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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Binzel, Christine; Fehr, Dietmar |
| Abstract: | Among residents of an informal housing area in Cairo, we examine how dictator giving varies by the social distance between subjects - friend versus stranger - and by the anonymity of the dictator. While giving to strangers is high under anonymity, we find - consistent with Leider et al. (2009) - that (i) a decrease in social distance increases giving, (ii) giving to a stranger and to a friend is positively correlated, and (iii) more altruistic dictators increase their giving less under non-anonymity than less altruistic dictators. However, friends are not alike in their altruistic preferences, suggesting that an individual's intrinsic preferences may not necessarily be shaped by his (or her) peers. Instead, reciprocal motives seem important, indicating that social relationships may be valued differently when individuals are financially dependent on them. -- |
| Keywords: | giving,reciprocity,social distance,networks, sorting |
| JEL: | C93 D64 L14 O12 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2013207&r=evo |
| By: | Gilles Grolleau (Unité MIAJ - INRA - Mathématiques et Informatique Appliquées - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA)); Angela Sutan (ESC Dijon Bourgogne - ESC Dijon Bourgogne); Radu Vranceanu (Economics Department - ESSEC Business School) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the dynamics of cooperation in public good games when contributions to the public good are immediately redistributed across contributors (intra-temporal transfers) and when contributions to the public good by the current group are transferred over time to a future group (inter-temporal transfers). We show that people are more cooperative in inter-temporal contexts than in intra-temporal contexts. We also find that subjects invest more on average in public goods when they know in advance their inheritance from the past. |
| Keywords: | Public goods ; Voluntary contribution mechanism ; Inter-temporal vs intra-temporal transfers ; Sustainable development |
| Date: | 2013–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00866970&r=evo |
| By: | de Haan, Thomas; van Veldhuizen, Roel |
| Abstract: | We investigate whether depleting people's cognitive resources (or willpower) affects the degree to which they are susceptible to framing effects. Recent research in social psychology and economics has suggested that willpower is a resource that can be temporarily depleted and that a depleted level of willpower is associated with self-control problems in a variety of contexts. In this study, we extend the willpower depletion paradigm to framing effects and argue that willpower depletion should increase framing effects. To test this we designed two experiments in which we depleted participants' willpower and subsequently had them take part in a series of tasks, including a framed prisoner's dilemma, an attraction effect task, a compromise effect task, and an anchoring task. However, we find no evidence that framing effects were indeed more prevalent in willpower-depleted participants than in controls. -- |
| Keywords: | willpower,ego depletion,framing,willpower depletion,experiment,behavioral economics |
| JEL: | D81 C91 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2013206&r=evo |
| By: | Andrei Kirilyuk (Solid State Theory Department - Institute of Metal Physics of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine) |
| Abstract: | We analyse the unreduced, nonperturbative dynamics of an arbitrary many-body interaction process with the help of the generalised effective potential method and reveal the well-specified universal origin of change (emergence), time and evolution in an a priori conservative, time-independent system. It appears together with the universal dynamic complexity definition, where this unified complexity conservation and transformation constitutes the essence of evolution. We then consider the detailed structure of this universal evolutionary process showing its step-wise, "punctuated" character, now provided with the exact mathematical description. Comparing the expected features of a revolutionary complexity transition near a step-like complexity upgrade with the currently observed behaviour of world's social and economic systems, we prove the necessity of complexity revolution towards the superior civilisation level of well-defined nature, the only alternative being an equally dramatic and irreversible degradation, irrespective of efforts applied to stop the crisis at the current totally saturated complexity level. |
| Keywords: | complexity; chaos; self-organisation; fractal; many-body problem; origin of time; revolution of complexity |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00760100&r=evo |
| By: | Laurent Lehmann; Georg Nöldeke; Jorge Peña (University of Basel) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we unify, simplify, and extend previous work on the evolutionary dynamics of symmetric N-player matrix games with two pure strategies. In such games, gains from switching strategies depend, in general, on how many other individuals in the group play a given strategy. As a consequence, the gain function determining the gradient of selection can be a polynomial of degree N-1. In order to deal with the intricacy of the resulting evolutionary dynamics, we make use of the theory of polynomials in Bernstein form. This theory implies a tight link between the sign pattern of the gains from switching on the one hand and the number and stability properties of the rest points of the replicator dynamics on the other hand. While this relationship is a general one, it is most informative if gains from switching have at most two sign changes, as it is the case for most multi-player matrix games considered in the literature. We demonstrate that previous results for public goods games are easily recovered and extended using this observation. Further examples illustrate how focusing on the sign pattern of the gains from switching obviates the need for a more involved analysis. |
| Keywords: | evolutionary game theory, multi-player matrix games, replicator dynamics, public goods games, gains from switching, polynomials in Bernstein form 2 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2013/13&r=evo |
| By: | Frédéric Schneider; Roberto A. Weber |
| Abstract: | We study how the willingness to enter long-term bilateral relationships affects cooperation even when parties have little information about each other, ex ante, and cooperation is otherwise unenforceable. We experimentally investigate a finitely-repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, allowing players to endogenously select interaction durations. Consistent with prior research, longer interactions facilitate cooperation. However, many individuals avoid long-term commitment, with uncooperative types less likely to commit than conditional cooperators. Endogenously chosen long-term commitment yields higher cooperation rates (98% in one condition) than exogenously imposed commitment. Thus, the willingness to enter into long-term relationships provides a means for fostering - and screening for - efficient cooperation. |
| Keywords: | Repeated games, cooperation, voluntary commitment |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D03 |
| Date: | 2013–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:130&r=evo |
| By: | Maxim Kotsemir (National Research University Higher School of Economics, Institute for Statistical Studies and Economics of Knowledge, Research Laboratory for Science and Technology Studies, Junior Research Fellow.); Alexander Abroskin (National Research University Higher School of Economics; Institute for Statistical Studies and Economics of Knowledge, Department for Strategic Foresight, Chief Research Fellow, Associate Professor, Doctor of science); Dirk Meissner (National Research University Higher School of Economics, Institute for Statistical Studies and Economics of Knowledge, Research Laboratory for Science and Technology Studies, Deputy Laboratory Head.) |
| Abstract: | This paper is devoted to the analysis of evolution of innovation concepts, aspects and types. First emergence and evolution of different aspects and concepts of innovation are analyzed, and then the development of innovation concepts from a historical perspective and finally an overview of the types of innovation classifications developed in the literature are given. Complementary the different definitions of innovation are described and analyzed in detail. The main goal of the article is to identify, describe and visualize the development trend of innovation conceptualization and understanding over time |
| Keywords: | innovation concepts, innovation types, aspects of innovation, innovation systems, innovation ecosystems, typology of innovation, product innovation, process innovation, service innovation, marketing innovation, organization innovation, business innovation |
| JEL: | B10 B20 O31 O32 O33 Q55 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:wpbrp05sti2013&r=evo |
| By: | Gilles Pison (INED) |
| Abstract: | Every other year, Population and Societies publishes a special issue called The population of the world, presenting an overall picture of the situation across the globe. There are slightly more than 7 billion humans on the planet in 2013. The world population has risen seven-fold over the last two hundred years and is expected to reach 10 or 11 billion by the end of the twenty-first century. |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idg:posoce:503&r=evo |
| By: | Irigoin, Maria Alejandra; Grafe, Regina |
| Abstract: | The great merit of North’s and Weingast’s insight into the importance of a ruler’s credible commitment to protecting property rights is that it is both parsimonious and it lends itself beautifully to generalizations. It has e.g. inspired the economic literature on the importance of legal origins” (LaPorta et al., 1998, 2008), which seemed to vindicate the notion that post-Glorious Revolution English institutions were particularly conducive to economic growth. More recently economists have acknowledged that growth in fact depends on state capacity. This encompasses not only investor protection (legal capacity) but also the ability of the state to finance itself, fiscal capacity. (Besley and Persson, 2009, 2010) show that the protection of private property rights and that of public property rights to taxation are linked and most likely co-evolutionary. However, the precise relation between the two is anything but clear. This paper argues that North’s and Weingast’s models one-sided focus on state coercion that threatened subject’ property rights has obscured the relation between coercion used in revenue collection and total revenue role of fiscal capacity. We suggest a very simple model to show that this relationship between state fiscal capacity and legal capacity is not linear, especially in the phase of nation state building. Before 1800 states faced one of two very different central challenges. 1) States that already exhibited high levels of coercion had to try to keep in check the ruler’s potential for predation as North and Weingast argued. 2) States that used very low levels of coercion faced a coordination problem instead of a predation issue. The case of Spain provides empirical evidence for the existence of states where an increase in coercion would have improved fiscal capacity, but high levels of legal capacity paradoxically prevented the ruler from adopting this path. Finally, we use financial market developments to show the serious welfare implications that resulted from such a lack of coordination and integration. |
| JEL: | N0 D72 K0 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:wpaper:44492&r=evo |