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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Maria Zumbuhl (Maastricht University); Thomas Dohmen (University of Bonn); Gerard Pfann (Maastricht University) |
| Abstract: | We study empirically whether there is scope for parents to shape the economic preferences and attitudes of their children through purposeful investments. We exploit information on the risk and trust attitudes of parents and their children, as well as rich information about parental efforts in the upbringing of their children from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study. Our results show that parents who invest more in the upbringing of their children are more similar to them with respect to risk and trust attitudes and thus transmit their own attitudes more strongly. The results are robust to including variables on the relationship between children and parents, family size, and the parents’ socioeconomic background. |
| Keywords: | parental investments, risk preferences, trust, intergenerational transmission, cultural economics, family economics, social interactions |
| JEL: | D80 J12 J13 J62 Z13 |
| Date: | 2013–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hka:wpaper:2013-018&r=evo |
| By: | Siegfried Berninghaus (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Institute of Economics); Stephan Schosser (University of Magdeburg, Department of Economics); Bodo Vogt (University of Magdeburg, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | For games of simultaneous action selection and network formation, game-theoretic behavior and experimental observations are not in line: While theory typically predicts inefficient outcomes for (anti-)coordination games, experiments show that subjects tend to play efficient (non Nash) strategy profiles. A reason for this discrepancy is the tendency to model corresponding games as one-shot and derive predictions. In this paper, we calculate the equilibria for a finitely repeated version of the Hawk-Dove game with endogenous network formation and show that the repetition leads to additional equilibria, namely the efficient ones played by human subjects. We confirm our results by an experimental study. In addition, we show both theoretically and experimentally that the equilibria reached crucially depend on the order in which subjects adjust their strategy. Subjects only reach efficient outcomes if they first adapt their action and then their network. If they choose their network first, they do not reach efficient outcomes. |
| Keywords: | Network games, Hawk/Dove games, finitely repeated game |
| JEL: | D85 C72 C73 C92 |
| Date: | 2013–11–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2013-048&r=evo |
| By: | Lisa Bruttel (Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Germany); Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany) |
| Abstract: | In the two-person sequential best shot game, first player 1 contributes to a public good and then player 2 is informed about this choice before contributing. The payoff from the public good is the same for both players and depends only on the maximal contribution. Efficient voluntary cooperation in the repeated best shot game therefore requires that only one player should contribute in a given round. To provide better chances for such cooperation, we enrich the sequential best shot base game by a third stage allowing the party with the lower contribution to transfer some of its periodic gain to the other party. Participants easily establish cooperation in the finitely repeated game. When cooperation evolves, it mostly takes the form of 'labor division,' with one participant constantly contributing and the other constantly compensating. However, in a treatment in which compensation is not possible, (more or less symmetric) alternating occurs frequently and turns out to be almost as efficient as labor division. |
| Keywords: | best shot game, coordination, transfer, experiment |
| JEL: | C71 C73 C91 |
| Date: | 2013–10–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:knz:dpteco:1324&r=evo |
| By: | Rema Hanna; Shing-Yi Wang |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we demonstrate that university students who cheat on a simple task in a laboratory setting are more likely to state a preference for entering public service. Importantly, we also show that cheating on this task is predictive of corrupt behavior by real government workers, implying that this measure captures a meaningful propensity towards corruption. Students who demonstrate lower levels of prosocial preferences in the laboratory games are also more likely to prefer to enter the government, while outcomes on explicit, two-player games to measure cheating and attitudinal measures of corruption do not systematically predict job preferences. We find that a screening process that chooses the highest ability applicants would not alter the average propensity for corruption among the applicant pool. Our findings imply that differential selection into government may contribute, in part, to corruption. They also emphasize that screening characteristics other than ability may be useful in reducing corruption, but caution that more explicit measures may offer little predictive power. |
| JEL: | H1 J2 O1 |
| Date: | 2013–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19649&r=evo |
| By: | Stark, Oded |
| Abstract: | We relate to others in two important ways: we care about others, and we care about how we fare in comparison to others. In some contexts, these two forms of relatedness interact. Caring about others can conveniently be labeled altruism. Caring about how we fare in comparison with others who fare better than ourselves can conveniently be labeled relative deprivation. I provide examples of domains in which the incorporation of altruism and relative deprivation can point to novel perspectives and suggest rethinking, and possibly revising, longheld views. And I show that there are domains in which consideration of relative deprivation can substitute for the prevalence of altruism, and vice versa. I conclude that this is a fascinating sphere for research on economics and social behavior. -- |
| Keywords: | Altruism,Relative deprivatio,Economic and social behavior |
| JEL: | D01 D03 D13 D31 D63 D64 F22 F24 J61 O15 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tuewef:62&r=evo |
| By: | Emeline Bezin |
| Abstract: | We develop an overlapping generations model within which the evolution of pollution and the formation of environmental concern are endogenous. On the one hand, people heterogeneously concerned with environmental issues contribute to pollution which is a public bad. On the other hand, the transmission of environmental attitudes is the result of some economic choice which is affected by pollution. The model predicts that the long run proportion of environmentally concerned individuals will always be high. Though, depending on the pollution-generating technology, the transition from a low-environmentally concerned society to a high-environmentally concerned one is accompanied by two different outcomes regarding the long run level of pollution. If the technology is “clean”, there is a stable steady state level of pollution. However, if it is “dirty”, pollution experiences an unlimited growth which eventually causes an environmental disaster. This result captures some stylized facts regarding the joint evolution of environmental concern and pollution in developing nations. In the latter case, we show that intergenerational transfers from the older generation to the young working one restore the possibility to reach a stationary level of pollution. |
| Keywords: | Overlapping generations, pollution, environmental concern, cultural transmission,environmental policy |
| JEL: | Q50 D90 J11 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rae:wpaper:201309&r=evo |
| By: | Keijiro Otsuka (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies); Frank Place (World Agroforestry Centre) |
| Date: | 2013–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ngi:dpaper:13-22&r=evo |
| By: | Butler, Jeffrey V.; Guiso, Luigi; Jappelli, Tullio |
| Abstract: | Prior research suggests that those who rely on intuition rather than effortful reasoning when making decisions are less averse to risk and ambiguity. The evidence is largely correlational, however, leaving open the question of the direction of causality. In this paper, we present experimental evidence of causation running from reliance on intuition to risk and ambiguity preferences. We directly manipulate participants' predilection to rely on intuition and find that enhancing reliance on intuition lowers the probability of being ambiguity averse by 30 percentage points and increases risk tolerance by about 30 percent in the experimental sub-population where we would a priori expect the manipulation to be successful (males). -- |
| Keywords: | Risk Aversion,Ambiguity Aversion,Decision Theory,Dual Systems,Intuitive Thinking |
| JEL: | D81 D83 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cfswop:201313&r=evo |