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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Matteo. Ploner (University of Trento, CEEL, Italy); Tobias Regner (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena, Germany) |
| Abstract: | In our experiment, a dictator game variant, the reported outcome of a die roll determines the endowment (low/high) in a subsequent dictator game. In one treatment the experimenter is present and no cheating is possible, while in another subjects can enter the result of the roll themselves. Moral self-image is also manipulated in the experiment preceding ours. The aim of this experimental set up is to analyze dynamic aspects of moral behavior. When cheating is possible, substantially more high endowments are claimed and transfers of high-endowed dictators are bigger than when cheating is not possible (mediated by the preceding moral self-image manipulation). The preceding manipulations also have a direct effect on generosity, when subjects have to report the roll of the die truthfully. Moral balancing appears to be an important factor in individual decision making. |
| Keywords: | honesty, moral balancing, self-image, dictator game, experiments, ethical behavior |
| JEL: | C91 D03 |
| Date: | 2013–01–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2013-002&r=evo |
| By: | Roman M. Sheremeta (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University); Jingjing Zhang (University of Zurich) |
| Abstract: | We examine behavior in a three-player trust game in which the first player may invest in the second and the second may invest in the third. Any amount sent from one player to the next is tripled. The third player decides the final allocation among three players. The baseline treatment with no communication shows that the first and second players send significant amounts and the third player reciprocates. Allowing insider communication between the second and the third players increases cooperation between these two. Interestingly, there is an external effect of insider communication: the first player who is outside communication sends 54% more and receives 289% more than in the baseline treatment. As a result, insider communication increases efficiency from 44% to 68%. |
| Keywords: | three-player trust games, experiments, reciprocity, communication |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D72 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:13-03&r=evo |
| By: | Engelmann, Dirk; Nikiforakis, Nikos |
| Abstract: | We investigate whether peer punishment is an efficient mechanism for enforcing cooperation in an experiment with a long time horizon. Previous evidence suggests that the costs of peer punishment can be outweighed by the benefits of higher cooperation, if (i ) there is a sufficiently long time horizon and (ii ) punishment cannot be avenged. However, in most instances in daily life, when individuals interact for an extended period of time, punishment can be retaliated. We use a design that imposes minimal restrictions on who can punish whom or when, and allows participants to employ a wide range of punishment strategies including retaliation of punishment. Similar to previous research, we find that, when punishment cannot be avenged, peer punishment leads to higher earnings relative to a baseline treatment without any punishment opportunities. However, in the more general setting, we find no evidence of group earnings increasing over time relative to the baseline treatment. Our results raise questions under what conditions peer punishment can be an efficient mechanism for enforcing cooperation. |
| Keywords: | altruistic punishment , counter-punishment , public good game , feuds |
| JEL: | C92 D70 H41 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mnh:wpaper:32651&r=evo |
| By: | Roman M. Sheremeta (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University); Matthew W. McCarter (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | A common finding in social sciences is that member change hinders group functioning and performance. However, questions remain as to why member change negatively affects group performance and what are some ways to alleviate the negative effects of member change on performance? To answer these questions we conduct an experiment in which we investigate the effect of newcomers on a group’s ability to coordinate efficiently. Participants play a coordination game in a four-person group for the first part of the experiment, and then two members of the group are replaced with new participants, and the newly formed group plays the game for the second part of the experiment. Our results show that the arrival of newcomers decreases trust among group members and this decrease in trust negatively affects group performance. Knowing the performance history of the arriving newcomers mitigates the negative effect of their arrival, but only when newcomers also know the oldtimers performance history. Surprisingly, in groups that performed poorly prior to the newcomers’ arrival, the distrust generated by newcomers is mainly between oldtimers about each other rather than about the newcomers. |
| Keywords: | coordination, group performance, oldtimers, newcomers, trust, experiments |
| JEL: | C72 C91 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:13-02&r=evo |
| By: | Alger, Ingela (TSE (LERNA, CNRS) Univesité Toulouse 1 Capitole); Cox, Donald (Boston College) |
| Abstract: | What can evolutionary biology tell us about male-female differences in preferences concerning family matters? Might mothers be more solicitous toward offspring than fathers, for example? The economics literature has documented gender differences—children benefit more from money put in the hands of mothers rather than fathers, for example—and these differences are thought to be partly due to preferences. Yet for good reason family economics is mostly concerned with how prices and incomes affect behavior against a backdrop of exogenous preferences. Evolutionary biology complements this approach by treating preferences as the outcome of natural selection. We mine the well-developed biological literature to make a prima facie case for evolutionary roots of parental preferences. We consider the most rudimentary of traits—sex differences in gamete size and internal fertilization—and explain how they have been thought to generate malefemale differences in altruism toward children and other preferences related to family behavior. The evolutionary approach to the family illuminates connections between issues typically thought distinct in family economics, such as parental care and marriage markets. |
| Date: | 2012–12–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:26680&r=evo |
| By: | Lindgren, Kristian; Verendel, Vilhelm |
| Abstract: | The finitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma is a good illustration of the discrepancy between the strategic behaviour suggested by a game-theoretic analysis and the behaviour often observed among human players, where cooperation is maintained through most of the game. A game-theoretic reasoning based on backward induction eliminates strategies step by step until defection from the first round is the only remaining choice, reflecting the Nash equilibrium of the game. We investigate the Nash equilibrium solution for two different sets of strategies in an evolutionary context, using replicator-mutation dynamics. The first set consists of conditional cooperators, up to a certain round, while the second set in addition to these contains two strategy types that react differently on the first round action: The "Convincer" strategies insist with two rounds of initial cooperation, trying to establish more cooperative play in the game, while the "Follower" strategies, although being first round defectors, have the capability to respond to an invite in the first round. For both of these strategy sets, iterated elimination of strategies shows that the only Nash equilibria are given by defection from the first round. We show that the evolutionary dynamics of the first set is always characterised by a stable fixed point, corresponding to the Nash equilibrium, if the mutation rate is sufficiently small (but still positive). The second strategy set is numerically investigated, and we find that there are regions of parameter space where fixed points become unstable and the dynamics exhibits cycles of different strategy compositions. The results indicate that, even in the limit of very small mutation rate, the replicator-mutation dynamics does not necessarily bring the system with Convincers and Followers to the fixed point corresponding to the Nash equilibrium of the game. We also perform a detailed analysis of how the evolutionary behaviour depends on payoffs, game length, and mutation rate. |
| Keywords: | backward induction; rationality; prisoners' dilemma; evolutionary dynamics |
| JEL: | C7 C73 C72 |
| Date: | 2013–01–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:43662&r=evo |
| By: | Katerina Straznicka (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne,F-69130 Ecully, France) |
| Abstract: | We examine the temporal stability of risk preference measures obtained by different elicitation methods in a controlled laboratory experiment at two distinct times. Our results indicate remarkable temporal stability of risk measures at the aggregated level and temporal instability at the individual level. We control for the impact of, first, personality traits, and second, performance realized in a market game. When better market performers demonstrate more stable risk preferences, the impact of personality traits is marginal. |
| Keywords: | Time stability, Risk Preferences, Personality Theory, Experimental economics |
| JEL: | C9 D8 D9 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1236&r=evo |
| By: | Bigoni, Maria (University of Bologna); Fort, Margherita (University of Bologna) |
| Abstract: | This paper presents an experiment on learning in repeated games, which complements the analysis of players' actual choices with data on the information acquisition process they follow. Subjects play a repeated Cournot oligopoly, with limited a priori information. The econometrics hinges on a model built upon Experience Weighted Attraction learning, and the simultaneous analysis of data on the information gathered and on actions taken by the subjects. Results suggest that learning is a composite process, in which different components coexist. Adaptive learning emerges as the leading element, but when subjects look at the strategies individually adopted by their competitors they tend to imitate the most successful behavior, which makes markets more competitive. Reinforcement learning also plays a role, as subjects favor strategies that have yielded higher profits in the past. |
| Keywords: | information, imitation, Cournot oligopoly, EWA learning |
| JEL: | L13 C92 C72 |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7125&r=evo |
| By: | Daniel L. McFadden |
| Abstract: | The neoclassical view of consumers as relentless egoistic maximizers is challenged by evidence from cognitive psychology, anthropology, evolutionary biology, and neurology. This paper begins by surveying the development of neoclassical consumer theory and the measurement of welfare, and expansions to encompass preference fields, nonlinear budgets, hedonic goods and household production, and consumption dynamics. Following this, it reviews the newer evidence on consumer behavior, and what this implies for the measurement of consumer beliefs, intentions, preferences, choices, and well-being. |
| JEL: | D03 D1 |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18687&r=evo |
| By: | Feinberg, Yossi (Stanford University) |
| Abstract: | We provide a tool to model and solve strategic situations where players' perceptions are limited, in the sense that they may only be aware of, or model, some of the aspects of the strategic situations at hand, as well as situations where players realize that other players' perceptions may be limited. We define normal, repeated, incomplete information and dynamic (extensive) form games with unawareness using a unified methodology. A game with unawareness is defined as a collection of standard games (of the corresponding form). The collection specifies how each player views the game, how she views the other players' perceptions of the game and so on. The modeler's description of perceptions, the players' description of other players' reasoning, etc. are shown to have consistent representations. We extend solution concepts such as rationalizability and Nash equilibrium to these games and study their properties. It is shown that while unawareness in normal form games can be mapped to incomplete information games, the extended Nash equilibrium solution is not mapped to a known solution concept in the equivalent incomplete information games, implying that games with unawareness generate novel types of behavior. |
| JEL: | C72 D81 D82 |
| Date: | 2012–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:stabus:2122&r=evo |
| By: | J. de la Horra Navarro; J. Miguel Marín; M. T. Rodríguez Bernal |
| Abstract: | Discrete time models are used in Ecology for describing the evolution of an agestructured population. Usually, they are considered from a deterministic viewpoint but, in practice, this is not very realistic. The statistical model we propose in this article is a reasonable model for the case in which the evolution of the population is described by means of a projection matrix. In this statistical model, fertility rates and survival rates are unknown parameters and they are estimated by using a Bayesian approach. Usual Bayesian and data cloning methods (based on Bayesian methodology) are applied to real data from the population of the Steller sea lions located in the Alaska coast since 1978 to 2004. The estimates obtained from these methods show a good behavior when they are compared to the actual values |
| Keywords: | Population projection matrices, Data cloning, Age-structured population, Leslie matrix, Bayesian MCMC algorithm |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:wsrepe:ws130102&r=evo |