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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Keuschnigg, Marc; Schikora, Jan |
| Abstract: | We investigate voluntary contribution to public goods in culturally heterogeneous groups with a laboratory experiment conducted among 432 Hindu and Muslim subjects in India. With our specification of 'Leading by example' we test for an interaction effect between leadership and religious heterogeneity in a high stake environment. While cultural diversity does not affect contributions in the standard linear Public Goods Game, it reduces cooperation in the presence of a leader. Furthermore, we show that preferences for conditional cooperation are only prevalent in pure groups. In mixed groups, poor leadership and uncertainty about followers' reciprocity hinders the functionality of leadership as an institutional device to resolve social dilemmas. |
| Keywords: | leading by example; conditional cooperation; reciprocity; religious diversity; public goods game |
| JEL: | C92 H41 O12 Z12 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:57533&r=evo |
| By: | Sergio Beraldo (Università di Napoli Federico II and CSEF); Robert Sugden (School of Economics and Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science, University of East Anglia) |
| Abstract: | This paper offers a new and robust model of the emergence and persistence of cooperation when interactions are anonymous, the population is well-mixed, and the evolutionary process selects strategies according to material payoffs. The model has a Prisoner’s Dilemma structure, but with an outside option of non-participation. The payoff to mutual cooperation is stochastic; with positive probability, it exceeds that from cheating against a cooperator. Under mild conditions, mutually beneficial cooperation occurs in equilibrium. This is possible because the non-participation option holds down the equilibrium frequency of cheating. The dynamics of the model are investigated both theoretically and through simulations. |
| Keywords: | Cooperation; voluntary participation; random payoffs |
| JEL: | C73 |
| Date: | 2014–07–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:368&r=evo |
| By: | Oana Borcan; Ola Olsson; Louis Putterman |
| Abstract: | All since the rise of the first civilizations, economic development has been closely intertwined with the evolution of states. In this paper, we contribute to the literature on state history and long-run economic development in four ways. First, we extend and complete the state history index from Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002) by coding the experience with states from the first state origins, 3500 BCE, up until 2000 CE. Second, we explore empirically the relationship between time since transition to agriculture and state age, as well as subsequent state history. Our estimated unconditional correlation implies that a 1000 year earlier transition to agriculture is associated with a 470 years earlier emergence of state institutions. We show how this relationship differs between indigenously- and externally- originated states. Third, we show that the relationship between our extended state history index and current levels of economic development has the shape of an inverted u. The results reflect the fact that countries that were home to the oldest states, such as Iraq, Egypt and China, are poorer today than younger inheritors of their civilizations, such as Germany, Denmark and Japan. This pattern was already in place by 1500 CE and is robust to adjusting for migrations during the colonial era. Finally, we demonstrate a very close relationship between state formation and the adoption of writing. |
| Keywords: | State history, comparative development |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bro:econwp:2014-8&r=evo |
| By: | Keuschnigg, Marc; Wolbring, Tobias |
| Abstract: | Adding to the debate about the “broken windows” thesis we discuss an explanation of minor norm violation based on the assumption that individuals infer expected sanctioning probabilities from contextual cues. We modify the classical framework of rational crime by signals of disorder, local social control, and their interaction. Testing our implications we present results from three field experiments showing that violations of norms, which prevent physical as well as social disorder, foster further violations of the same and of different norms. Varying the net gains from deviance it shows that disorder effects are limited to low cost situations. Moreover, we provide suggestive evidence that disorder effects are significantly stronger in neighborhoods with high social capital. |
| Keywords: | broken windows theory; disorder; field experiment; low cost situations; norm violation; social capital |
| JEL: | C9 C93 K42 R23 Z13 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:57534&r=evo |