can create the social metamorphosis of a peaceful people group into one that supports or does not resist violence against an out-group. The model is extended into geographic space by analyzing interactions among peaceful and aggressive phenotypes in Moore and von Neumann neighborhoods. The model also reveals policy interventions in which the social evolution of aggression never gets started or comes to a halt if already underway. |
| Keywords: | Terrorism, Terrorism, Genocide, Game Theory |
| JEL: | C73 D74 H56 |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hcx:wpaper:1407&r=evo |
| By: | Elvio Accinelli (Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República); Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera (Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí); Osvaldo Salas (Goteborg University) |
| Abstract: | In this work the evolutionary dynamics of migratory behavior driven by imitation is studied. We show that, any migratory flow, driven by the imitation, can be modeled by a dynamic system, once the rules governing imitative behavior of the population, are established. The parameters characterizing the system are determined by the economic sitatuon in each country from which the migratory current is established, and may be changed from policy considerations and social conditions. These changes, in turn lead to changes in the dynamic system solutions that reflect the evolution of the migratory flow. We show that labor migration can modify the performance of the economies of both receiving countries and those where it starts, positively or negatively, depending on the prevailing characteristics. Finally, elements of economic policy designed to counteract possible negative effects migration are discussed. In particular consider the migrant stream established between Chile and Peru and their possible impact on their economies. |
| Keywords: | Social Welfare; Behavior of Migrants; Evolutionary Games; Theory of imitation; Replicator Dynamics. |
| JEL: | C72 F22 G3 R1 |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ude:wpaper:0414&r=evo |
| By: | Anastasia Litina (CREA, Université de Luxembourg); Great Expectations - The Persistent Effect of Institutions on Culture (persistent effect on culture. It is argued that immigrants coming from corrupt countries,) |
| Abstract: | documented as the Great Expectations effect. This result is interesting and intriguing for several reasons. First, it highlights the persistent effect of institutions (at the origin coun- try) on the cultural attitudes of immigrants. Interestingly, this effect is rather persistent and can be detected even to the second generation immigrants. Second, the analysis explores whether mean attitudes at the origin country have an effect on immigrants. attitude. The findings suggest that mean attitudes do not confer a statistically significant effect, whereas a horserace between origin institutions and origin culture suggests that it is the effect of institutions that prevails. Last, the analysis establishes that the inflated trust of immigrants affects their political attitudes. Immigrants coming from corrupt countries tend to be less interested in politics, to overtrust the host governments and to be less active in the political arena. In a globalized world where international immigration is rather extensive, pinning down the cultural differences across immigrants and thus the differences in their political attitudes is of an essence. |
| Keywords: | Trust , Institutions, Culture, Migration |
| JEL: | F22 O17 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:luc:wpaper:14-17&r=evo |