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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | David Gill; Victoria Prowse |
| Abstract: | In this paper we investigate how cognitive ability and character skills influence behavior, success and the evolution of play towards Nash equilibrium in repeated strategic interactions.� We study behavior in a p-beauty contest experiment and find striking differences according to cognitive ability: more cognitively able subjects choose numbers closer to equilibrium, converge more frequently to equilibrium play and earn more even as behavior approaches the equilibrium prediction.� To understand better how subjects with different cognitive abilities learn differently, we estimate a structural model of learning based on level-k reasoning.� We find a systematic positive relationship between cognitive ability and levels; furthermore, the average level of more cognitively able subjects responds positively to the cognitive ability of their opponents, while the average level of less cognitively able subjects does not respond.� Finally, we compare the influence of cognitive ability to that of character skills, and find that both cognition and personality affect behavior and learning.� More agreeable and emotionally stable subjects perform better and learn faster, although the effect of cognitive ability on behavior is stronger than that of character skills. |
| Keywords: | Cognitive ability, character skills, personality traits, level-k, bounded rationality, learning, convergence, non-equilbrium behavior, beauty contest, repeated games, structural modeling, theory of mind, intelligence, IQ, cognition, Raven test |
| JEL: | C92 C73 D83 |
| Date: | 2014–06–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:712&r=evo |
| By: | Matthias Doepke (Northwestern University); Fabrizio Zilibotti (University of Zurich) |
| Abstract: | We develop a theory of intergenerational preference transmission that rationalizes the choice between parenting styles. Parents maximize an objective function that combines Beckerian altruism and paternalism towards children. They can affect their children's choices via two channels: either by influencing children's preferences or by imposing direct restrictions on their choice sets. Different parenting styles (authoritarian, authoritative, permissive) emerge as equilibrium outcomes, and are affected both by parental preferences and by the socioeconomic environment. The theory is consistent with the decline of authoritarian parenting in industrialized countries, and with the greater prevalence of permissive parenting in countries characterized by low inequality. |
| Keywords: | Parenting Style, Intergenerational Preference Transmission, Paternalism, Occupational Choice |
| JEL: | D10 J10 O10 |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hka:wpaper:2014-013&r=evo |
| By: | Rossi, Guido; Spagano, Salvatore |
| Abstract: | The present paper combines legal history with economic theory so to explain the passage from custom to law. Economists have usually explained the shift from customary to statutory law (that is, from spontaneous to formal rules) either in terms contractualism or evolutionism. In the first case, law is the only efficient solution for a Hobbesian-like immanent social conflict. In the second case, customs do create an efficient enough equilibrium. Law comes on a later stage just to formalise an already accepted rule, vesting the custom with a formal status. Neither theory, however, is fully able to explain the transition from custom to law. One struggles with the very acceptance of customs in the first place. The other fails to provide a satisfactorily explanation of the passage from custom to law. The present work seeks to reconcile the two theories by looking at the economic advantages of statutory law over custom. Unlike the first theory, it does not deny that customs may produce a relatively efficient status, but it seeks to explain why, at a certain point, customs were considered as inadequate and statutory law became more desirable. Our answer lies in the publication of written rules, for the presumption of knowledge it entails. Presumption of knowledge of the applicable rules is one of the elements that (oral) customs could not provide to contracts. Although somewhat neglected in many studies on customs and legislation, publication is a crucial element for our understanding of the passage from spontaneous custom to positive law. The work shall first introduce the passage from customary to statutory law in both legal and economic theories. Then, it will analyse the deep symmetry between the number of agents involved and the number of transactions on the one hand and the progressive replacement of customs with statutes on the other. The conclusions of such an analysis will be used to prove the crucial role played by the presumption of knowledge, which is perhaps the missing link between different economic theories on customs and law. |
| Keywords: | Evolutionary Economics, Constitutional Law |
| JEL: | B25 H10 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:56643&r=evo |
| By: | Dilger, Alexander |
| Abstract: | In traditional game theory, strategies are equivalent with actions and mixed strategies are the only extension. As a new extension, strategies are interpreted as plans. Although most plans are not very interesting (like doing a certain action), some conditional plans are. For example, they enable cooperation in the Prisoners' Dilemma. -- In der traditionellen Spieltheorie sind Strategien äquivalent mit Handlungen und gemischte Strategien die einzige Erweiterung dazu. Als eine neue Erweiterung werden Strategien als Pläne interpretiert. Obgleich die meisten Pläne nicht sehr interessant sind (wie eine bestimmte Handlung zu tun), sind manche bedingten Pläne es doch. So können sie beispielsweise Kooperation im Gefangenendilemma ermöglichen. |
| JEL: | C72 C70 D83 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:umiodp:52014&r=evo |
| By: | Claire Loupias (EPEE - Centre d'Etudes des Politiques Economiques - Université d'Evry-Val d'Essonne); Bertrand Wigniolle (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris) |
| Abstract: | This paper suggests a new explanation for changes in economic and population growth with a long run perspective, emphasizing the role of land in the development process. Starting from a pre-industrialization state called the "Malthusian regime", land and labor are the main production factors. The size of population is limited by the quantity of land available for households and by incomes. Technical progress driven by a "Boserupian effect" may push the economy towards a take-off regime. In this regime, capital accumulation begins and a "learning-by-doing" effect in production takes over from the "Boserupian effect". If this effect is strong enough, the economy can reach an "ultimate growth regime". In the different phases, land plays a crucial role. |
| Keywords: | Endogenous fertility; Land; Endogenous growth; |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:pseose:halshs-00823255&r=evo |