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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Kolmar, Martin |
| Abstract: | This article summarizes the major findings from the economic and socio-biological theories of group conflicts and contrasts them with findings from sociology and social psychology, especially the relationship between group size and group success. The predictive power of some of the results of economic group-conflict models for behavior in laboratory experiments is relatively poor if one assumes that individuals are self-interested. One gets systematic overinvestment compared to the theoretical predictions, which points to the fact that other-regarding references may be an important explanatory variable. This conjecture is in line with findings in evolutionary biology, social psychology, and neuroscience that all point to a close link between the structure of individual preferences and group conflicts. In fact, the evidence suggests group conflicts were constitutive for the ability of individuals to cooperate, and that this willingness to cooperate evolved in the form of parochial altruism. Building on this idea, the last part of the essay builds a bridge between parochial altruism and social identities and traces the question how social identities are constructed and what this implies for the structure of group conflicts. |
| Keywords: | Group conflicts, Parochial altruism, Cooperation, Social identities |
| JEL: | D74 H41 |
| Date: | 2013–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usg:econwp:2013:31&r=evo |
| By: | Liu, Elaine M. (University of Houston); Meng, Juanjuan (Peking University); Wang, Joseph Tao-yi (National Taiwan University) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates how Confucianism affects individual decision making in Taiwan and in China. We found that Chinese subjects in our experiments became less accepting of Confucian values, such that they became significantly more risk loving, less loss averse, and more impatient after being primed with Confucianism, whereas Taiwanese subjects became significantly less present-based and were inclined to be more trustworthy after being primed by Confucianism. Combining the evidence from the incentivized laboratory experiments and subjective survey measures, we found evidence that Chinese subjects and Taiwanese subjects reacted differently to Confucianism. |
| Keywords: | social norm, Confucianism, time preferences, risk aversion, trust |
| JEL: | C91 Z10 |
| Date: | 2013–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7684&r=evo |
| By: | John E. Roemer (Dept. of Political Science, Yale University) |
| Abstract: | Although evidence accrues in biology, anthropology and experimental economics that homo sapiens is a cooperative species, the reigning assumption in economic theory is that individuals optimize in an autarkic manner (as in Nash and Walrasian equilibrium). I here postulate a cooperative kind of optimizing behavior, called Kantian. It is shown that in simple economic models, when there are negative externalities (such as congestion effects from use of a commonly owned resource) or positive externalities (such as a social ethos reflected in individuals’ preferences), Kantian equilibria dominate Nash-Walras equilibria in terms of efficiency. While economists schooled in Nash equilibrium may view the Kantian behavior as utopian, there is some -- perhaps much -- evidence that it exists. If cultures evolve through group selection, the hypothesis that Kantian behavior is more prevalent than we may think is supported by the efficiency results here demonstrated. |
| Keywords: | Kantian equilibrium, Social ethos, Implementation |
| JEL: | D60 D62 D64 C70 H30 |
| Date: | 2012–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1854r&r=evo |
| By: | Anil Alpman (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a new theory of social norms that explores the relation between individuals' income, time allocation decisions, and consumption choices on the one hand, and the determinants of individuals' decision to conform or not to social norms on the other. It is shown that rational consumers may obey inefficient social norms, which in turn would slow economic development. An empirical test of the model is performed for different categories of countries using the World Values Survey, a voluminous cross-country micro dataset. The results yield the gain and the cost of disobeying inefficient social norms, the latter of which can be used as an indicator of social pressure regarding conformity. |
| Keywords: | Social norms, social interactions, consumer behavior, household production, economic development, social pressure indicator. |
| JEL: | D11 D12 O43 Z13 |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:13038r&r=evo |
| By: | Pauline Grosjean (School of Economics, Australian School of Business, the University of New South Wales) |
| Abstract: | This paper uses new micro-level evidence from a nationally representative survey of 39,500 individuals in 35 countries to shed light on how individual experiences of conflict shape political and social preferences. The investigation covers World War II and recent civil conflict. Overwhelmingly, the results point to the negative and enduring legacy of war-related violence on political trust and perceived effectiveness of national institutions, although the effects are heterogeneous across different types (external vs. internal) and outcomes (victory vs. defeat) of conflict. Conflict spurs collective action, but of a dark nature, one associated with further erosion of social and political trust. |
| Keywords: | Conflict, social capital, state capacity, Europe, Caucasus, Central Asia |
| JEL: | N24 O57 Z13 |
| Date: | 2013–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:swe:wpaper:2013-29&r=evo |
| By: | Collin Raymond; Daniel J. Benjamin; Matthew Rabin |
| Abstract: | People believe that, even in very large samples, proportions of binary signals might depart significantly from the population mean.� We model this "non-belief in the Law of Large Numbers" by assuming that a person believes that proportions in any given sample might be determined by a rate different than the true rate.� In prediction, a non-believer expects the distribution of signals will have fat tails, more so for larger samples.� In inference, a non-believer remains uncertain and influenced by priors even after observing an arbitrarily large sample.� We explore implications for beliefs and behavior in a variety of economic settings. |
| Keywords: | learning, non-Bayesian updating, behavioral economics, information economics |
| JEL: | B49 D03 D14 D83 G11 |
| Date: | 2013–09–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:672&r=evo |