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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Uri Gneezy; Alex Imas; Kristóf Madarász |
| Abstract: | We develop a dynamic model where people decide in the presence of moral constraints and test the predictions of the model through two experiments. Norm violations induce a temporal feeling of guilt that depreciates with time. Due to such fluctuations of guilt, people exhibit an endogenous temporal inconsistency in social preferences—a behavior we term conscience accounting. In our experiments people first have to make an ethical decision, and subsequently decide whether to donate to charity. We find that those who chose unethically were more likely to donate than those who did not. As predicted, donation rates were higher when the opportunity to donate came sooner after the unethical choice than later. Combined, our theoretical and empirical findings suggest a mechanism by which prosocial behavior is likely to occur within temporal brackets following an unethical choice. |
| Keywords: | Emotions, Temporal Brackets, Deception, Prosocial Behavior |
| JEL: | D03 |
| Date: | 2012–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:stitep:/2012/563&r=evo |
| By: | Giuseppe Albanese (Bank of Italy); Guido de Blasio (Bank of Italy); Paolo Sestito (Bank of Italy) |
| Abstract: | This paper considers the role of preferences in explaining trust. By using the Bank of ItalyÂ’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), the paper shows that time preferences and risk preferences are key covariates of self-reported trust. They both predict negatively a measure of generalized trust; however, risk aversion is positively correlated with an index of particularized trusting behaviour (which refers to family and friends). Moreover, the results are robust to using a different data source to gauge the role of social preferences and personality traits. The study highlights that neglecting preferences when analysing the role of trust in explaining socio-economic outcomes might pose serious challenges in terms of omitted variables. |
| Keywords: | trust, preferences, survey data |
| JEL: | D1 D8 Z1 |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_911_13&r=evo |
| By: | Andries Richter (Centre for Ecological and Evolutionary Synthesis (CEES), University of Oslo, Norway, and Department of Mathematical Statistical Methods, Wageningen University, the Netherlands); Daan van Soest (Department of Spatial Economics and IVM, VU University Amsterdam, Department of Economics, Tilburg University, the Netherlands); Johan Grasman (Department of Mathematical and Statistical Methods, Wageningen University, the Netherlands) |
| Abstract: | Real world observations suggest that social norms of cooperation can be effective in overcoming social dilemmas such as the joint management of a common pool resource – but also that they can be subject to slow erosion and sudden collapse. We show that these patterns of erosion and collapse emerge endogenously in a model of a closed community harvesting a renewable natural resource in which individual agents face the temptation to overexploit the resource, while a cooperative harvesting norm spreads through the community via interpersonal relations. We analyze under what circumstances small changes in key parameters (including the size of the community, and the rate of technological progress) trigger catastrophic transitions from relatively high levels of cooperation to widespread norm violation – causing the social-ecological system to collapse. |
| Keywords: | Social Norms, Common Pool Resource, Co-Evolution, Resilience, Alternative Stable States |
| JEL: | C73 D62 D64 Q20 |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2013.36&r=evo |
| By: | Brito, Paulo; Datta, Bipasa; Dixon, Huw (Cardiff Business School) |
| Abstract: | This paper adopts an evolutionary perspective on the rent-extraction model with conjectural variations (CV). We analyze the global dynamics of the model with three CVs under the replicator equation. We find that the end points of the evolutionary dynamics include the pure-strategy consistent CVs. However, there are also mixed-strategy equilibria that occur. These are on the boundaries between the basins of attraction of the pure-strategy sinks. We develop a more general notion of consistency which applies to mixed-strategy equilibria. In a three conjecture example, we find that in contrast to the pure-strategy equilibria, the mixed-strategy equilibria are not ESS: under the replicator dynamics, there are three or four mixed equilibria that may either be totally unstable, or saddle-stable. There also exist heteroclinic orbits that link equilibria together. |
| Keywords: | Rent-extraction; evolutionary dynamics; consistent conjectures; global dynamics; mixed-strategy |
| JEL: | D03 L15 H0 |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2012/23&r=evo |
| By: | Korenok Oleg (Department of Economics, VCU School of Business); Edward L. Millner (Department of Economics, VCU School of Business); Laura Razzolini (Department of Economics, VCU School of Business) |
| Abstract: | We answer the question: Is giving equivalent to not taking? We show that, if giving is equivalent to not taking, impure altruism could account for List's (2007) finding that the payoff to recipients in a dictator game decreases when the dictator has the option to take. We examine behavior in dictator games with different taking options but equivalent final payoffs. We find that the recipients tend to earn more as the amount the dictator must take to achieve a given final payoff increases. We conclude that not taking is not equivalent to giving and agree with List (2007) that the current social preference models fail to rationalize the observed data. |
| Keywords: | Dictator Game; Impure Altruism; Taking |
| JEL: | C91 D01 D64 H30 H41 |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vcu:wpaper:1301&r=evo |
| By: | Heinrich H. Nax (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales [EHESS] - Ecole des Ponts ParisTech - Ecole normale supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA), EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris); Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew (Department of Zoology - University of Oxford (UK)); Stuart A. West (Department of Zoology - University of Oxford (UK)); H. Peyton Young (Department of Economics - University of Oxford (UK)) |
| Abstract: | Many interactive environments can be represented as games, but they are so large and complex that individual players are in the dark about what others are doing and how their own payo s are a ected. This paper analyzes learning behavior in such 'black box' environments, where players' only source of information is their own history of actions taken and payoff s received. Speci fically we study repeated public goods games, where players must decide how much to contribute at each stage, but they do not know how much others have contributed or how others' contributions a effect their own payoff s. We identify two key features of the players' learning dynamics. First, if a player's realized payoff increases he is less inclined to change his strategy, whereas if his realized payo ff decreases he is more inclined to change his strategy. Second, if increasing his own contribution results in higher payoff s he will tend to increase his contribution still further, whereas the reverse holds if an increase in contribution leads to lower payo ffs. These two e ffects are clearly present when players have no information about the game; moreover they are still present even when players have full information. Convergence to Nash equilibrium occurs at about the same rate in both situations. |
| Keywords: | Learning ; Information ; Public goods games |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:hal-00817201&r=evo |
| By: | Luis Rayo (London School of Economics); Arthur Robson (Simon Fraser University) |
| Abstract: | Why did evolution not give us a utility function that is offspring alone? Why do we care intrinsically about other outcomes, such as food, and what determines the intensity of such preferences? A common view is that such other outcomes enhance fitness and the intensity of our preference for a given outcome is proportional to its contribution to fitness. We argue that this view is incomplete. Specifically, we show that in the presence of informational asymmetries, the evolutionarily most desirable preference for a given outcome is determined not only by the significance of the outcome, but by the Agent's degree of ignorance regarding its significance. Our model also sheds light on the phenomena of peer effects and prepared learning, whereby some peer attitudes are more influential than others. |
| Keywords: | Utility, Biological evolution |
| JEL: | D01 D80 |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1893&r=evo |