nep-evo New Economics Papers
on Evolutionary Economics
Issue of 2013‒07‒05
six papers chosen by
Matthew Baker
City University of New York

  1. The Evolutionary Robustness of Forgiveness and Cooperation By Pedro Dal Bó; Enrique R. Pujals
  2. Does willful ignorance deflect punishment? – An experimental study By Björn Bartling; Florian Engl; Roberto A. Weber
  3. Cooperation makes it happen? Groundwater management in Aguascalientes, Mexico: An experimental approach By Du Bois, Rodrigo Salcedo; Macias, Miguel Angel Gutierrez
  4. Non-Strategic Punishment when Monitoring is Costly: Experimental Evidence on Differences between Second and Third Party Behavior By Goeschl, Timo; Jarke, Johannes
  5. Justice among strangers. On altruism, inequality aversion and fairness By Luciano Andreozzi; Matteo Ploner; Ivan Soraperra
  6. An Adaptive Learning Model in Coordination Games By Naoki Funai

  1. By: Pedro Dal Bó; Enrique R. Pujals
    Abstract: We study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in innitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. The evolutionary process we consider is given by the replicator dynamics. We show that there are strategies with a uniformly large basin of attraction independent of the size of the population. Moreover, we show that those strategies forgive defections and, assuming that they are symmetric, they cooperate. We provide partial eciency results for asymmetric strategies.
    Keywords: #
    Date: 2013
  2. By: Björn Bartling; Florian Engl; Roberto A. Weber
    Abstract: This paper studies whether people can avoid punishment by remaining willfully ignorant about possible negative consequences of their actions for others. We employ a laboratory experiment, using modified dictator games in which a dictator can remain willfully ignorant about the payoff consequences of his decision for a receiver. A third party can punish the dictator after observing the dictator’s decision and the resulting payoffs. On the one hand, willfully ignorant dictators are punished less if their actions lead to unfair outcomes than dictators who reveal the consequences before implementing the same outcome. On the other hand, willfully ignorant dictators are punished more than revealing dictators if their actions do not lead to unfair outcomes. We conclude that willful ignorance can circumvent blame when unfair outcomes result, but that the act of remaining willfully ignorant is itself punished, regardless of the outcome.
    Keywords: Willful ignorance, third party punishment, dictator game, fairness
    JEL: C91 D63
    Date: 2013–06
  3. By: Du Bois, Rodrigo Salcedo; Macias, Miguel Angel Gutierrez
    Abstract: This research develops economic framed field experiments in order to analyze the attitude and behavior of farm groundwater users in several fictional situations, including adoption of efficient irrigation technology and compliance of group arrangements. A groundwater game was played by 256 farmers selected from different regions of the state of Aguascalientes, Mexico.
    Keywords: Common pool resource management, groundwater, efficient irrigation technologies, strategic behavior, behavioral economics, economic framed field experiments, Latin America, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,
    Date: 2013
  4. By: Goeschl, Timo; Jarke, Johannes
    Abstract: This paper studies monitoring and punishment behavior by second and third parties in a cooperation experiment with endogenous information structures: Players are uninformed whether the target player cooperated or defected at the cooperation stage, but can decide to resolve the information imperfection at non-negative cost at the punishment stage. We examine how monitoring and punishment respond to changes in monitoring costs, and exploit the evidence to gain new insights about commonalities and differences between second and third party behavior. We establish three effects of positive monitoring costs relative to the zero-cost baseline and find that each one affects third parties differently than second parties: A «direct punishment cost effect» (the supply of non-strategic punishment decreases), a «blind punishment effect» (players punish without resolving the information imperfection) and a «diffusion effect» (defectors make up a smaller share of the punished and receive weaker punishment). The first effect affects third parties less, the other two more. As a result, third party punishment leads to increasingly weaker incentives for cooperation relative to second party punishment as monitoring costs rise. In addition, the differences between second and third parties suggest the presence of a «pure role effect»: Taking into account elicited beliefs and risk preferences, third parties punish differently from second parties, not just more weakly.
    Keywords: monitoring; punishment; sanctions; information; cooperation
    Date: 2013–06–26
  5. By: Luciano Andreozzi; Matteo Ploner; Ivan Soraperra
    Abstract: We present an axiomatic model of choice involving two agents, motivated by the experimental evidence on non-selfish preferences. We distinguish two classes of social preferences, depending on whether they are or not separable. Altruism and spite (Andreoni & Miller, 2002; Cox et al., 2007) are separable, while the various forms of inequality aversion are not (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Charness & Rabin, 2002). Separable and non-separable preferences give very close predictions when only sure outcomes are involved, but they make opposite predictions in choices involving lotteries. We show this by proposing a generalization of expected utility that accounts for preferences for “fair procedures”, which violate the independence axiom. An experimental test of the model reveals little evidence of ex-post inequality aversion, even when non-expected utility preferences are accounted for.
    Date: 2013
  6. By: Naoki Funai
    Abstract: In this paper, we provide a theoretical prediction of the way in which adaptive players behave in the long run in games with strict Nash equilibria. In the model, each player picks the action which has the highest assessment, which is a weighted average of past payoffs. Each player updates his assessment of the chosen action in an adaptive manner. Almost sure convergence to a Nash equilibrium is shown under one of the following conditions: (i) that, at any non-Nash equilbrium action profile, there exists a player who can find another action which gives always better payoffs than his current payoff, (ii) that all non-Nash equilibrium action profiles give the same payoff. We show almost sure convergence to a Nash equilibrium in the following games: pure coordination games; the battle of the sexes games; the stag hunt game; and the first order static game. In the game of chicken and market entry games, players may end up playing a maximum action profile.
    Keywords: Adaptive Learning, Coordination Games
    JEL: C72 D83
    Date: 2013–06

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