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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Asongu Simplice (Yaoundé/Cameroun); Oasis Kodila-Tedika (Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo) |
| Abstract: | The paper extends Breggren et al. (2008, EE) on ‘trust and growth: a shaky relationship” by incorporating recent developments in the trust-growth literature and using a robust methodological underpinning that accounts for the presence of outliers. The empirical evidence is based on 63 countries. Two main findings are established. Firstly, the substantially documented positive trust-growth nexus is broadly confirmed. Secondly, when initial levels of growth come into play in determining the relationship, only 0.25 and 0.90 quantiles confirm the positive nexus. The results suggest that the trust-growth nexus cannot be generalized for all countries as some previous studies have concluded. Accordingly, trust-growth policies should be contingent on existing levels of development and tailored differently across rich and poor countries. |
| Keywords: | Trust; Growth; Conditional Effects |
| JEL: | A13 O40 Z13 |
| Date: | 2013–05–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:agd:wpaper:13/024&r=evo |
| By: | Brendan Daley; Philipp Sadowski |
| Abstract: | We establish that in the Prisoners’ Dilemma, the model of Daley and Sadowski (2013) is logically distinct from three models that employ well-known forms of other regarding preferences - altruism (Ledyard, 1995; Levine, 1998), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and reciprocity (Rabin, 1993). |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:duk:dukeec:13-18&r=evo |
| By: | Catia Batista (Faculdade de Economia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa and IZA); Dan Silverman (Arizona State University and NBER); Dean Yang (Department of Economics and Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan, NBER, and BREAD) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the determinants of giving in a lab-in-the-field experiment with large stakes. Study participants in urban Mozambique play dictator games where their counterpart is the closest person to them outside their household. Dictators share more with counterparts when they have the option of giving in kind (in the form of goods), compared to giving that must be in cash. Qualitative post-experiment responses suggest that this effect is driven by a desire to control how recipients use gifted resources. Standard economic determinants such as the rate of return to giving and the size of the endowment also affect giving, but the effects of even large changes in these determinants are significantly smaller than the effect of the in-kind option. Our results support theories of giving where the utility of givers depends on the composition (not just the level) of gift-recipient expenditures, and givers thus seek control over transferred resources. |
| Keywords: | sharing, altruism, giving, dictator game, inter-household transfers, Mozambique |
| JEL: | C92 C93 D01 D03 D64 O17 |
| Date: | 2013–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:1321&r=evo |
| By: | Kaplan, Todd; Ruffle, Bradley; Shtudiner, Zeev |
| Abstract: | Sometimes cooperation between two parties requires exactly one to cede to the other. If the decisions whether to cede are made simultaneously, then neither or both may acquiesce leading to an inefficient outcome. However, inefficiency may be avoided if a party can wait to see what the other does. We experimentally test whether adding a waiting option to such a two-player cooperation game enhances cooperation. Although subjects cede less overall with the waiting option, we show that they coordinate more and consequently achieve higher profits. Yet, a dark side overhangs waiting: the least cooperative pairs do worse with this option. They wait not to facilitate coordination but to disguise their entry. |
| Keywords: | cooperation, endogenous timing, social dilemmas |
| JEL: | C9 Z13 |
| Date: | 2013–09–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:50096&r=evo |
| By: | Tsusaka, Takuji W.; Kajisa, Kei; Pede, Valerien O.; Aoyagi, Keitaro |
| Abstract: | Artefactual field experiments, spatial econometrics, and household survey are blended in a single study to investigate how the experience of collective irrigation management in the real world facilitates the spillover of social behaviour among neighbours. The dictator and public goods games are conducted among irrigated and non-irrigated rice farmers in the Philippines. The spillover effect is found only among irrigated farmers. In the public goods game, punishment through social disapproval reduces free-riding more effectively among irrigated farmers. These indicate that strengthened ties among neighbours are likely to induce the spillover of social norms together with an effective punishment mechanism. |
| Keywords: | behavioural games, artefactual field experiments, spatial econometrics, dictator game, public goods game, irrigation, social norms |
| JEL: | C59 D01 Q25 |
| Date: | 2013–07–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:50162&r=evo |
| By: | Kohei Daido (School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University); Ken Tabata (School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the role played by the social norms of working hours in a household labor- leisure and fertility decision model. We suppose that social norms enforce workers not to deviate from the ideal level of working hours, which depends on past and current observations of working hours in workplaces. We show that the social norms lead to multiple equilibria: one with long working hours and a low fertility rate and another with short working hours and a high fertility rate. Our results may help to explain the long working hours and low fertility rate that are observed in Japan. |
| Keywords: | Fertility, Work-life balance, Social norms, Peer effects |
| JEL: | O40 J11 J22 |
| Date: | 2013–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kgu:wpaper:108&r=evo |
| By: | Brendan Daley; Philipp Sadowski |
| Abstract: | We provide axiomatic foundations for a simple model of play in the prisoners’ dilemma. The model accommodates cooperation and suggests that players behave as if their expectations about their opponents’ behavior vary with their own choice. We refer to this nonstandard updating as magical thinking. The degree to which players exhibit magical thinking may be heterogeneous in the population and is captured by a uniquely identified parameter for each player. Further, it is as if all players perceive these parameters to be i.i.d. draws from a common distribution. The model’s identification allows for tractable comparative statics. |
| Keywords: | Prisoners’ dilemma, magical thinking, cooperation |
| JEL: | C7 D8 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:duk:dukeec:13-17&r=evo |
| By: | Francesconi, Marco (University of Essex); Ghiglino, Christian (University of Essex); Perry, Motty (Department of Economics, University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | We present a game theoretic model to explain why people form life long monogamous families. Three components are essential in our framework, paternal investment, fatherhood uncertainty, and, perhaps the most distinctive feature of all, the overlap of children of different ages. When all three conditions are present, monogamy is the most efficient form of sexual organization in the sense that it yields greater survivorship than serial monogamy, group marriage, and polygyny. Monogamy is also the only conguration that fosters altruistic ties among siblings. Finally, our result sheds light to the understanding of why most religions center around the monogamous delity family. JEL classification: Overlapping generations ; Free riding ; Kinship systems ; Religion JEL codes: C72 ; D01 ; D10 ; J12 ; Z13 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1028&r=evo |
| By: | Yann Algan; Thierry Mayer; Mathias Thoenig |
| Abstract: | This paper aims at studying how economic incentives influence cultural transmission. We do so in the context of naming decisions, a crucial expression of cultural identity. Our focus is on Arabic versus Non- Arabic names given by parents to their newborn babies in France over the 2003-2007 period. Our model of cultural transmission disentangles between three determinants: (i) vertical transmission of parental culture; (ii) horizontal influence from the neighborhood; (iii) economic penalty associated with names that sound culturally distinctive. Our identification is based on the sample of households being exogenously allocated across public housings dwellings. We find that economic incentives largely influence naming choices: In the absence of economic penalty, the annual number of babies born with an Arabic name would have been more than 50 percent larger. Our theory-based estimates allow us to perform a welfare analysis where we gauge the strength of cultural attachment in monetary units. We find that the vertical transmission of an Arabic name provides the same shift in parents’ utility as a 3% rise in lifetime income of the child. |
| Keywords: | Cultural transmission;Choice of first names |
| JEL: | D10 |
| Date: | 2013–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cii:cepidt:2013-25&r=evo |