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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Isabelle Salle (GREThA - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée - CNRS : UMR5113 - Université Montesquieu - Bordeaux IV, CeNDEF - Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance - Universiteit van Amsterdam); Pascal Seppecher (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS : UMR7321 - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (UNS)) |
| Abstract: | This paper applies a social learning model to the optimal consumption rule of Allen & Carroll (2001), and delivers convincing convergence dynamics towards the optimal rule. These findings constitute a significant improvement regarding previous results in the literature, both in terms of speed of convergence and parsimony of the learning model. The learning model exhibits several appealing features: it is frugal, easy to apply to a range of learning objectives, requires few procedures and little information. Particular care is given to behavioural interpretation of the modelling assumptions in light of evidence from the fields of psychology and social science. Our results highlight the need to depart from the genetic metaphor, and account for intentional decision-making, based on agents' relative performances. By contrast, we show that convergence is strongly hindered by exact imitation processes, or random exploration mechanisms, which are usually assumed when modelling social learning behaviour. Our results suggest a method for modelling bounded rationality, which could be tested most interestingly within the framework of a wide range of economic models with adaptive dynamics. |
| Keywords: | learning; bounded rationality; evolutionary algorithms; consumption rule |
| Date: | 2013–09–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00989233&r=evo |
| By: | Alexander W. Cappelen (Department of Economics, Copenhagen University); Ulrik H. Nielsen (Department of Economics, Copenhagen University); Bertil Tungodden (Norwegian School of Economics); Jean-Robert Tyran (Department of Economics, Copenhagen University); Erik Wengström (Department of Economics, Copenhagen University) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we provide new evidence showing that fair behavior is intuitive to most people. We find a strong association between a short response time and fair behavior in the dictator game. This association is robust to controls that take account of the fact that response time might be affected by the decision-maker's cognitive ability and swiftness. The experiment was conducted with a large and heterogeneous sample recruited from the general population in Denmark. We find a striking similarity in the association between response time and fair behavior across groups in the society, which suggests that the predisposition to act fairly is a general human trait. |
| Keywords: | Response Time, Dictator Game, Experiment, Fairness |
| JEL: | C90 D03 D60 |
| Date: | 2014–04–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1410&r=evo |
| By: | Cappelen, Alexander W. (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Kariv, Shachar (University of California, Berkeley); Sørensen, Erik Ø. (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Tungodden, Bertil (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration) |
| Abstract: | We report an experimental test of the four touchstones of rationality in choice under risk – utility maximization, stochastic dominance, expected-utility maximization and small-stakes risk neutrality – with students from one of the best universities in the United States and one of the best universities in Africa, the University of Dar es Salaam. Although the US and the Tanzanian subjects come from different backgrounds and face different economic prospects, they are united by being among the most able in their societies. Importantly, many of whom will exercise an outsized influence over economic and political affairs. We find very small or no significant differences between the two samples in the degree of rationality according to a number of standard economic measures. An alternative approach is to take cognitive ability (IQ) as a proxy for economic rationality. We show that a canonical IQ test indicates a much larger development gap in rationality relative to our economic tests. |
| Keywords: | Development; rationality; revealed preference; stochastic dominance; expected utility; risk aversion; cognitive ability; experiment. |
| JEL: | D01 D03 D81 O12 |
| Date: | 2014–01–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhheco:2014_008&r=evo |
| By: | Sylvia Frühwirth-Schnatter; Martin Halla; Alexandra Posekany; Gerald J. Pruckner; Thomas Schober |
| Abstract: | Prior empirical research on the theoretically proposed interaction between the quantity and the quality of children builds on exogenous variation in family size due to twin births and focuses on human capital outcomes. The typical finding can be described as a statistically nonsignificant two-stage least squares (2SLS) esti- mate, with substantial standard errors. We regard these conclusions of no empirical support for the quantity-quality trade-off as premature and, therefore, extend the empirical approach in two ways. First, we add health as an additional outcome di- mension. Second, we apply a semi-parametric Bayesian IV approach for econometric inference. Our estimation results substantiate the finding of a zero effect: we provide estimates with an increased precision by a factor of approximately twenty-three, for a broader set of outcomes. |
| Keywords: | Quantity-quality model of fertility, family size, human capital, health,semi-parametric Bayesian IV approach |
| JEL: | J13 C26 C11 I20 J20 I10 |
| Date: | 2014–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jku:econwp:2014_03&r=evo |
| By: | Paul Castaneda Dower (New Economic School, Center for Study of Diversity and Social Interactions); Victor Ginsburgh (ECARES, Universite Libre de Bruxelles); Shlomo Weber (Southern Methodist University) |
| Abstract: | Polarization measures that are used in examining the empirical relationship between ethnic divisions and violent conflict, heavily rely on mechanisms of group identification and often use somewhat arbitrary divisions of a society into ethnic groups. In this paper we construct two new measures of polarization, one that accounts for differences in linguistic policies across localities during the colonial era and one that accounts for the differences over time and across localities in the experience of violence throughout the conflict episode. By examining the protracted war in Sri Lanka and applying these indices (and their combination) to a data set describing victims of the civil conflict by district and year, we are able to better identify the effect of ethno-linguistic polarization on the civil conflict in the country. We find that, for each of our polarization indices, there is a positive effect on the conflict. The historical underpinnings of our indices allow us to demonstrate in a quantitative and concrete way the relevance of historical processes for understanding episodes of civil conflict. |
| Keywords: | Sri Lanka, violent conflict, ethno-linguistic fractionization, polarization indices, regional differences |
| JEL: | D74 F54 N45 |
| Date: | 2014–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hka:wpaper:2014-011&r=evo |
| By: | Berthelemy, Jean-Claude; Thuilliez, Josselin |
| Abstract: | Malaria still claims a heavy human and economic toll, specifically in sub-Saharan Africa. Even though the causality between malaria and poverty is presumably bi-directional, malaria plays a role in the economic difficulties of the region. This article pro |
| Keywords: | malaria, poverty, economic epidemiology |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp2014-047&r=evo |